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ABSTRACT
In September 1957, Little Rock, Arkansas was the scene of a dramatic
confrontation between federal and state government that brought to a head the southern
movement of massive resistance against the United States Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v.
Board of Education school desegregation ruling. Although numerous studies have analysed
the Little Rock crisis from a variety of perspectives, one striking omission in the existing
historiography is the role played by the local black community who were at the very centre
of events. Building upon recent local and state studies conducted by scholars of the civil
rights movement, this thesis locates the events in Little Rock of September 1957 within an
unfolding struggle for black rights at a local, state, regional and national level between
1940 and 1970. In so doing, the thesis seeks to revise the time-frame for black activism
imposed by a first wave of civil rights scholarship, which focused almost exclusively on
the role played by national civil rights organisations between 1955 and 1%5. It argues that
only by comprehending the groundwork laid in the 1940s and 1950s, through litigation and
voter registration drives at a grassroots level, can the significance of later black protests be
fully understood. In line with the findings of other state studies, it highlights the pivotal
role played by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
which, assisted by a nexus of local organisations, formed the backbone of early civil rights
struggles at a local level. Thus, the thesis aims not only to provide a corrective for the
existing gap in the historiography of the Little Rock school crisis, but also seeks to broaden
and deepen our understanding of the ways in which indigenous black movements
developed and sustained protest strategies at state and local levels across the South.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 1957, Governor Orval E. Faubus drew national and international
attention to Arkansas when he called out the troops of the National Guard to surround
Central High school in the state capital of Little Rock in order to prevent the implementation
of a court-ordered desegregation plan. In defying the local courts and, ultimately, the
United States Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation
decision, Faubus directly challenged the authority of the federal government as no other
elected southern politician had since the Civil War. Over the next few weeks frantic
negotiations took place between the White House and the governor's mansion that finally
led to the withdrawal of the National Guard. However, when nine black students attempted
to attend classes on September 23, an unruly white mob caused so much disruption that
school officials were forced to withdraw the black students for their own safety. The
scenes of violence finally prompted President Eisenhower to intervene in the crisis by
sending in federal troops to secure the safe passage of the black students into Central High.
On September 23, the nine black students finally completed their first day of classes under
armed escort.
Over the past forty years the Little Rock school crisis has been the subject of a great
deal of attention. Numerous first-hand accounts of the events provide us with a variety of
perspectives, including that of President Eisenhower, Congressman Brooks Hays,
Governor Orval Faubus, Superintendent of Schools Virgil Blossom, Little Rock's Mayor
Woodrow Mann, Arkansas Gazette editor Harry Ashmore, segregationist politician Dale
Alford and school teacher Elizabeth Huckaby. Secondary works by movement scholars
have focused on Governor Orval Faubus, massive resistance and the White Citizens'
2Councils, local white clergymen, the local white business elite, local whitejudges, and the
interaction of national and local political and legal issues.1
Useful though these memoirs and studies are, by focusing almost exclusively on
the events of September 1957 and Little Rock's emergence in the national spotlight they
offer little insight into how the school crisis fitted into a much larger struggle over the
future of race relations in both city and state. Even more importantly, these works, mostly
written by and about whites, fail to present a thoroughgoing analysis of the black
community and its contribution to the story of race relations in Arkansas. For over thirty
years the only black perspective on the school crisis was the memoir of Daisy Bates, head
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the state.
Significantly, the second work to emerge from the black community, written by Melba
Pattillo Beats in 1994, one of the nine students who integrated Central High, adds little to
Bates's account. Like the works by whites, Bates's and Pattillo's books provide only a
snapshot of events, lacking a broader context to locate the dramatic events of September
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1965); Brooks
Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959) and Politics Is
My Parish, An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981); Orval Eugene
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Rock: Democrat Printing and Lithographing Company, 1986); Virgil T. Blossom, Ii Has Happened Here
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31957.2 In terms of the white community, we do, at least, have some variety of perspectives
reflecting very different shades of opinion. For blacks, we simply do not. This
unsatisfactory state of affairs is compounded by the fact that the Little Rock school crisis
was, after all, about black rights-- specifically about the right of blacks to have the same
access to educational opportunities as whites. Yet black viewpoints remain noticeably
absent from the historiography of the Little Rock school crisis. We know precious little of
what the events of 1957 meant to local blacks or how they fitted into their collective hopes
and aspirations for racial change. One of the goals of this thesis is to answer such
questions.
In many ways, the historiography of the Little Rock school crisis mirrors wider
trends in the historiography of the civil rights movement. A first wave of scholars writing
in the 1970s and 1980s tended, much like scholars of the school crisis, to write about the
civil rights movement from a national perspective. They focused almost exclusively on
events, leaders and organisations of perceived national importance.3 Adam Fairciough has
characterised this early work on the civil rights movement as the "Montgomery-to-Selma"
narrative.4 This narrative essentially tells the story of a national movement for black rights
fronted by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the black church, which, through a
succession of non-violent direct action protests, managed to arouse the conscience of
America into passing legislation that guaranteed its black citizens the same basic rights as
those of whites. What emerged from this was a distorted vision of how those privileged
events fitted into the wider context of black activism in America. Only when a second wave
2 Daisy Bates, The Loiig Shadow of Little Rock: A Memoir (New York: David McKay Company, Inc.,
1962); Mel ba Pauillo Deals Warriors Don't cry: A Searing Memoir of the Battle to Integrate Lizzie Rock's
Central High (New York: Pocket Books, 1994).
3 For exam pies of these works sce David Garrow, Bearing tile Cross: Martin Luther King Jr., and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: William Morrow, 1986); Adam Fairciough, To
Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern christian Leadership conference and Martin Luther King, Jr.
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987); and Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: Martin Luther King
and (lie Civil Rights Move,neni, 1 954-63 (London: Macmillan, 1988).
Adam Fairciough, Race and De,nocracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1995), p. xi.
4of scholarship, emerging in the 1980s and developing in the 1990s, shifted its focus from a
"top down" approach to a "bottom up" perspective did the shortcomings of earlier works
become fully apparent. Focusing "from the point of view of people in local communities,
where the struggle for civil rights was a continuing reality, year in and year out" works
such as William H. Chafe's Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and
the Black Struggle For Freedom, Robert J. Norrell 's Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil
Rights Movement in Tuskegee , and David R. Colburn's Racial Change and Community
Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877-1980, helped to set a new agenda of concerns upon
which subsequent scholars have built.5
Recent works by Adam Fairciough on Louisiana, and John Dittmer and Charles
Payne on Mississippi, have added to and extended our knowledge of local-based black
activism. 6 In particular, these studies have acknowledged the interaction between local,
regional and national factors in determining the rate and trajectory of racial change. Adding
to this body of scholarship, my choice of Arkansas for this study provides an instructive
model for the development of black activism. Many of the local and state initiatives which
occurred there illuminate regional and national developments in the struggle for black
rights. The teachers' salary suit launched in Little Rock in 1942, for example, demonstrates
how local concerns interacted with the national agenda of the NAACP and built upon and
co-ordinated with regional initiatives of a similar nature. Likewise, the attempt by the
Arkansas Negro Democratic Association (ANDA) to gain black voting rights provides an
understanding of the groundwork laid for the landmark Smith v. Al/wright (1944) ruling at
a local level and how their struggle interlinked with that of blacks in Texas, Virginia and
William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rig/its: Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black Struggle For
Freedotn (New York; Oxford University Press, 1980), quote from p. 3; Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the
Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); David R.
Colburn, Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877-1980 (New York; Columbia
University Press, 1985).
6 Fairclough, Race and De,nocracy; John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle For Civil Rig/its in
Mississippi (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1994); Charles M. Payne, I've Got the Light of
Freedom: The Organising Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995).
5Louisiana. The desegregation of the Law School at the University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville, helps provide part of the picture for what was happening in other places across
the South regarding black graduate education in the late 1940s and again links
developments within Arkansas to a national and regional struggle. The events surrounding
the attempts to desegregate Central High school in the late 1950s places Arkansas at the
very centre of the massive resistance movement after the Brown decision. All these
developments within Arkansas speak to a larger context than the state and local struggles
that they concentrate primarily upon and thereby provide grounds for a comparative
analysis of developments at national, regional and other state levels.
Factors unique to Arkansas also make the civil rights struggle there worthy of
attention. In particular, the state provides a useful microcosm of the tensions existing
between the upper and lower (or "Deep") South states over racial change. The delta, which
dominated south-eastern Arkansas, was an area very much allied to the lower South. Most
of the state's black population lived there, brought first as slaves to the cotton plantations
that dominated the area, then tied to the land as sharecroppers and tenant farmers, and in
more recent years moving into the growing towns and villages where more often than not
they have been concentrated in low-paid menial jobs. In terms of its racial climate and
mores, the Arkansas delta shared much in common with the neighbouring state of
Mississippi. The north-west of Arkansas has always been very different. A mountainous
region, at first-glance it appears to have more in common with the West than the South.
Traditionally, very few blacks have lived in this part of the state with many counties having
no black population whatsoever. The diverse local environments through which black
activism emerged provide a glimpse at the different pressures that were encountered in
upper and lower South areas and how, at a state-level, blacks directed their efforts with
these conditions in mind.
6While this thesis seeks to present the events of September 1957 in Little Rock as
part of a much longer and broader statewide movement, it nonetheless focuses heavily on
events within the capital city. Right at the centre of the state, Little Rock stood on the fault
line between the upper and lower South and felt the pressures and tensions inherent
between the two particularly keenly. Afforded the protection of the only truly urban part of
the state, blacks in Little Rock were predominantly at the helm of black organisational
activity. This did not mean, however, that the city was always at the forefront of black
activism. One of the persistent tensions in the development of the civil rights struggle in
Arkansas was the disappointment and discontents of rural blacks that the capital city did not
make more use of its resources to push for black rights. Nonetheless, black activists from
across the state recognised that without the help and support of the influential organisations
and leaders in Little Rock the struggle for civil rights could not succeed. The civil rights
struggle in Little Rock therefore formed the backbone of the statewide struggle, with the
relationship between the urban centre and rural hinterlands of pivotal importance to
understanding the development of black activism in a statewide context.
As well as examining the development of black activism in Arkansas within the
context of national and regional events and trends, then, this thesis will also flesh out gaps
in the skeletal historiography of the Little Rock school crisis. In so doing, the work shares
the conviction of others who have written local community studies that the traditional
chronology which the first wave of civil rights historians' ascribed to black activism must
be revised. The Montgomery-to-Selma narrative that focuses on the years between 1955
and 1965 is, as Charles Payne puts it, "a good story, but useless history." More "theatrical
than instructive" the narrative focuses on the dramatic points of conflict that hit national
headlines, but fails to provide a probing analysis and examination of the underlying forces
that drove black activism during this period.7 Critically, it fails to take into account the
growth and development of black activism during the 1940s and early 1950s and the ways
Payne, I've Got the Light oJFreedoin, p. 418.
7in which it laid the foundations for later protests. Although less media-friendly than mass
demonstrations in the streets, litigation that chipped away at segregation in higher
education, wage discrimination and impediments to voting rights, coupled with the early
drives to register voters in southern communities, were a pivotal part of the attempt by
black Americans (including black Arkansans) to stake a claim for first class citizenship.
With the Little Rock school crisis placed firmly "within the context of a struggle that
stretched over three decades" in Arkansas, this thesis is primarily concerned with the
diverse efforts in Arkansas of a succession of black activists who helped organise and
mobilise the black population to struggle to better their conditions within the state.8
Confirming the findings of other local studies on Louisiana and South Carolina,
this history of the civil rights struggle in Arkansas demonstrates the pivotal role played by
the NAACP in the development of state and local black activism during the 1940s and
1 950s. Thus it offers another corrective to the Montgomery-to-Selma school of civil rights
history that has tended to minimise discussion of the NAACP, arguably the most important
civil rights organisation, in favour of groups such as the Student Non-violent Co-
ordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) who loomed large in the later mass protests.
Lacking a charismatic national leader with Roy Wilkins at the helm, perceived as slow-
moving and bureaucratic due to its reliance on litigation to rectify black grievances, and
short on the youthful dynamism of other later organisations, the important pre-1954
victories and achievements of the NAACP have been largely neglected. Viewed from a state
and local level, particularly in the 1940s and early 1950s, a very different picture of the
NAACP's contribution emerges. It is clear that successful litigation by the NAACP had a
profound impact on blacks in local communities. Not only did successful lawsuits offer
evidence that changes could be wrought through black initiatives, they provided tangible
gains and trailblazed a path for local people to organise and push for their legal rights in
8 Fairclough, Race and De,nocracy, p. xii.
8their own localities. The activism and agitation which court litigation engendered also
indicated that the supposed dichotomy between legal and non-violent direct action tactics
was not so clear cut and oppositional as its protagonists and subsequently historians have
suggested. As the history of the civil rights struggle in Arkansas shows, at the grassroots
level filing litigation wasjust as controversial and direct a protest against segregation in the
1940s and 1950s as sit-ins and marches were in the 1960s. Moreover, at another level,
litigation was often the catalyst for, and interacted with, many other direct action initiatives
within the broad repertoire of black protest techniques.
Of course, the NAACP did not bring forth black activism out of a vacuum. This
thesis highlights the role played by local grassroots organisations in providing the building
blocks for both the national and local successes of the NAACP. In Arkansas, particularly at
the state capital of Little Rock, the strength and tenacity of local organisations was
remarkable. The nexus of business, Masonic, professional, social, civic, political and
religious groups in Little Rock provided key points of community mobilisation. Often,
these groups formed their own organisations and allegiances to advance the cause of black
rights without help from a national level. In the late 1920s, for example, Little Rock
physician Dr. J. M. Robinson founded ANDA, made up of prominent black businessmen
and professionals, as a vehicle to campaign for black voting rights. In the 1960s, the
Council on Community Affairs (CoCA) emerged from the black professional community to
seek the desegregation of downtown facilities. Outside of the state capital the most
important indigenous movement to emerge was the Committee on Negro Organisations
(CNO) in the 1940s, fronted by black lawyer W. H. Flowers. The CNO had a tremendous
impact on the early development of black activism in Arkansas and was directly responsible
for the later successes of the NAACP in the state. The strength and durability of these
groups reveal a long and successful indigenous organising tradition within the state.
Fiercely independent, these groups worked in tandem with national organisations like the
NAACP, but sometimes fell out with the organisation. Certainly, they were never totally
9subsumed by or entirely subject to the NAACP's dictates, even though ultimately they
recognised the need to cultivate national support structures to achieve the financing and
support necessary to win local gains. Even when local groups adopted the name of the
NAACP, their distinctive characteristics, goals and aspirations remained closely linked to
problems shaped and defined at state and local levels.
An acknowledgement of the co-operation and co-ordination between various groups
should not obscure the fact that divisions within the black community were rife. Arguments
over strategies, aims, tactics and leadership, as David Garrow has noted, could all prove
detrimental to black protest efforts. 9 Inter- and intra-organisational battles, centred on a
clash of personalities, often forestalled collective action and, ultimately, the successful
attainment of common goals. Class divisions compounded this conflict since the black
middle classes often adopted a stance of accommodation to the existing order, even when
the black masses called for a direct protest against segregation. The process through which
the influential black middle classes were persuaded to adopt a new protest agenda and their
shifting relationship with the black masses is another theme that runs throughout this
thesis.
Whites were quick to exploit divisions in the black community by claiming
variously that blacks didn't really know what they wanted, were divided over their goals
and had no legitimate common expression of discontents of which whites were bound to
take any notice. Successful subordination of disruptive internal divisions within the black
community to a greater common cause was vital to the growth and development of black
activism in Arkansas. The ways in which coalitions were formed and differences put aside,
however temporarily, were important factors in organising and mobilising protest that
could effectively challenge the white power structure and racial iniquities.
David Garrow, "Commentary," in Charles W. Eagles (ed.), The Civil Rig/its Movement in America
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986), pp 55-64.
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Not all divisions were debilitating, however. Indeed, Nancy Weiss has stressed that
"creative tensions" which existed within the movement, as well as within the black
community, provided important diversity that was essential to the civil rights struggle. 1 ° In
the 1 960s, for example, it took both the direct-action tactics of SNCC, coupled with the
negotiating skills of CoCA, to bring about the desegregation of downtown Little Rock.
Without the militancy of protest in the streets white businessmen would not have listened to
the demands of the adult black community; without the ability of the adult black community
to negotiate on their behalf, the direct-action protests of SNCC would probably have
achieved little concrete. Although very different, the two organisations were dependent on
each other for achieving common goals.
The generational divisions within the black community were generally a help rather
than a hindrance to black protest in Arkansas. Youth activism, in a variety of forms, was a
vital catalyst for racial change from the 1940s to the 1970s, with each new generation of
blacks continually challenging the previous one to push harder, further and faster in the
pursuit of black rights. Dynamic leaders of one era quickly became the old guard to be
dislodged in subsequent phases of the movement.
Gender divisions also played a distinctive role in the civil rights struggle in
Arkansas, as elsewhere. 11 In myriad ways, as leaders, workers and organisers, black
women were at the very forefront of black protest. One of the earliest instances of black
activism in Little Rock, in the form of a teacher's salary suit, provides a vivid example of
how women contributed to the civil rights struggle. Black women teachers were the prime
movers in organising and funding the initiative and also provided the standard-bearer for
10 Nancy Weiss, "Creative Tensions in the Leadership of the Civil Rights Movement," in Eagles (ed.), The
Civil Rig/its Movement in America, pp. 39-55.
11 See Vicki Crawford, eta!, (eds.), Women in the Civil Rights Movement: Trailblazers and Torchbearers
(Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carison Publishing, 1990).
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the case in Sue Morris. Throughout its career in Arkansas the NAACP drew heavily upon
black female secretaries to keep its branches afloat and in good working order at times
when many male members of the population remained largely ambivalent about its
activities. It was no co-incidence that in the hey-days of the Arkansas NAACP in the 1950s
the organisation was spearheaded by Daisy Bates, one of the most influential figures in the
history of the movement in Arkansas.
Emphasising the multiplicity of concerns and priorities within the black community
is one way in which this thesis hopes to nuance the often oversimplified picture of the civil
rights struggle as one of black versus white. Although my primary focus here is on the
black community the desire to complicate, rather than simplify, is also served by paying
close attention to white Arkansans. Quite plainly the story of black activism in Arkansas
would not make sense without reference to whites. Racial change represented an ongoing
dialectic between two communities, one black, one white; yet, further, it also involved an
intricate dialogue within those two communities. Differences and divisions over racial
change were as much a feature of the white community as amongst blacks. At one end of
the white spectrum were those willing to resort to violence and terrorism to prevent any
diversion from total white supremacy and strict Jim Crow. In Arkansas, these die-hards
were in a minority. Although the White Citizens' Councils employed incendiary rhetoric
over the school desegregation issue in the 1950s their support, too, was relatively weak.
Opposition to black rights generally manifested itself in far more subtle forms, using
informal pressures and legal manoeuvring to forestall racial change. There were even some
in the white community who were willing to advocate racial tolerance, even change. Again,
the specifics of any such change produced diverse opinions. Some whites advocated
tackling the problems blacks faced only within the boundaries of the existing Jim Crow
system; a bold few contended that only desegregation could begin to address them.
12
Conducting research on the civil rights struggle in Arkansas involved utilising a
wide variety of primary materials. As William H. Chafe has noted, many of the traditional
sources used by historians' lack a balanced perspective within the context of southern race
relations since "Whites have run the newspapers, held the public offices [and] deposited the
manuscript collections." 12 Of course, these records do have their uses; they provide an
important glimpse into how whites viewed blacks, and how they chose to conduct and
represent their interactions with the black community. Moreover, some black viewpoints
are represented in the form of traditional sources. For example, the papers of Daisy Bates
are deposited at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin; the State Press newspaper, run
by Daisy Bates and her husband L. C. Bates in Little Rock from 1941 to 1959, is available
on microfilm; and the papers of national civil rights organisations, which contain
correspondence with local branches, are available for consultation at various archives
across the United States. All of these sources provided important mines of information.
With a little detective work, I also managed to track down the papers of towering local
figures in the Arkansas black community such as W. H. Flowers and Dr. J. M. Robinson.
In these cases, relatives generously provided access to these important materials. Yet in
order to gain a more in-depth view of the civil rights struggle in Arkansas, oral history
interviews proved invaluable to this study. Judiciously handled and balanced by existing
documentary sources or other corroborative testimony wherever possible, oral testimony
provides an effective antidote to an official past which still remains largely a product of a
segregated society.'3
Chapters One and Two of this thesis analyse the early development of black
activism in Arkansas during the 1940s and early 1950s. Chapter One traces the impact of
the New Deal and World War Two on black activism, examining the first efforts to
encourage mass black political participation by W. H. Flowers and the CNO, and their
12 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, p. 10.13 On oral history see Kim Lacy Rodgers, "Oral History and the History of the Civil Rights Movement,"
Journal of American History 75 (September 1988), pp. 567-576.
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relationship with other leaders and organisations at a local, state, regional and national
level. Chapter Two examines the impact of statewide black rights campaigns on the state
capital of Little Rock in the early 1940s, looking at the development of black activism in the
city by focusing on efforts by blacks to gain a say in the all-white Democratic party
primaries, the launch of a teacher's salary equalisation suit, and black reactions to the
shooting of a black soldier in the downtown black business district.
Chapter Three looks at the changes that took place in the racial order in Arkansas
during the post-war period. At a state level, it discusses the desegregation of the University
of Arkansas Law and Medical Schools and the attack on segregation in higher education
throughout the South in the 1940s, as well as charting the growth and development of the
NAACP within the state. The Chapter also looks at the unique redefinition in the
boundaries of segregation taking place in Little Rock during the period as whites, wary of
increasing federal pressure, sought to broker a series of informal compromises with black
leaders to maintain the ethos of racial separation, in order to avoid being compelled to
desegregate through the courts.
Chapters Four and Five track the development of black activism and the growth of
white resistance to racial change within the context of the United States Supreme Court's
landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision. Chapter Four focuses on
Arkansas's reaction to the Brown decision from 1954 to 1957. On the one hand, it assesses
the emergence of the NAACP to the very forefront of black community activism in
Arkansas, focusing on the lawsuit filed against the Little Rock school board and its
repercussions. On the other hand, the Chapter deals with the variety of tactics which whites
drew upon in the effort to prevent desegregation, from the passage of legislation in the
Arkansas General Assembly designed to legally circumvent Brown, to the call for active
defiance and disruption of its implementation advanced by the White Citizens' Council.
Chapter Five examines the school desegregation crisis in Little Rock from 1957 to 1959.
14
During that time Little Rock remained in the national spotlight as Governor Orval E.
Faubus closed the city's schools in order to avoid desegregation. Eventually, through the
efforts of the local and national NAACP, rulings by the United States Supreme Court and,
ultimately, the resolution of white city businessmen to take on militant segregationists,
Little Rock's schools were re-opened with token desegregation.
Chapter Six provides an analysis of Arkansas's encounters with the direct action
protests of the 1960s, such as the sit-ins demonstrations and Freedom Rides. Such protests
in Little Rock were not always an immediate success, since, particularly in the early 1960s,
the black community lacked the kind of support networks to sustain such action. In contrast
to successful non-violent action in other communities, the Little Rock black community
struggled to adapt new modes of protest effectively. Only through a difficult process of co-
ordinating existing black organisations and leaders and fostering co-operation among them
to pursue common goals and aims, together with the efforts of local black students, did the
black community manage to sufficiently mobilise its resources in order to compel whites to
accept racial change.
The thesis concludes with an analysis of the achievements of black activism from
194.0 to 1970, assessing its impact on politics, employment, education and housing, and
looks at how new black militant youth movements attempted to address the complexities
and ambiguities of race relations during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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CHAPTER ONE
ORIGINS: FROM ACCOMMODATION TO PROTEST
In 1940, Little Rock, with a black population of 25,000 that accounted for almost
one-quarter of its residents, was a central focus for many of the major black enterprises in
Arkansas. Opportunities for black advancement were far more numerous than in rural areas
as the existence of downtown West Ninth street testified. West Ninth was home to a black
business district that housed black-owned restaurants, bars, undertakers, beauty parlours
and pool halls. Offices of black lawyers, doctors and dentists, who serviced not only the
city, but also much of the state, were based there. West Ninth also boasted a nexus of black
organisations providing a hub of black social, political and civic activity, including Masonic
temples, fraternities, professional associations, the local branches of the NAACP and
Urban League, and the headquarters of black Republican and Democratic groups. As an
important cultural centre for blacks, West Ninth was second to none in the state. Described
by one observer as "Little Rock's Harlem" revellers on Friday and Saturday nights could
enjoy a degree of freedom within the segregated order there, away from whites, in their
own movie theatres, dance halls and bars. Outside of West Ninth street, Little Rock was a
chief centre of black education, with Dunbar High, Arkansas's only accredited secondary
school for blacks, a particular source of community pride, along with the three black
denominational colleges, Philander Smith (Methodist), Shorter (African Methodist
Episcopalian), and Arkansas Baptist. Strength of numbers, the density of black
organisations and the presence of an influential black leadership all suggested that the Little
Rock black community possessed sufficient resources to mobilise a push for black rights.'
1 Survey of Negroes in Little Rock and North Little Rock; Arkansas: A Guide to the Slate Compiled by
Workers of the Writers Program of the Works Project Administration in the State of Arkansas (New York:
Hastings House, 1941), p. 171.
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Certainly there was no lack of issues for the black community to protest. In spite of
the benefits and opportunities that a more urbane setting offered to those few who aspired
to positions of influence, second class citizenship for the majority of the city's blacks was
as comprehensive a feature of daily life as in other parts of the state. In terms of
employment, for example, most blacks were trapped in low-paid, low-skilled jobs with
little prospects of advancement. As with most southern cities, half of the black workforce
was employed in domestic service with by far the largest segment of this type of work
conducted by female domestic servants in white homes. Black women, who were also
employed in laundries, hotels and restaurants, constituted almost half of the entire black
workforce in the city, supplementing family incomes that the low wages of most jobs open
to the traditional male breadwinners required. Although some blacks worked in skilled jobs
such as automobile mechanics, railroad workers, brick and stone masons, carpenters,
electrical workers, plasterers, plumbers and painters, the rest of the male population not
engaged in domestic service worked in a variety of menial jobs such as janitors, caretakers,
labourers, waiters, bellboys, shoeshines, street cleaners and garbage collectors.2
The black business and professional class in the city accounted for only around
three per cent of the entire black population. Half the professional class consisted of
teachers in black schools; ministers formed the next largest group, with only a handful of
doctors, pharmacists, dentists, lawyers and journalists making up the rest. The potential for
an expansion of the black professional class was severely limited since no professional
training was offered within the state, as the segregated order decreed that only whites could
attend the colleges that offered the appropriate qualifications. Those blacks seeking to enter
professions were forced to move out of the state and to fund their own education, an
endeavour well beyond the means of the vast majority in the city. Although black
businesses accounted for slightly more black employment than professional occupations,
2 Survey 0/Negroes in Little Rock, pp. 5-20.
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most of them in post-Depression Little Rock, consisting predominantly of small eating
places, barber shops, beauty parlours, grocery stores and sundry other small-scale
operations, by no means offered a secure form of employment. The lack of capital and
credit available to prospective black entrepreneurs, their lack of business training and
experience, and the limited market that they serviced, meant that black businesses remained
by nature restricted operations.3
Discrimination in education was a pressing issue for blacks in Little Rock, as in the
rest of the state. The complete lack of professional training for blacks at a graduate level
was coupled with second class conditions lower down the educational ladder. Even in Little
Rock, which had the best black schools in the state, conditions were far below those for
whites. In terms of financial support black schools were allocated less of the education
budget with $39.59 per annum spent on each black student compared with $66.56 on
whites. Similar disparities continued throughout the school system. Black principals of
high schools received salaries of $1,340 per annum compared with $2,099 for their white
counterparts, and black teachers received an average salary of $724 per annum compared to
the $1,216 paid to white teachers. The eight public schools for blacks in Little Rock, with a
total enrolment of 4,324 pupils, experienced chronic overcrowding. Even at Dunbar High,
the flagship of black secondary education in the state, teachers were regularly instructing
classes of forty to fifty pupils, far too large, they insisted, to offer adequate attention and
instruction to individual students. The situation was gradually growing worse due to an
influx of students from outlying areas in search of a better education in the city. At all
schools there was a lack of playground space, no athletics equipment and no gymnasiums.
Any extra-curricular activities depended upon self-financing fund-raising drives within the
black community.4
Ibid., pp. 21-34.
Ibid., pp. 35-46.
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Housing for the majority of the black population was of a deplorable standard. A
survey conducted by the Greater Little Rock Urban League in 1941 reported that the
housing situation of blacks typified "the lowest extremes of poverty, primitiveness and
squalor." The most common type of building was the "duplex" which consisted of two
"shotgun" shacks -- narrow, straight-lined constructions, partitioned into 2 or 3 rooms --
joined together in a double-barrel fashion. Families of up to 8 and 10 were living in these
dwellings with the problems of overcrowding compounded by poor sanitary conditions and
the absence of all but the most basic of facilities. Even in the city, some families had no
running water, relying instead upon a shared hydrant outside which often froze during the
winter months. Unlike some other southern cities, however, in Little Rock no laws had
ever existed to prohibit blacks and whites living in the same area and racially mixed
neighbourhoods did exist. Nevertheless, due to economic constraints, the location of black
institutions, and the practicalities of finding security in numbers, there were easily
discernible black districts just off West Ninth street and towards the east of the city.5
Although blacks in Little Rock encountered numerous problems as a result of wide-
ranging discrimination, no agenda for protest or redress had emerged from the city. A
central obstacle to the mobilisation of effective black protest was the existing black
leadership, drawn from the black professional and business elite. Many of these leaders
leant towards the Booker T. Washington philosophy of "accommodation" that stressed
economic advancement within the boundaries of segregation instead of head-on racial
protest to challenge Jim Crow and disfranchisement. By 1940, with many black businesses
severely hit by the Depression of the previous decade, it was clear that such a philosophy
was no longer credible. However, since the segregated order remained in the vested
interests of many in the black middle class, the very people whom the black community
Ibid., pp. 61-64.
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looked toward to take the lead in a push for black rights, protest remained muted.
Segregation provided black businesses and black professionals with an exclusive black
clientele for their services that they remained reluctant to sacrifice in a push for social
equal ity. Moreover, black leaders relied on their position as spokesmen for their race to
gain status and prestige within the community, with their standing in part both defined and
enhanced by their liaisons with influential whites for whom they often acted as go-
betweens with the black community. Working to destroy segregation for black leaders
ultimately meant undermining their own financial position, by abolishing their protected
market, and community standing, by alienating influential whites.
The vested interests of the black elite in the segregated order forestalled the
cultivation of race-based protest and the mobilisation of the large black population in the
city. Rather, the black elite sought to emphasise class distinctions within the black
community, over and above racial solidarity, since it differentiated them from the majority
of other blacks and helped to reinforce their own status on the top rung of the black social
hierarchy. Efforts to cultivate cross-class race-based protests were extremely rare. The only
convincing example of such collective black protest before 1940 came at the turn of the
century with the organisation of a street car boycott in 1903. As in many other southern
cities at the time, the Street car boycott became a focus for black dissatisfaction at the
establishment of urban segregation by a series of Jim Crow statutes. In Little Rock black
business and professional leaders played a major role in organising the boycott and openly
solicited support from other blacks in the city to help their cause. Although initially
successful, like other boycotts across the South, the protest eventually succumbed to an
overwhelming tide of white racism.6 As the segregated order became the established norm,
6 John William Graves, "Jim Crow in Arkansas: A Reconsideration of Urban Race Relations in the Post-
Reconstruction South," Journal of Soul/tern History 60 (August 1989), pp. 421-448; J. Morgan Kousser,
"Black Protest in the 'Era of Accommodation': Documents," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 34 (Summer
1975), pp. 147-178; August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, "The Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow
Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906," Journal of American History 55 (March 1969), pp. 756-775.
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black leaders moved away from efforts to cultivate community protest and instead focused
in the main upon consolidating their own position as heads of a subjugated class within the
bounds of a white dominated society.
Just as the segregated order forestalled the development of cross-class racial
solidarity, it also worked against co-operation and co-ordination amongst existing black
organisations and institutions. The competition between various leaders and organisations
in the black community to assert their authority, as Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal
noted in his study of the social structure of America's black community in the 1940s, was
often "ruthless."7 Internal divisions and rivalries within the black community were intense,
with various groups striving for recognition as the most influential representatives of the
race and jealously guarding and cultivating their own spheres of influence. Black leaders in
Little Rock felt the pressures of competition particularly keenly, since owning a successful
business enterprise or a successful professional practice, working in a highly rated school
or college, preaching in the pulpit of a well supported and well-funded church, or heading
an influential black civic, social or political organisation in the capital city, conferred a great
deal of kudos, commanding not just city-wide, but statewide recognition.
The intense competition between black leaders and organisations at a local level
failed to provide a nurturing environment for national civil rights organisations, such as the
NAACP, which could potentially provide a catalyst for grassroots black activism. The first
local branch of the NAACP in Arkansas had been established in 1918 in Little Rock. 8 One
of the most celebrated cases of the national NAACP's early history followed a year later
Gunnar Myrdal, An A,nerican Dilemma: Vol. 2. Tue Negro Social Structure (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1964 paperback edition, originally published 1944), p. 775.
8 "Application for Charter and Official Authorisation," Papers of the NAACP: Part 12: Selected Branch
Files, 1913-1939. Series A: The South. Microfilm Reel 4: group I, series 0, branch files: group I, box 0-
12. Little Rock, Arkansas Branch, frames 0785-0787. University Publications of America, Bethesda,
Maryland. Special Collections Division, University of Arkansas Libraries, Little Rock, Arkansas
(collection hereinafter cited as NAACP (Microfilm, SCUALR)).
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after a race riot at the small eastern Arkansas delta settlement of Elaine. The riot started
when local whites attempted to break up a meeting of black cotton pickers who were in the
process of organising a union; at the shoot out which followed over two hundred blacks
were killed. The NAACP subsequently helped to represent twelve black prisoners
sentenced to death for their alleged role in the incident. During a lengthy and expensive five
years of litigation the NAACP finally won a reprieve for the convicted men, in a landmark
victory for the organisation, on the grounds that they had been unfairly tried in a hostile
courtroom.9 In spite of the victory, the NAACP were unsuccessful at winning widespread
support in the state. The indifference of the existing black leadership to its activities stymied
the progress of the oldest and largest local NAACP branch at Little Rock which failed to
make any headway in building support in the city let alone in leading organisational efforts
in the surrounding rural areas. Beyond the efforts of a few dedicated black female
secretaries, most notably Mrs. Carrie Sheppherdson, who won the Madam C. J. Walker
Gold Medal in 1925 for her outstanding fund raising drive, there was very little interest in
NAACP activities. 10 As Mrs. H. L. Porter, local branch secretary, put it in 1933, "the
lawyers, Doctors, preachers and businessmen.., are just a bunch of egoistic discussers and
not much on actual doings." 1
Little Rock's black leaders proudly boasted that racial matters could be handled
most effectively by them, at a local level, without outside interference. The example of the
Grand Mosaic Templars of America, a Masonic fraternity-come-insurance agency and one
of the most successful black business concerns in Little Rock, illustrates how the Booker
T. Washington ideal of economic advancement tied in with racial advancement in the eyes
Meier and John H. Bracey Jr., "The NAACP as a Reform Movement 1909-1965: To Reach the
Conscience of America," Journal of Southern History 59 (February 1993), pp. 13-30. For a more detailed
account see Richard C. Cortner, A Mob Intent on Death: The NAACP and the Arkansas Riot Cases
(Middletown: University of Connecticut Press, 1988).
'°Telegmm from William Pickens to Carrie Sheppherdson, January 5, 1925, frame 0879, NAACP
(Microfilm SCUALR).
Mrs. H. L. Porter to Roy Wilkins, November 14, 1933, frames 0039-0041, NAACP (Microfilm
SCUALR).
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of those who ran it. Established in 1882 by two members of Little Rock's influential black
middle class, John Bush and Chester Keats, at the height of their success in 1924 the
Templars boasted a membership of 108,000 people in 24 states and combined assets of
$280,000. The Templars' building, a four story and particularly ornate downtown edifice,
offered a central meeting place for the black professional, civic, religious, fraternal and
political groups in the city. The NAACP occupied only one room among many other
groups trying to advance the cause of blacks. By providing insurance for blacks, boLstering
the local and regional black economy, and housing local black organisations, the Templars
considered their own efforts to further the cause of the race equal, if not better, to those of
the NAACP which was based far away in New York.12
One area in which the black elite had managed to exercise some influence with the
white community was in politics. However, black participation in politics was viewed
strictly as a pursuit of the privileged few who represented their own interests rather than
those of the black masses. Under Republican Reconstruction after the Civil War, well-to-
do blacks occupied a number of important positions in local, county and state government
in Arkansas. 13 Although their influence declined towards the end of the nineteenth century,
due to the re-emergence of the Democratic party as a political force in the state and the
establishment of the all-white party primaries to prevent any meaningful black participation
in the electoral process, the struggle for a black political voice continued. In the vanguard
of the political struggle during the early decades of the twentieth century was Scipio
Africanus Jones. Born a slave at Tulip, Arkansas, during the Civil War, Jones worked as a
field hand after emancipation, moving to Little Rock around 1881. After gaining an
education at Philander Smith, then Shorter College, Jones became a self-taught lawyer,
opening up a practice in 1889. Jones was a lawyer of no mean talent, confirmed by the fact
12 A. E. Bush and P. L. Dorman, History of the Mosaic Templars of America (Little Rock: Central
Printing Company, 1924).
13 Willard B. Gatewood, "Negro Legislators in Arkansas 1891: A Document," Arkansas Historical
Quarterly 30 (Autumn 1972), pp. 220-33.
23
that he quickly became the first choice counsel of many of the black fraternal and Masonic
groups in the city, as well as an early advocate for black rights in the courtroom. Jones's
cause célèbre case came in 1919 when, employed by the NAACP, he successfully
managed to win a commution of the death sentence for twelve black prisoners after the
Elaine Race Riot.' 4 These exploits undoubtedly helped Jones in his successful political
career that most notably included taking on the so-called "lily-whites" in the Republican
ranks who tried to prevent black participation in the party after the end of Reconstruction.
The long, bitter and hard-fought battle was eventually won by Jones and his followers in
1928 when he was elected as a delegate to the Republican National Convention, forcing
Arkansas Republicans to acknowledge and accept the legitimacy of black participation in
the state organisation) 5 By the time that Jones had successfully established a black voice in
the Republican party, however, the retrenchment of the Democratic party as the dominant
force in Arkansas politics meant that the struggle of black Republicans counted for little.16
A dramatic incident -- the lynching of John Carter in May 1927 -- precipitated a new
shift in the direction of black political activism. Carter, accused of attacking two white
women on the outskirts of Little Rock, was hunted down by a posse of whites and
summarily executed. With a fusillade of around two hundred bullets shot into his dead
body, a white mob strapped Carter to the front of a car and drove him into Little Rock
where they dragged him around the city for several hours. After driving slowly through the
black neighbourhoods the lynching party ended up in the middle of the black downtown
business district on West Ninth street where they made a makeshift funeral pyre from pews
torn from Bethel AME, one of the most prestigious black churches in the city, and set it on
fire, throwing Carter's body to the flames. The mob, which at one point swelled to over
14 Tom Dillard, "Scipio Jones," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 31 (Autumn 1972), pp. 20 1-19; Tom
Dillard, "Perseverance: Black History in Pulaski County, Arkansas-- An Excerpt," Pulaski county
Historical Review 31 (Winter 1983), pp. 62-73.
Tom Dillard, "Scipio Jones," pp. 201-19; Tom Dillard, "To the Back of the Elephant: Racial Conflict
in the Arkansas Republican Party," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 33 (Spring 1974), pp. 3-15.
16 V. 0. Key, Soul/ten, Politics in Slate and Nation (New York: Vintage, 1949), p. 183.
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one thousand, was only dispersed when Governor Martineau sent in National Guardsmen
to quash the disturbance.17
Although barbaric forms of asserting white supremacy such as lynching was not
uncommon in the rural hinterlands of Arkansas displays of such racial violence in Little
Rock were rare, due both to the protection of numbers in the black community and, in
particular, the commitment of the city's white business leaders, as in other southern urban
centres, to project a progressive and civilised image to the rest of the country in order to
attract northern capital, investments and goodwill.' 8 The desire to repair the harm which
many businessmen believed the lynching of Carter had done to the city was apparent in
their swift and outright condemnation of the affair. A meeting of local businessmen the day
after the lynching roundly denounced the "cravenly and criminal act" promising "any
amount of money necessary" to bring the perpetrators to light. There was severe criticism
of the mayor and chief of police who were both accused of shirking their responsibilities of
maintaining law and order and some demanded their removal from office. Meanwhile, the
Arkansas Gazette lamented that the incident would paint an "unjust" picture of the city,
ignoring the "thousands of law-abiding men and women" who distanced themselves from
such acts of barbarism. With suitable protestations of remorse and anguish adorning the
front pages of the city's newspapers and a full investigation underway, within a few days,
after the story was safely out of the national spotlight, the grand jury met for only a few
days before deciding that there was not enough evidence to bring any convictions in the
case. Within a week of the lynching the case was closed.'9
17 Arkansas Gazette, May 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1927.
' 8 T1d E. Lewis, "Mob Justice in the 'American Congo': 'Judge Lynch' in Arkansas during the Decade
after World War I," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 52 (Summer 1993), pp. 156-184; Elizabeth Jacoway and
David R. Colburn (eds.), Southern Businessmen and Desegregation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1982), p. 2.
19 Ark,as Gazelle, May 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1927.
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As the black community took stock of events in the aftermath of the Carter
lynching, a number decided to abandon the city altogether and search for a more favourable
racial climate elsewhere. 20 Others decided to take a stand. An immediate response came
with the founding of ANDA in 1928. The formation of ANDA constituted a new attempt
from a different faction of the Little Rock black elite to gain a say for educated blacks in
politics and exercise some leverage with whites to help prevent a recurrence of the violence
that the city had witnessed. At the forefront of this organisation was Dr. John Marshall
Robinson, a black physician from Little Rock, who moved to the city after graduating from
Knoxville Medical College, Tennessee, at the turn of the century. 21 The origins of ANDA
lay in a meeting held September 1928 in the small town of England, Arkansas, just outside
Little Rock, when seventy-five black professionals organised a Smith-Robinson Club in
order to lend support to the Alfred Smith - Joseph T. Robinson (the latter one of
Arkansas's senatorial congressional representatives) Democratic presidential ticket that
year. At the meeting Dr. Robinson declared that blacks were "no longer slaves of the
Republican party." Robinson stated that he believed "labor, thought, concentration and
understanding between the races is a possible solution to our progress" and that this could
best be achieved in the white man's party of Arkansas since "the white man lends us
money, feels our sorrows and helps us bear our burden.... When we want a favour, we go
to him and usually get it." Although Robinson preached a friendly reconciliation with white
Democrats, at the same time, in a move bold by leadership standards in Little Rock, he
indicated that he was prepared to pursue other possibilities, such as legal redress, if such a
reconciliation proved unsuccessful.22
20 Survey of Negroes in Little Rock, p. 95.
21 Arkansas Gazelle, July 2 1,1970.
22 Ibid., September 19, 1928, clipping in Pulaski County Democratic Central Committee Scrapbooks,
Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock (collection hereinafter cited as PCDCCS).
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Just a month after the formation of the Smith-Robinson clubs black Democratic
aspirations were consolidated in the organisation of ANDA whose stated two fundamental
goals were to educate blacks in the workings of state and local politics and to encourage
blacks to vote. 23
 One of the first actions taken by ANDA was to file suit against white
Democrats for the right to vote in the party's primary elections. The Arkansas Democratic
party primary elections existed to select candidates from the Democratic party to stand for
office at general elections. Since the Democratic party dominated virtually every political
office in Arkansas at the time, the primary elections were seen as the true source of political
power in the state, with general elections providing for little more than a ratification of a
Democratic nominee.24 Democratic party regulations stated that only whites could
participate in the primary elections, thus denying the black population any meaningful voice
in state politics.
ANDA's attack on the white primary built upon recent regional developments in
black activism initiated by black Democrats in Texas who, aided by the NAACP, won an
important ruling in front of the United States Supreme Court in Nixon v. Herndon (1927).
In the Nixon case the Supreme Court ruled that blacks could not be prevented from voting
in the Democratic party primaries by state law. This victory proved only a partial triumph
since the Supreme Court did not rule specifically on the constitutional rights of black voters
but rather upon the use of state laws as a means of disfranchisement in general. This left the
way open for state Democratic parties, as private organisations, to introduce their own rules
to prevent blacks from voting in party primaries. 25 Since the white primary system in
Arkansas was identical to that used in Texas, ANDA sought to clarify and extend the Nixon
23 "Constitution and By-Laws and Order of Incorporation of the Arkansas Negro Democratic Association of
Arkansas," box 26, file 296 "Black Matters," Governor Sidney Saunders McMath Papers, Arkansas History
Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas (collection hereinafter cited as GSMP).
24 Key, Southern Politics in Stale and Nation, p. 183.
25 Darlene Clark Hine, Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of t/ze White Primary in Texas (Millwood, N.Y,:
KTO Press), pp. 72-85.
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v. Herndon ruling in seeking a court decision that would prohibit the use of private party
rules specifically to disfranchise blacks in party primaries.
Unlike black's in Texas, black Arkansans found it difficult to enlist the support of
the NAACP in their struggle. Largely, this was due to the lack of enthusiasm shown by
Little Rock's black elite in the NAACP's affairs which led to the national organisation
treating local protest efforts in a disparaging manner. From the outset the NAACP were
reluctant to lend support to ANDA. To be sure, similar cases were being argued in
Virginia, Florida and Texas at the time that overlapped with ANDA's efforts since they
raised the same basic principles as the Arkansas suit. Yet it was clear that the ratio of
money expended on states to help sustain black activism was carefully weighed against
support offered to the national organisation in return. Walter White, executive secretary of
the NAACP, felt particularly strongly that "it is not fair to other states who have by their
contributions enabled the Association to continue in existence that we should give
disproportionate amounts in cases in states where little has been done to help the
Association carry on its work." Further, White pointed out, "We know that there are
enough colored men of means in Little Rock alone to finance this case." 26
 White's memo
about the case to Arthur Spingarn, president of the NAACP, declared "[a] reason to feel we
should not give much, if anything towards this case... [is that] we have never been able to
get any considerable support from the state. For, example, the Little Rock branch sent to
the National office during 1928 only $48, and this year only $44.25." The memo
concluded, in a pragmatic manner, that "we send say fifty or one hundred dollars as a
contribution towards this case so that in the event that it turns out to be the one on which
we get the definitive decision, we will at least have given something."27
26 Ibid., p. 97.
27 Walter White to Arthur Spingarn, November 7, 1929, miscellaneous correspondence, 1917-25, 1928-32,
NAACP, Little Rock, Microfilm, Special Collections Division, University of Arkansas Libraries,
Fayetteville (collection hereinafter cited as NAACP (Microfilm SCUAF)).
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On November 27, 1928, Judge Richard M. Mann of the Second Division Court,
sitting in the absence of Chancellor Frank H. Dodge in the Pulaski County Chancery
Court, upheld an application by Dr. Robinson etal for an injunction against the Democratic
party to prevent them from barring black voters from their party primaries. However, the
ruling by Judge Mann seemed to indicate what he felt would be the eventual outcome of the
case as he ordered a "precautionary measure" to ensure that ballots cast by blacks in
primary elections were separated at the polls pending an appeal. 28
 Sure enough, on August
30, 1929, Chancellor Dodge, having returned to court and considered the suit for several
months, revoked the restraining order. Dodge cited as a precedent the ruling of Justice J.
C. Hutchenson of Houston, Texas, in July 1928, who stated in a similar suit to ANDA's
(Grigsby v. Harris) that specifying membership rules of the Democratic party as "white
electors" did not directly interfere with the casting of black ballots at a general election. As a
prerequisite of affiliation to a private organisation, ruled Hutchenson, the clause was
entirely valid.29
Arkansas's black Democrats based their case on a different suit pending in Virginia
at the time, under the title of West v. Biley (1929), which argued that the state could not
finance all-white party primaries whilst delegating their rules and regulations to the
Democratic party as a private organisation. Dodge chose to ignore this on the grounds that
in Virginia the Democratic primaries were financed by the state, and were therefore not
privately run, whereas in Arkansas the Democratic party financed its own primaries. Also,
Dodge noted, the suit in Virginia was still on appeal.3 °
 Robinson complained that he felt "I
and my colleagues have been buffed about in a manner unbecoming of Democratic citizens.
I feel that we who qualify as Democrats have the right to vote in the primary and that
anything less is a reflection upon the integrity and confidence of Democracy in
28 Arkansas Gazette, November 27, 1928, clipping in PCDCCS.
29 Hine, Black Victory, p. 115.
30 Arkansas Gazette, August 30, 1929, clipping in PCDCCS; Hine, Black VictorY, pp. 94-96.
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Arkansas."31 Nevertheless, the ANDA lawsuit failed to meet with any further success.
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the Democratic State Committee and on November
24, 1929, the United States Supreme Court finally killed off the suit when it refused to hear
the case on the grounds that it "failed to raise a constitutional question." In spite of these
setbacks Dr. Robinson remained philosophical about the suit. He noted that "no great
height is reached in a day" and urged ANDA members to be "patient."32
During the 1930s a significant shift took place that led to a need to redefine the
balance between local support and outside help in the struggle for black rights. The
Depression years crippled the black business elite in Little Rock and other parts of the state.
Many successful enterprises, like the Mosaic Templars, who had staggered through a
worsening racial climate, went into terminal decline. By the end of the decade there was a
lack of money to sustain and nourish such local organisations. At the same time, a new
agenda was moving to the forefront of the black community's desire for advancement that
went beyond the capacity of those groups to handle. The majority of blacks in the state
were far worse hit by the Depression than the black elite; at one stage, almost one-third of
black families in the Arkansas delta faced starvation. In the face of this hardship the federal
government began to offer a "New Deal" that brought with it the potential for change, along
with a new optimism and raised hopes throughout the state's black community. While the
limited impact of the New Deal on black lives was ultimately ambiguous and its positive
aspects very often undermined by segregation and discrimination, nonetheless, the New
Deal did mean that more black facilities such as schools and hospitals were built in the
1930s than ever before. The New Deal provided more jobs, more training and a greater
access to adult education, offering the black population a small glimpse of the potential that
the federal government possessed to make a difference in their daily lives. Demographic
31 Arkansas Gazette, March 26, 1930, clipping in PCDCCS
32 Ibid., November 25, 1930; Hine, Black Victory, pp. 96-99.
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shifts helped to consolidate black aspirations and offered a growing base for collective
action. Blacks moved off the land and into the towns and villages of the delta. As a result
of the move to these urban areas, where blacks were less vulnerable and isolated, a greater
sense of community cohesion emerged. These developments were conducive to more
effective mobilisation of the black population and lowered the ability of whites to forcibly
attack and intimidate those who sought to take a stand for better treatment.33
World War Two acted as a further catalyst for change. Wartime army bases that
located in the South helped its ailing economy, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt
recognised as the nation's "number one economic problem" with twelve billion dollars of
investment. Encroaching industrialisation went hand in hand with further urbanisation and
a burgeoning of the black population in cities, towns and villages. Blacks pushed hard to
win their share of wartime prosperity not only in the South but nationwide. The threat of a
mass march on Washington by black labour leader A. Philip Randolph led to the formation
of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) by President Roosevelt to monitor
racial discrimination in employment. Even with its shortcomings, the FEPC contributed to
a tripling in the federal employment of blacks. Hundreds of thousands of blacks enlisted to
help fight in the war for democracy with the firm intention of winning support for what the
black press termed the "double V" -- victory at home for democracy and equality, as well as
abroad. Even normally reticent Southern black leaders announced that they were opposed
to segregation "in principle and practice" at a celebrated meeting in Durham, North
Carolina, 1942. Recriminations against blacks by white southerners who were afraid of the
growth in black militancy led to outbreaks of violence, particularly in areas where black
Harvard Sitkoli, A New Deal For Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1978) provides an excellent overview of the plight of blacks in the 1930s.
On the displacement of agricultural workers due to New Deal policies see Pete Daniel "The Legal Basis of
Agrarian Capitalism: The South since 1933," in Melvyn Stokes and Rick Halpern (eds.) Race and Class in
the American South Since 1890 (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994), pp. 79-102. For local developments see
Survey of Negroes in Little Rock. The best collection of primary materials on the effects of the New Deal
in Arkansas are the Floyd Sharp Scrapbooks 1933-43, at the Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock,
Arkansas. Hoyd Sharp was co-ordinator of the WPA in the state.
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advancement was visibly apparent, for example, at army bases where black soldiers were
trained and in defence industries that employed black workers. Although clearly
intimidatory, these outbreaks of violence often served only to increase the resolve and
determination of black Americans to pursue the goal of equal rights.34
Looking to build upon the promise of change that the New Deal had brought and
which America's entry into the Second World War held the potential to fulfil, an ever-
growing constituency for mass mobilisation in Arkansas, wrought by demographic
changes and an enlivened base of support for a more aggressive pursuit of black rights,
began to develop. Yet in spite of this potential base of support, there was still the problem
of a distinct lack of direction and leadership in the state's black community for such a
movement. The entrenched conservative elite in Little Rock still wielded considerable
influence and still dominated organisational activities. Compounding these problems was
the continued lack of NAACP interest in the state that denied Arkansas a possible antidote
to the stagnation of local black leadership and an impetus for a more active pursuit of black
rights. By 1940 only a paltry six local NAACP branches existed in Arkansas with a
membership of around 600 people.35
It was the problem of implementing an activist agenda despite the reluctance of an
entrenched conservative local leadership and in the absence of galvanising outside help, that
a young lawyer William Harold Flowers, and his newly formed group the Committee on
34 0n blacks and World War Two see Richard M. Dalfumie, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro
Revolution," Journal of American History 55 (June 1968), pp. 90-106, and Desegregation of the U.S.
Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969); Neil
Wynn, The African-American and the Second World War (London: Paul Elek, 1976); John Morton Blum, V
was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II (New Yoric Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1976); Harvard Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the Second World War,"
Journal of American History 58 (December 1971), pp. 661-681; and Merle E. Reed, Seedlime for the
Modern Civil Rights Move,nent: Tue President's Go,nmittee on Fair Employment Practice, 1941-1946
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).
35 William Pickens to W. H. Flowers, May 10, 1940, group II, series C, container 10, folder "Pine Bluff,
Ark., 1940-1947," NAACP Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
(collection hereinafter cited as NAACP (LC)).
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Negro Organisations (CNO) sought to address. Half a generation younger than the
established black middle-class leadership, this band of professionals recognised the need to
harness the support of the masses in order to be able to bring about the kinds of benefits
that would enhance the position of all black Arkansans. The CNO was founded on March
10, 1940, at the Buchanan Baptist Church in Stamps, south-west Arkansas at a meeting of
around 200 supporters. Addressing the group of black activists Flowers charged that there
was a "blackout of democracy" in Arkansas. There was, he claimed, no adequate
organisation to serve the needs of its Negro citizens, to publicise and stand up against the
daily racial injustices that they were forced to encounter. Realising the magnitude of the
task in filling such a void, Flowers expressed the belief that the young leadership of the
CNO possessed "enough brain power and courage to revolutionise the thinking of the
people of Arkansas."36
Over the following two years Flowers and the CNO launched a highly successful
campaign to organise and mobilise the black population of Arkansas. Building upon the
social, political, economic and demographic changes that resulted from the effects of both
the New Deal and World War Two, Flowers and the CNO looked to harness an enlivened
constituency of support amongst the state's black population for a more militant leadership
in the struggle for black rights and for a more expansive agenda to tackle the probLems
which black Arkansans faced. At a time when national civil rights organisations like the
NAACP were less than enthusiastic to help at a local level, and the existing leaders and
organisations in Arkansas offered little dynamism for change, it was Flowers and the CNO
who introduced a new forward-looking agenda for black activism that would have a
profound impact on the struggle for black rights there. Both in the way they laid the
groundwork for later black protest orgariisations and challenged black self-perceptions and
36 Press Release, (n.d.), W. H. Flowers Papers, Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The W. H. Flowers Papers
(collection hereinafter cited as WHFP) are unprocessed and uncollected at his law offices in Pine Bluff, as he
left them at the time of his death in 1990. Research was conducted with the kind permission of Ms.
Stephanie Flowers, W. H. Flowers's daughter and custodian of the papers.
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their capacity to resist Jim Crow at the time, no-one in Arkansas could claim to have had a
more of an impact on the early development and subsequent growth of black activism in the
state.
Flowers was born in Stamps in 1911. Son of an insurance salesman and a
schoolteacher, he grew up in a family that belonged to a professional class representing the
upper echelons of black society. Yet rather than sharing the complacency of others in the
black elite, Flowers's early experiences helped to mould a more militant attitude toward
black rights. Enamoured with childhood trips to the courthouse with his father that
provided his "first peep into the judicial system," Flowers finally determined to pursue a
legal career after a harrowing and graphic introduction to another side of southern justice.
At the age of sixteen, on a visit to Little Rock, he witnessed the burning of John Carter on
the main black downtown business thoroughfare, on a funeral pyre built with pews
plundered from a nearby black church. It was at this sight, he would recall in later years,
that he was "truly converted to be a lawyer."37
Flowers graduated from Robert H. Terral law school in Washington D. C. in 1937
and returned to Arkansas the following year to set up a practice in Pine Bluff. 38 Young,
eager and idealistic, with first-hand experiences of southern injustices towards blacks, from
his first days in Pine Bluff Flowers set about trying to use his legal talents to further the
cause of the race both in his immediate locality and across the state. Initially, Flowers
looked to the NAACP to help in this ambitious task. In October 1938 Flowers wrote to
Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP, emphasising the fact that Arkansas badly
needed organisation and leadership and that it was a "fertile field" for new groups to
introduce a new civil rights agenda. Flowers stated that he had returned to his home state
7 Arkansas Gazette, July 31, 1988.
38 For a portrait of black Pine Bluff see George Lipsitz, Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p. 15-38.
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"to practice law and render a distinct service to my people" and indicated that he wished to
have the job of organising Arkansas's black population, but needed financial assistance to
carry out such a task. As a novice lawyer, just starting to build up his business, he could
barely afford to take time away from his livelihood.39
In spite of these pleadings, no offers of help from the central offices of the NAACP
in New York were forthcoming. Rather than positive encouragement letters arrived trying
to appease Flowers's frustrations. Charles Houston, one of the NAACP's leading
attorneys, wrote to tell Flowers that he empathised with the situation in Arkansas and
recognised the fact that the young lawyer would be hard pressed to take time out of his own
office without due recompense. However, Houston also explained that the NAACP
worked strictly through local volunteers and did not have the capital to fund widespread
local-based activism. Houston admitted that this meant black protest was sporadic and
heavily reliant on the efforts of a few dedicated individuals, but that this was the only way
the organisation could afford to work. Thurgood Marshall, an aspiring protégé of Houston
in the NAACP, wrote to Flowers soon after expressing regret that not much progress had
been made in organi sing Arkansas's black population, but advised that the matter be left in
abeyance until the next NAACP national conference.40
By the time that the NAACP had rebuffed all his requests for help, W. H. Flowers
decided that he could wait no longer for them to act. At the March 10 meeting in Stamps,
Flowers officially launched his own organisation to tackle the task of mobilising the state's
black population and outlined a platform of concerns and issues that they intended to
address, heralded as "the most forward looking ever... touching every field of social
activity." The programme declared that the CNO's purpose was to provide a "single
39 W. H. Flowers to Walter White, October 31, 1938, WHFP.
Charles Houston to W. H. Flowers, November 22, 1938; Thurgood Marshall to W. H. Flowers, April
14, 1939, WHFP.
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organisation sufficient to serve the social, civic, political and economic needs of the
people." It stood for the rights of Negroes to have a say in the government that they
supported, to fight "un-American activities.., enslaving the Negro people" and to devise a
"system of protest" to remove them. The CNO programme also highlighted the
organisation's desire to gain equal rights for blacks in education, politics, health, housing,
jobs and employment. In particular, the CNO sought greater opportunities for blacks in the
armed forces and wartime industries, the provision of public facilities equal to those of
whites and a fair allocation of New Deal farm benefits to help remove the "existing evils" in
the sharecropping landlord-tenant relationship that held many blacks in penury. Within each
broad area the CNO had specific aims. For example, in education there were demands for
equalising school facilities, equalising black and white teachers' salaries, providing greater
graduate opportunities and appointing Negroes to policy-making boards at state and local
levels.41
The cornerstone of the CNO's programme was to encourage black participation in
the political process. This was by no means a new idea as the efforts of Scipio Jones and
black Republicans and Dr. J. M. Robinson and black Democrats testified. Indeed, Flowers
and the CNO were part of a long tradition of black political activity in Arkansas. However,
in direct contrast to all previous attempts to secure black political participation, which had
been sought by black leaders who wished to win representation in politics so that the
educated few, like themselves, could exercise a voice in the political process on behalf of
their race, Flowers had a much broader vision of what might be achieved. Whereas older
black political leaders had always seen black participation in politics as a way of articulating
grievances they had never envisaged that it might be a vehicle for issuing a wholesale
challenge to existing inequalities in the way that Flowers and the CNO proposed.
Moreover, Flowers, even though a staunch Republican himself, insisted that efforts to
41 The CNO Spectator, July 1, 1940, WHFP.
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mobilise the black population in Arkansas would be non-partisan. Moving beyond the
confines of white-dominated party politics, Flowers proposed the creation of an
independent mass black political organisation, representative of all blacks in the state, as a
way of tackling the common problems that they all collectively encountered.
The first step towards the kind of black political participation which Flowers and
the CNO envisaged was payment of the state poll tax. Unlike other southern states that
used a variety of legal and extra-legal measures to prevent blacks from voting in general
elections, in Arkansas, the payment of a $1 poll tax qualified a person to vote irrespective
of colour. Blacks were allowed the vote at general elections in Arkansas for two reasons.
First, whites knew that because of the racially exclusive Democratic party primaries blacks
could not influence state politics. Second, landowners in eastern Arkansas were able to
coerce black sharecroppers and tenant farmers, who were dependent upon them for their
homes and livelihoods, into voting Democrat at a general election should any significant
opposition ever arise. Often landlords paid the poli taxes of their black tenants just in case
they ever needed them to vote. Flowers and the CNO believed that once blacks began to
purchase poll tax receipts and turn up on election day independently to cast their own vote,
demonstrating an interest, awareness and desire to pursue the cause of voting rights, it
would prove a stepping stone to challenging the all-white Democratic party primaries. To
attain the goal of mass political mobilisation, organisation would be needed. The ability to
organise and mobilise blacks effectively reached to the very core of the CNO's mission. Its
central platform was to "seek the endorsement of Negro church, civic, fraternal and social
organisations."42 Only by bringing about unity, direction of purpose, and exerting power
through the sheer strength of numbers in a statewide representative body could the task of
raising black political consciousness be effectively carried out. This would mean creating a
coalition in what black sociologist Aldon Morris has identified as an "organisation of
42 Ibid.
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organisations"43 pooling individual and group bases of influence throughout the state. The
whole programme hinged upon the CNO's ability to gain a wide base of recognition and
support throughout the black community.
Although the self-styled "independent" programme of the CNO essentially only
replicated the demands put forward by the NAACP at the time, it did differ in one very
important aspect in that it was entirely focused upon the condition of blacks in Arkansas.
While the NAACP concentrated on winning court rulings that would have a national
impact, the CNO was determined to focus upon the immediate needs of those living in the
state. It resolved to be attuned to their problems, in a way that an organisation based in
New York would find difficult to accommodate. Few people understood the local situation
better than W. H. Flowers and fewer still were quite so well equipped to begin the
enormous task of trying to change it. Flowers's father was not only a businessman but also
a leading Mason. His mother was a schoolteacher. He was a lawyer. All the Flowers
family, who were well respected and well known in black Arkansas, had strong links to the
church. With a working, first-hand knowledge of all these different organisational power
structures within the Arkansas black community, and direct contact with its various
strands, Flowers understood exactly which channels he needed to work thorough in order
for the campaign to be effective. In later years Flowers outlined his two-step strategy for
community mobilisation which he followed when campaigning for the CNO. The first step,
he stated, was to "identify yourself with the organised strength in the Negro community."
If there was no such strength Flowers would "get busy organising it" which he did in
several places by setting up indigenous branches of the CNO. The second step was to
harness the organised strength in the community and re-deploy it toward the fight for civil
and political rights. "The name of the organisation doesn't matter" declared Flowers. "The
Aldon Morris, The On gills of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organising for Change
(New York: Free Press, 1984), p. 100.
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important thing is for Negroes to get together and start working in the field of social
action."44
It was precisely this philosophy which Flowers enacted in his early years of
campaigning with the CNO. After the initial meeting at Stamps that had launched the
organisation, Howers set off on a speaking tour of the state in an attempt to muster support
from grassroots organisations in the various communities that the CNO needed to succeed.
To do this meant tapping into, harnessing and re-deploying the already existing centres of
influence, which resided in different institutions, organisations and individuals in different
places. On April 7, 1940, under the sponsorship of the Hope Interdenominational
Ministerial Alliance, in southern Arkansas, around three hundred blacks turned out to hear
the CNO programme explained. The message was reported as "enthusiastically received."
At Potsdelle, in eastern Arkansas, on April 14, approximately six hundred people listened
to a meeting held under the auspices of the local branch of the NAACP. On April 16, the
Negro Business Club of Morrillton sponsored a mass meeting in central Arkansas of over
two hundred citizens. On May 5, the Lewisville Negro Taxpayers Association in southern
Arkansas acted as hosts. There, more than 250 persons pledged their support to the
programme. Although not under the direct guidance of the CNO, numerous other meetings
were held in support throughout the state.45
The series of mass meetings culminated in the "First Conference on Negro
Organisation" September 27, 1940, held at Lakeview Junior High School, a recently
completed federal Farm Security Administration (FSA) project. Located in the heart of the
Arkansas delta, the conference exposed the CNO to exactly the kinds of inequalities against
which it was fighting. Difficulties were encountered from the outset. Chairman of the local
Arkansas Gazette, July 31, 1988.
The CNO Spectator, July 1, 1940, WHFP.
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white school board, Lester Wolfe, ordered FSA officials to prevent the meeting from taking
place, claiming that he had been "misled" as to its true purpose. In spite of the typically
conservative attitude of local black leaders from the NAACP calling for the conference to be
cancelled, since they feared the possibility of angering the local white population, Flowers
firmly stood his ground and proclaimed that the meeting would take place "even if we have
to use the banks of the lake which borders this United States Government project."46
Eventually, local white officials relented and the meeting went ahead. At the
opening address, Flowers told the crowd that they had been brought together to try to
"devise a program of action" to combat discrimination against Negroes "merely because of
the color of their skin." Flowers spoke of organising Arkansas's half a million Negroes
through a programme of definite aims and objectives to improve their standing in the state
and cultivating a leadership able to vigorously pursue them with successful results. "For
six months we have obtained the endorsement of twenty-one organisations, with a
numerical strength of approximately ten thousand Negro citizens" Flowers claimed.
Further, Flowers outlined the achievements of the CNO to date. Thirty-five investigations
had been carried out over colour discrimination in public works employment, a ban
preventing blacks from participating in opportunities provided by the National Youth
Administration (NYA) in Jefferson County had been removed, and the first Negro census
enumerator ever to be hired in the state had been employed in St. Francis county. Sixteen
mass meetings had taken place with a total attendance of over four thousand people. 47 For
the first time blacks were beginning to show their disdain of the segregated system in large
numbers and the white power structure in the state, albeit on a small scale, was responding
by an acquiescing to some black demands.
Press Release, October 12, 1940, WHFP. Accounts of the meeting appeared in various black newspapers
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After the successful three-day conference at Lakeview, Flowers kept up the
pressure for a concerted challenge to the white power structure in the state. On January 1,
1941, Flowers spoke to the White County Chapter of the Lincoln Emancipation league,
urging them to help build an organisation that would be "truly representative of the people."
Moving on to the Salem Baptist Church he warned, echoing the rhetoric of the NAACP,
that "a voteless people is a hopeless people." Explicitly drawing upon the fight against
racism in Europe, and America's possible entry into World War Two, Flowers declared
that "the success of our effort to make democracy a way of life for the peoples of the world
must begin at home, not after a while, but now." Flowers focused blame for the lack of
black activism in the state on the complacency of the existing leadership of professionals,
preachers and businessmen, particularly lambasting "the pussyfooting educators on the
public payroll, who are only submissive to those responsible for their jobs."48
Flowers continued to stump the state making speeches throughout the year in an
effort to mobilise support. The next step, of converting organisational strength and
enthusiasm into direct gains, came with the poll tax drives in September 1941, when
Flowers and the CNO urged blacks to pay the tax before the October 1 deadline for voter
qualification. Under the direction of the CNO, Dr. Roscoe C. Lewis, a physician from the
town of Hope, ran a poil tax purchasing campaign in southern Arkansas, whilst W. L.
Jarrett, an undertaker from Morriliton, supervised in the North. The drive confirmed the
success of the CNO's ability to tap the strength of grassroots organisations and mobilise
them effectively to pursue a new goal of black rights. The expanding base of CNO support
included help from the NAACP branches at Warren, Potsdelle and Phillips county; from
business organisations like the Morrillton Business Club, the Conway Negro Business
League and the Brinkley Negro Chamber of Commerce; from civic associations like the El
Press Release, September 11, 1941, WHFP.
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Dorado and St. Francis Negro Civic League and the Lewisville Negro Taxpayers
Association; from fraternities like the Tau Phi Chapter of the Omega Psi Phi fraternity; from
Masonic groups like the Order of the Eastern Star and the Free and Accepted Masons of
Arkansas; from religious organisations like the Bethlehem District Association of the
Missionary Baptist Church, the Middle Western District Baptist Association, and the
Phillips, Lee, Monroe and Desha District Baptist Associations; and finally, from
indigenous CNO organisations founded where no centres of organisational strength already
existed, at Camden, Menifee, Crosssett, Dermott and Fort Smith.49
"Drive to Increase Race Votes Is Successful" headlined the State Press, the Little
Rock-based black newspaper, at the end of the CNO's campaign. A record turnout of black
voters was anticipated. 5° Emboldened by this expectation, Flowers and the CNO began to
test the impact that the upsurge of interest in black voting rights would have on the state's
white power structure. Before the election, in line with the NAACP's fight to put pressure
on state Boards of Education to provide equal facilities for black graduate students, the
CNO petitioned Governor Homer Adkins to assist Arkansas's black graduates in light of
the fact that no facilities existed for them in the state. "We direct your attention to the
growing unrest on the part of the Negro race" Flowers wrote to Adkins. "They no longer
are willing to remain on their knees begging for the rights, privileges and immunities of
Negro citizenship."5 ' Adkins passed the letter on to the State Department of Education,
which fervently resisted the idea of spending money on education for blacks and suggested
using the latest increase in funds at Pine Bluff Agricultural Mechanical & Nonnal
(AM&N), the state's only publicly funded black college, to pay for out-of-state
scholarships. With the implementation of this plan left to college trustees, no action was
taken and the situation remained at an impasse. Dissatisfied with the way Adkins and the
9 Ibid., September 4, 1941; Stale Press, September 19, 1941.
Ibid.
51 Press Release, September 11, 1941, WHFP.
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State Department of Education feigned action whilst in fact doing nothing to address the
situation, Flowers called together influential Negro educators from throughout the state for
a conference which he demanded with the state commissioner for education, Ralph B.
Jones. As a result of that meeting, a few weeks later the first of fourteen $100 awards that
year was given to Flower's brother, Cleon A. Flowers, to help with his studies at Meharry
Medical College in Tennessee.52 Although the scholarships still enabled the state to dodge
the issue of proper provisions for black graduates within Arkansas, it did offer the
beginnings of a solution and paved the way for Flowers to successfully press for an end to
segregated black graduate facilities within a period six years.
Two years after the organisation had first been launched, the CNO could claim a
number of concrete achievements, each more probing of the policy of segregation and
discrimination than the last. Significantly, the first big breakthrough for black rights in
Arkansas came in the same year that the State Press printed Flowers's photograph with a
caption that acknowledged the fact that "He Founded A Movement." 53 In March 1942, Sue
Morris, a black Little Rock schoolteacher, filed suit on behalf of the Little Rock City
Teachers Association (CTA) for the right to be paid the same salary as white teachers in the
city's schools system. The case proved to be the first successful attempt by blacks in
Arkansas to win equal rights through the courts. 54
 Flowers's admonishing of teachers to
be more concerned with the struggle for black rights and his encouragement to take a stand
paid off. The case had a long-term impact on the struggle for black rights in Arkansas. The
teachers' victory was not only a breakthrough for black Arkansans, but also proved to be
one of the NAACP's most important national triumphs in an area to which they had
52 Ibid.; Stale Press, May 15, 1942.
3 Ibid., March 6, 1942.
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Association, 1981), pp. 89-91.
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devoted much time and attention. 55 The local efforts attracted the help of Thurgood
Marshall whose presence in Little Rock helped garner a great deal of support for the
organisation there. With such a renowned national figure as Marshall taking an interest in
the affairs of Little Rock's black community, a new interest was awakened in the NAACP,
and according to reports from Mrs. H. L. Porter, the local branch secretary, membership
dues began to take a dramatic upswing. "He sure did shoot them some straight dope as to
their part and membership to be played in the NAACP cause" Porter declared, adding
"Then and there at that meeting we collected $68.50 in membership." 56 In response to this
rising local interest, the national headquarters of the NAACP began, in turn, to take more
of an interest in the state. In 1945 an Arkansas State Conference of NAACP Branches
(ASC) was established, with Flowers finally receiving his original wish to bring
organisation, direction and purpose to black activism in the state when he was appointed as
its chief recruitment officer.57
As the NAACP grew in the state the groundwork done by Flowers and the CNO
remained very much apparent since the local organisation created the infrastructure,
provided the leaders, and ensured the successes for the national organisations in the state
that were to follow. In politics, the year before the ASC came into existence, the Smith v.
Allwright (1944) ruling by the United States Supreme Court outlawed the all-white
Democratic party primaries that had previously prevented blacks in the state from exercising
a meaningful say in elections. Although white Arkansas Democrats tried to preserve racial
exclusion by instituting a complex system of "double primaries," in which local and state
election primaries remained segregated, whilst federal primaries were desegregated, the
expense, plus the time-consuming, cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures involved
Mark Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1 950 (Chapel Hill:
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soon led to its collapse.58 Because of foundations laid by Flowers and the CNO, when
blacks could finally reap the benefits of the vote in the late 1 940s, they began to make an
immediate impact in significant numbers: from 1.5% of voting age blacks registered in
1940, the number had expanded to 17.3% by 1947. Through poll tax drives, voter
education rallies, and the general raising of political awareness and activity, Flowers and
the CNO made sure that black political organisation pre-dated national rulings.
Flowers and the CNO effectively provided a blueprint for other local political
groups who worked alongside the NAACP in the unfolding civil rights struggle. These
groups, building upon the leverage gained with the white community through the political
empowerment of the black community, dedicated themselves to mobilising the vote and
using it as a tool with which to elicit concessions from the white power structure. In Little
Rock, for example, black soldiers returning from World War Two formed the Veterans'
Good Government Association (VGGA) under the charge of Charles Bussey who, like
Flowers, hailed from Stamps, Arkansas. The VGGA ran voter registration drives in the
city and helped to challenge the inactivity of the existing black leadership there. In 1947,
Bussey successfully ran for the position of "bronze mayor," an annual election that was
usually a formality of ratifying an unofficial mayor for blacks supported by whites. Bussey
and the VGGA upset the usual smooth-running of the election by persuading blacks to vote
for him, a result that clearly upset whites since they cancelled the usual celebration banquet
alter the victory of an unendorsed candidate. 60 Bussey also had a hand in helping to form
the East End Civic League (EECL) which represented a depressed black area in Little Rock.
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The EECL was run by Jeffrey Hawkins and helped to put pressure on white politicians for
the improvement of street lighting, roads and pavements in the community.6 ' These
groups, modelled upon, and riding the tide of black activism created by Flowers and the
CNO, became part of the wider struggle to translate a raised black political consciousness
throughout the state into various forms of political activism whereby blacks could secure
tangible material improvements in their everyday lives.62
In the state courts, Flowers continued to trailbiaze a path for black civil rights. Out
of the many cases which Flowers fought in an effort to win equal treatment for blacks, the
Wilkerson (1946) case had the most profound impact. In the case, two black men stood
accused of killing two white men, an act which usually swiftly and routinely brought with
it an automatic death sentence. However, in this instance, Flowers managed to get their
sentences commuted tojail terms, an unprecedented concession in the tense atmosphere that
traditionally surrounded such a trial in the South. At the same trial Flowers successfully
demanded that some black jurists were allowed to sit injudgement on the case, the first
time this had happened in the state since the days of Reconstruction. These achievements
were even more remarkable given the fact that Flowers was the only one of the eight black
lawyers who practised in the state at the time who represented his clients without the
counsel of a white lawyer and thereby contravened the established racial etiquette of the
Arkansas courts. As a courtroom pioneer, Flowers was a role model which other emerging
civil rights lawyers aspired to emulate. Wiley Branton, who grew up in Pine Bluff where
Flowers built his law practice and later became a leading civil rights lawyer with the
NAACP, head of the Southern Regional Council's (SRC) Voter Education Project (VEP)
in the South, and eventually the Dean of the Law School at the prestigious Howard
61 Jeffrey Hawkins, interview with John Kirk, September 30, 1992, UNOHC.
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University in Washington D. C., recalled that Flowers's courtroom battles had "a major
impact on the view of black people... that maybe there is justice after all."63
Branton was one of a number of young lawyers in the 1950s to benefit directly
from W. H. Flowers's struggle to improve black educational opportunities. In 1948 it was
Flowers who handled the admission of Silas Hunt to the law school at the University of
Arkansas at Fayetteville. Hunt's was one of several cases which Flowers pursued to gain
admission for blacks to the graduate school and it was this pressure, coupled with national
rulings gained by the NAACP at the time, which finally persuaded white authorities to
desegregate without going to court. When Hunt enrolled in February 1948 he became the
first black student to attend classes with whites at a university anywhere in the South since
Reconstruction. 64 Hunt's admission to the Law School led to others taking up the practice
of law in Arkansas and using their skills to further the civil rights struggle in their own
local communities instead of leaving with scholarships for other states. Through his work
in helping to desegregate graduate facilities Flowers helped to forge the opportunities upon
which a cadre of new, young black attorneys built their careers, which subsequently
enabled them to take Flowers's place in the legal battle for black rights. The long lasting
impression Flowers had on the black legal profession in Arkansas can still be seen today as
the state black lawyer's association bears the title of the William Harold Flowers Lawyers
Association in his honour.
In the field of black secondary education Flowers played an important role in the
attempt to get school boards to desegregate state facilities. In 1949 Flowers filed one of the
earliest suits for school desegregation against the DeWitt school board in eastern
63 Arkansas Gazette, July 31, 1988.
Guerdon D. Nichols, "Breaking the Color Barrier at the University of Arkansas," Arkansas Historical
Quarterly 27 (Spring 1968), pp. 3-21.
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Arkansas.65 Significantly, DeWitt, alongside other school districts in which flowers
helped to mobilise parents to take action for desegregation in the late 1940s and early
1950s, were the same areas that witnessed the most intense pressure to desegregate schools
after the United States Supreme Court Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision.
flowers thus directly helped to lay the foundations for the statewide attack on
desegregation through the courts upon which later black activists successfully built.
The campaigns run by flowers and the CNO in the early 1940s were a resounding
success. Working with limited resources they managed to provide the leadership,
organisation and direction to effectively channel the rising aspirations of the state's black
population into political action that began to yield concrete rewards. Yet both flowers and
other CNO members realised that their efforts could not succeed without the help and
support of other black groups at a local, state and national level, flowers and the CNO saw
themselves as catalysts for change, first and foremost encouraging others to lend their
support in the struggle for black rights in Arkansas. In particular, a major obstacle to
effective statewide mass mobilisation of the black population, continually criticised by
flowers and the CNO, was the conservatism and complacency of existing black leaders
and organisations in Little Rock. An important part of the work of flowers and the CNO
was to provide a statewide context that would encourage and enlist the help of blacks in
Arkansas's capital city, the most important hub of black organisational activity in the state,
to take a more active stand in the struggle for black rights. Only through achieving this goal
could blacks in Arkansas begin to attract the vital outside help required from organisations
like the NAACP. Therefore, the most immediate and direct consequence of the success of
flowers and the CNO was the increasing scrutiny upon Little Rock's black leadership and
the raised expectations that they should live up to their potential and spearhead the
developing struggle for black rights in the state.
65 State Press, July 15, 1949.
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CHAPTER TWO
CHALLENGES: VOTERS, TEACHERS AND SOLDIERS
As black activism began to take root across Arkansas it became clear that black
leaders in Little Rock, who had previously been reluctant to surrender their existing status
for the uncertainties of protest, could not afford to ignore the statewide agitation for
change. Aware of the increasing restlessness and dissatisfaction over their leadership
abilities, members of the black elite in the state capital slowly began to respond to a
changing constituency of support for black activism. At the same time, the shape and form
which protest activities in Little Rock took were clearly tempered by the conservative
outlook of black influentials in the city. The contradictions involved in acknowledging the
need for black advancement, whilst trying to preserve some of the benefits and status
conferred by the segregated order, along with efforts to maintain the goodwill of whites,
remained distinctive hallmarks of early black rights campaigns there.
After its defeat in the 1928 lawsuit, ANDA had lain dormant for over a decade. Yet
with the new interest in voting rights stimulated by Flowers and the CNO the organisation
made an attempt to renew its own efforts. In December 1940 Robinson petitioned the new
Democratic State Committee (DSC) to modify its rules to allow blacks to vote in the
Democratic party primaries. Robinson, whilst seeking the right to vote, still offered the
reassurement to whites that ANDA did not seek "mass voting" by blacks. Rather,
Robinson claimed, ANDA asked only that those who could qualify for the privilege to vote
"under challenge" an assertion that actually seemed to invite laws used in the rest of the
South, such as a poll tax or literacy tests, to prevent mass black participation at the polls, be
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allowed to do so. Robert Knox, the Democratic Committee chairman, referred the matter to
a subcommittee where the issue was shelved indefinitely.1
Without the strength of numbers to back up their demands ANDA could do little to
protest the decision. Whereas Flowers and the CNO could draw upon a grassroots
statewide network of members and organisations to help press their demands and assert
black rights, the limited scope of action, aims and backing for ANDA precluded such bold
measures. As a result another two years passed before a new campaign for black voting
rights was launched in Little Rock. When the issue resurfaced it was prompted by
developments at a national level when The United States v. Classic(1941) came before the
United States Supreme Court. The case, which concerned fraud in the Louisiana state
primary elections by opponents of Huey Long, did not deal directly with the voting rights
of blacks, but did involve the legal question of the constitutional status of primary
elections. When the Supreme Court handed down its decision it ruled that discriminatory
practices in primary elections, although they did not directly interfere with the right to vote
in general elections, "may... operate to deprive the voter of his constitutional right of
choice." The Court therefore concluded "We think the authority of Congress... includes the
authority to regulate primary elections."
The recognition of the primary as a form of election that could be subject to federal
jurisdiction undermined claims by state and local Democrats across the South that their own
private rules should govern those elections. Certainly, NAACP attorney Thurgood
Marshall regarded the decision as "striking and far reaching" in terms of future possible
attacks on the white primary system in the South. 2 Local black leaders echoed Marshall's
sentiments, including Dr. Robinson, who viewed the decision as "distinctly clarify[ing] our
1 Arkansas Gazette, December 8, 1940, clipping in PCDCCS.
2 Hine, Black Vic1or, pp. 202-207.
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position in the coming political enigma." Discussions were subsequently held amongst
leading Negro Democrats to consider voting procedures. In the main, keeping the
sensibilities of the black elite within sight, these stressed the importance of good manners
as Robinson advised members of ANDA "to avoid sidewalk and barber shop politics" and
insisted that "We are on trial and we must practice decorum." A letter was sent from ANDA
to United States Attorney General Francis Biddle asking for his support in allowing blacks
their legitimate voting rights as inferred in the Classic decision. Robinson informed Biddle
that a petition to secure such rights had been ignored by the Democratic party in Arkansas.3
In July 1941 ANDA announced that a meeting of the organisation would take place
to allow members to discuss tactics for an attempt to vote in the forthcoming Democratic
party primary elections. Robinson remained at pains to appease white Democratic party
officials as much as possible, re-iterating his contention that ANDA did not wish to gain
"mass voting of negroes." Robinson claimed that "We only want orderly, liberty loving,
loyal negro Democrats to vote for congressional and senatorial candidates." In reply,
various reasons were given by those who held high office in the party as to why the
Supreme Court ruling would not affect them, but all offered the same conclusion: blacks
would still be barred from voting. June Wooten, secretary of the Pulaski County
Democratic Committee (PCDC), simply stated that under the rules of the Democratic Party
of Arkansas (DPA) blacks could not vote in primary elections. Governor Adkins, when
questioned, replied that the issue was "clearly a matter of party regulations" with the party
reserving an inherent "right to make their own rules." Joe C. Barrett, chairman of the DSC,
felt that the burden for enforcement fell on the election judges and clerks in each precinct,
adding however that "the party rules speak for themselves in the matter" and that he
remained confident they would be complied with.4
' Arkansas Gazette, April 12, 1942, clipping in PCDCCS.
Ibid., July 22, 1942.
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Meanwhile, Robinson was buoyed by a reply from the United States Attorney
General's office that stated that although it was not the place of the Attorney General to
offer an official opinion on the matter "the denial of the right to Negro voters to participate
in the primary elections has been the subject of a series of conferences within this
department." Attorney General Francis Biddle recommended that Robinson confer with
Thurgood Marshall whom his office had already been in touch with. As a result of this
encouragement Robinson was confident that the colour barrier would be broken in the
city's Democratic party primaries the following week and declared that "there is no question
but that we shall go to the polls Tuesday and vote for candidates for Federal office." 5
 The
sentiment was repeated at a meeting of "more than 100 well-dressed Negroes" at
Dreamland Hall on Ninth and State streets. In a speech simultaneously broadcast over the
radio waves by KLRA-Little Rock, Robinson told the audience that he expected no trouble
at the polls from whites and warned that blacks should conduct themselves in an orderly
manner. Robinson advised black voters to demonstrate civility and that "if any [primary
election] judge denies you the right to vote. I suggest that you bow politely and leave the
booth without ado." In spite of this advice, Robinson reiterated that he did not anticipate
"any trouble" or expect "any denial" of the vote. ANDA secretary J. H. McConico told the
gathered crowd "We are not asking pity or any special favours, we are simply seeking to
exercise those rights and privileges guaranteed to free men in a free country." White party
officials remained adamant that blacks would not vote in the party primaries, although one,
with a worried eye on the possibility of federal intervention, was willing to admit
reluctantly that the tenure of the New Deal Court and the current mood of the Justice
Department might invalidate the outcome of the primary if blacks were prevented from
voting.6
Ibid., July 23, 1942.
6 ibid., July 24, 25, 27, 1942.
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The test of the implications of the Classic ruling for black Arkansans came the
following Tuesday when the Little Rock Democratic party primaries were held. The first
black voter to attempt to cast a ballot was a Baptist minister who was refused entry to the
polling booth by the election clerk. A further request by the ministerjust to see a blank
ballot was also denied. Similar events occurred throughout the city, with an estimated 75 -
100 blacks sent away from the voting booths. This group included a consortium of
professionals who headed the black Democratic organisation, including, I. T. Gillam,
president of Gibbs Elementary School, T. W. Coggs, president of the Arkansas Baptist
College, and J. H. McConico, secretary of ANDA. There were no reports of violence at
any of the polis. In fact, Robinson claimed that he had been treated "very courteously" by
election officials, who received a memorandum on election day reminding them that the
only persons qualified to vote were "WHITE DEMOCRATS."7
After the elections Dr. Robinson filed a report of events to Thurgood Marshall. In a
resigned and typically cautious manner Robinson wrote that "They [white Democrats] made
their decisions and made it stick. We'll just have to let things cool off for a while until
everybody gets level headed again." Indicating the influence that the support of outside
organisations could have on sustaining local black protest, discussions with the head
offices of the NAACP brought a more emboldened statement from ANDA that, if blacks
were not allowed to vote in the following Tuesday's second primary, they would "appeal to
the federal courts for relief." At the same time, Robinson, obviously uneasy with such
threats, and perhaps still wary of the costs involved with the previous failed suit, remained
hesitant about taking the case to court. In a letter to the DPA state secretary, Harry Combs,
he stressed in conciliatory, almost apologetic terms, "We hope you understand that this will
be a friendly suit, with no financial or penal objectives." Court action was viewed strictly
'' Ibid., July 29, 1942.
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as a last resort. Combs bluntly replied that "The same rule that applies to the first primary
applies to the second primary."8
As the position of stalemate continued at the local level action was again only
stimulated by a ruling from the United States Supreme Court. Soon after the Ciwisic ruling
in 1942, Thurgood Marshall launched a test case in Texas in an attempt to get the courts to
apply the new precedent in party primaries to black voting rights. The Smith v. Allwright
case, similar to litigation existing in several other states, finally came down decisively for
black voting rights with the declaration that the all-white Democratic party primaries were
unconstitutional. 9 The immediate reaction from Arkansas's white officials was encouraging
for black Democrats. June Wooten, secretary of the PCDC, conceded that the ruling would
mean that blacks would be able to vote for federal offices the following summer. However,
Wooten did not totally admit defeat in the matter, as he stated that he still believed blacks
could be denied the vote in state elections for office, since the Supreme Court ruling
covered only federal elections. Even in the federal elections at which blacks were able to
vote, some semblance of segregation was envisaged by providing separate ballot boxes for
black and white voters. Although the Supreme Court had this time provided as clear as
possible a mandate to allow blacks the vote in DPA primaries, in the light of past events,
Robinson was wary of the outcome, issuing a statement to the press that he was "hopeful"
that the committee would "grant us the privilege" of voting.10
Some encouragement was provided when the United States Assistant Attorney
General Cleveland Holland put forward a more liberal interpretation of the Supreme
Court's ruling than white Arkansas Democrats had. He emphasised the "state and national"
clause of the written judgement which he held to mean that blacks could vote notjust in
8 Ibid., August 4, 1942.
Hine, Black Victory, pp. 212-229.
10 Arkansas Gazette, April 4, 1944, clipping in PCDCCS.
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senatorial and congressional races "but may be able to vote for state and local offices as
well." 1 1 With the backing of federal government behind them, yet another meeting was
held by ANDA, at Dunbar High, to discuss plans for voting in the following summer
primaries. This time, in his letter of invitation to the meeting, Robinson expressed
confidence to ANDA members that "a definite understanding with the majority group" had
been reached. 12 Such optimism was borne out by the announcement on May 17, 1944, that
the DSC would meet in the morning at the Hotel Marion to amend party rules, allowing full
participation by blacks in DPA primaries. By the simple act of removing the word "white"
from Rule No. 2, which read that only "all eligible and legally qualified white electors"
could vote in Democratic primaries, the long struggle by blacks to gain that vote would be
over. 13
White supremacy in the DPA proved all too tenacious for such a simple and
apparent solution. After all the positive signs, the issue of black voting rights was stymied
at a meeting of white Democrats the following morning. The move towards black
Democratic party primary suffrage was blocked by Governor Adkins, who, in a letter to the
meeting, stated that the proposal to remove the voting restrictions placed upon blacks "does
not coincide with my views in any respect." Furthermore, he urged that no action be taken
"as it is entirely a matter for the convention and legislature to settle." 4 In the meantime,
Adkins pressed for the initiation of further steps to prevent blacks from voting. Seeking to
circumvent the Smith v. Allwright decision, in June 1944, just before the summer
primaries, Adkins advocated barring black voters on another "basis than that of race or
color." What he had in mind, he revealed, was a "loyalty clause" basing denial of the vote
on the grounds that blacks had been loyal to, and participated in, the Republican party. This
11 Ibid., April 11, 1944.
12 Ibid., April 22, 1944.
Ibid., May 17, 1944.
Ibid., May 18, 1944.
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general theme was taken up by DSC chairman Joe C. Barrett, who suggested that the
"white" restriction be removed to make way for rules allowing wider "freedom" for white
Democrats to prevent black voting.15
The new measures to prevent black ballots being cast were put into effect the
following month when the party amended two rules to its constitution. First, the
Democratic state convention voted to include a clause in their constitution that stressed the
"good faith" of prospective voters to replace the "white electors" clause. The clause
required that voters in DPA primaries be "not only in sympathy with the principles and
policies of the Democratic Party, but with their practical application in government affairs"
(presumably including racial exclusion). Second, the convention altered Rule No.3 in the
party constitution to read that qualified electors consisted only of, i/those "eligible for
membership in the Democratic Party," ii! those not "affiliated with the Republican Party or
with any other political organisation that is opposed to the Democratic Party," iii] those who
had "openly declared [their] allegiance to the principles and policies of the Democratic
Party," iv/ those who had not voted against a Democratic nominee within the last two
years, v/those who had supported anyone who espoused an anti-Democratic cause, and vi/
all those who were not in sympathy with the success of the Democratic party. These tests
were to be administered by white Democratic party election judges, who were asked to
reach a "majority decision" in deciding whether the voter was allowed to cast their ballot or
not. The parameters for denying the right to vote were drawn so wide and contained so
many ambiguous clauses, open to an apparently infinite number of interpretations, that
anybody could have been prevented from voting, black or white, if the rules were stretched
far enough. For all the jargon, in practice the rule changes were merely a new set of
restrictions that could be used to disfranchise black voters.16
15 Ibid., June 4, 1944.
16 C. Calvin Smith, "The Politics of Evasion," pp. 47.
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The convention also decided to try and circumvent possible future federal court
rulings by passing a resolution to put pressure on the state legislature to change the
prescribed political party rules to allow white Democrats the right to "prescribe the
qualifications for its own membership" and "to prescribe qualification for voting in its party
primaries." At the same convention, Dr. Robinson was called upon as a representative of
ANDA to put his organisation's point of view. Clearly angered by the proceedings,
Robinson declared that when the law dictated such, blacks had "stayed away from the
polls" but now that the law was on their side, he expected white Democrats to be "equally
subservient to the law." He reminded participants at the meeting that members of ANDA
had been "Democrats true and tried since 1928," and stressed that they sought "no racial
equality." As usual Robinson insisted that the privilege of voting was principally a matter
of exercising rights guaranteed under the constitution.'7
Robinson's plea did little to persuade white Democrats. Later that month, when Dr.
Robinson announced ANDA's support of Governor Adkins for the forthcoming election,
Adkins replied curtly that the endorsement was "neither wished or solicited by me." Adkins
went on to declare that "the Democratic Party in Arkansas is the white man's party and will
be kept so... If I cannot be nominated by the white voters of Arkansas I do not want the
office." 18 Whilst the loophole existed between the ratification of the new party rules and
their acceptance by the Arkansas Supreme Court, Democrats allowed blacks to vote in the
city primaries. This right was to be short lived. 19 In January 1945, at the biennial Arkansas
General Assembly, the Trussell Bill ratified the changes to DPA membership rules and the
Moore Bill initiated a complex segregated "double primary" system to disfranchise black
voters. The double primary system provided for city and statewide primaries to exclude
17 Arkansas Gazette, July 9, 1944, clipping in PCDCCS.
18 Ibid., July 20, 1944.
19 Ibid., July 26, 1944.
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blacks, and federal primaries at which blacks could vote but only at segregated ballot
boxes.20
The renouncement of Robinson's support was followed by a direct personal smear
designed to discredit and weaken black Democrats. In September 1944, Arkansas Secretary
of State C. G. Hall claimed that Robinson was not eligible to vote because of a conviction
for manslaughter in 1911, for which he had served two years in the penitentiary, before
being released on parole. Hall claimed that Robinson had never been pardoned for the
offence and thus could not qualify as a registered voter. Hall was technically correct in his
observation, although Robinson was under the impression that a pardon had been granted
by Governor Hays after his release from prison. 2 ' Clearly, the issue was raised at an
opportune time,just after the Supreme Court decision to allow blacks to vote in the
primaries, as a thinly veiled threat to the ANDA leader that he risked further persecution if
he continued with his political activities. The blatant attempt to intimidate Robinson
worked. In exchange for his citizenship rights restored, Robinson offered not only to
resign as the president of ANDA, but to "permanently cease and terminate all my activities,
political or otherwise" linked to the organisation. 22
 It fell to Governor Adkins to grant or
withhold a pardon. Since the ploy to intimidate ANDA's leader had clearly proven
successful, Adkins issued a pardon, but only after the elections had gone by and he was re-
elected as governor. 23 Although Adkins did not insist on Robinson terminating his
leadership of ANDA or ceasing his activities in politics, the intimidatory tactics had a
definite impact on the activities of black Democrats in the city as subsequently their
activities declined and no more attempts to assert black voting rights were forthcoming.
20 C. Calvin Smith, "The Politics of Evasion," pp. 48-49.
21 Arkansas Gazette, September 17, 1944, clipping in PCDCCS.
22 Ibid., September 23, 1944.
23 State Press, November 17, 1944.
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While the efforts of Robinson and ANDA to secure black voting rights were
important, of even more impact was a second significant strand in Little Rock's black
activism during the early 1940s. This took the form of a teachers' salary equalisation suit
filed by the Little Rock Classroom Teachers' Association (CTA). Like ANDA's renewed
efforts, the teachers' salary suit had roots in the burst of activism set in motion by W. H.
Flowers and the CNO, which singled out teachers in particular for their lack of contribution
to, and interest in, the struggle for black rights. There were other important similarities
between the fight for black voting rights and the teachers' salary equalisation suit with
regard to the development of black activism in Little Rock. The approach of both
organisations in addressing racial matters was very much rooted in the black elite's self-
serving attitude to the struggle for black rights that pursued narrowly defined aims and
objectives, addressing the needs of only a small, influential elite, and acting specifically in
their interests, rather than attempting to address more broadly defined racial inequalities.
Moreover, both employed a court-based form of redress that did not encourage mass
participation by other members of the black community and, in keeping with the desire of
the black middle-class to minimise conflict and antagonisms with the white community,
neither group sought to challenge the segregated order but rather asked for concessions
within the existing boundaries of white domination. Yet there was an important distinction
between the two actions that proved decisive to their respective outcomes. Although the
teachers, like ANDA, drew upon regional and national developments in black activism,
they were ultimately more successful in engaging support from the national headquarters of
the NAACP whose backing, resources and experience, working in harmony with local
people, proved vital to the success of the action.24
From the mid-1930s Charles Houston at the NAACP's New York headquarters
recommended a two-pronged attack on segregation in education, through teachers' salary
24 Mark Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 21
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cases and in attempts to gain admission for blacks into university and professional graduate
programmes. The teachers' salary cases were especially appealing since the disparities of
pay between black and white teachers were in most cases blatantly apparent, therefore
establishing the fact that discrimination existed was relatively easy. Moreover, teachers
offered a large potential pool of plaintiffs from the NAACP' s projected middle-class
constituency of support. Gains made in teachers' salary suits, Houston argued, would help
to bring more money into the black community. As a result, the cases would help to bolster
black businesses and potentially bring greater support from influential local black leaders
for the organisation's activities. From the teachers' point of view, salary suits offered the
immediate gain of higher wages plus the incentives of legal and financial assistance from
the NAACP to help strengthen their cause. With a high element of self-interest involved,
there was a greater likelihood that personal rivalries in the black community would be put
aside with a goal of economic self-betterment at stake. At the same time, the teachers'
salary suits were not as threatening as other forms of litigation since they made no
challenge to the ethos of "separate but equal" but, in fact, to some extent actually helped to
reinforce the principal by asking that it be applied fairly rather than abolished altogether.
The suits therefore theoretically caused less strife to defendants, who were more likely to
concede to equalisation than desegregation, and appealed to teachers, who were less likely
to support more militant and controversial forms of action. Above all, the greatest incentive
was that the NAACP had proved that teachers' salary suits were winnable.25
The first successes in the teachers' salary cases came through the efforts of
Thurgood Marshall who quickly became the champion of the cause. In his home state of
Maryland, Marshall won his first teachers' salary case in 1937 when a county school board
agreed to equalise black teachers' salaries in an out of court settlement. Marshall gained his
first court ruling in favour of equalisation in the same state in November 1939. Building
25 Ibid., pp. 13, 20-2 1.
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upon these victories, Marshall looked to pursue similar suits across the South. However,
although there were enquiries from teachers' groups in Florida, Alabama, Kentucky and
Louisiana, no significant breakthroughs came. In some places teachers withdrew from the
case because their jobs were under threat as a result. In others the school board managed to
string out the case in the courts to try and dishearten and intimidate the teachers through
delaying tactics. Another ploy used by school boards was to offer out of court settlements
on condition that teachers drop their salary suits first, which then left the teachers in a
dubious legal limbo.26
The NAACP also encountered problems when working with the black community.
Often it could prove difficult to find lawyers who were willing to handle litigation at a local
level, and even when they did, communications with them could break down and
jeopardise the case. Since the NAACP could not, for legal reasons, openly solicit teachers'
cases, they were dependent upon plaintiffs coming forward. A decision to take on a local
white school board required considerable courage, exposed the plaintiff to recriminations
and, because the cases were often very lengthy, required a large amount of staying power.
In spite of these drawbacks, the NAACP persevered and were rewarded with a victory in
1940 when an Appeals Court upheld the case of Melvin Alston, president of the Norfolk
Teachers' Association in Virginia, for equal pay.27
The Aiston ruling represented the NAACP's first victory in a teachers' salary case
in the South and had a direct bearing on the decision by Little Rock teachers to take similar
action. The CTA watched the teachers' salary cases develop from Maryland to Virginia
with a keen interest. After the Aiston ruling they organised a Salary Adjustment Committee
(SAC) to launch their own suit.28 In February 1941 Miss Solar M. Caretners, secretary of
26 Ibid., pp. 20-26, 116-122.
28 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
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SAC, wrote to both Melvin Aiston at Norfolk, Virginia, and Walter White at NAACP
headquarters, to ask for advice about "the method of procedure and techniques of bringing
about equal salaries for teachers." 29
 Following recommendations from the replies, SAC
conducted research to gather the details of the exact amounts of pay disparity that existed.
The study confirmed the huge gap in pay between black and white teachers. On average,
white teachers were paid a salary of $1,216 per annum, whilst black teachers received only
$724 per annum, for the same work, in the same schools system.3 ° In light of these
figures, the teachers drew up a petition for the equalisation of salaries and proposed a three-
year plan to phase out the existing inequalities gradually. The petition, signed by all the
city's black teachers, was then presented to the Little Rock superintendent of schools who
passed the matter on to the Little Rock school board. The school board chose to table the
subject indefinitely. Over the summer, to add insult to injury, the school board actually
increased the pay disparity between black and white teachers when it came to its annual
review of salaries. Enraged by this action, together with continued refusals to discuss the
matter of pay differentials by white school board officials, the teachers began to contribute
to a fund for a salary suit and retained local lawyers Robert A. Booker and Scipio Jones in
preparation for the case.31
The determination of the CTA to press ahead with their case took Thurgood
Marshall by surprise. In reply to his advice that teachers wait until they received their salary
schedules for the 1942-1943 academic session before taking further action, an adamant
CTA urged that this would only serve to weaken their case as they claimed they were ready
to go to court immediately. Since the teachers' salary case offered an ideal opportunity to
advance their national agenda, and the action was being supported enthusiastically in Little
29 Miss Solar M. Caretners to Melvin 0. Austin, February 20, 1941; Miss Solar M. Caretners to Walter
White, February 22, 1941, group II, series B, container 174, folder "Teachers Salaries, Arkansas, Little
Rock, Morris v. School Board (General) 1941-1943), NAACP (LC).
30 Survey of Negroes in Little Rock, p. 41.
31 J. L. Wilson to Thurgood Marshall, December 9, 1941, group II, series B, container 174, folder
"Teachers Salaries, Arkansas, Little Rock, Morris v. School Board (General) 1941-1943), NAACP(LC).
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Rock, the NAACP agreed to lend their support. Thurgood Marshall arrived in Little Rock
in February 1942 to assist local attorneys in filing the suit. The day before going to court
Marshall attended a meeting of the CTA and witnessed them adopt a final resolution to go
ahead with the action. Marshall noted with interest that the teachers insisted upon voting
individually on the matter and performing a roll call of votes to ensure complete unanimity.
All present at the meeting voted "yes" to press on in pursuit of their demands. "Boy"
Marshall reported back to Roy Wilkins, suitably impressed, "these Southern Teachers have
acquired new backbones." Confirming Charles Houston's belief that teachers' salary suits
would help spread support and enthusiasm for the activities of the organisation as a whole,
Marshall added in his letter that all members of the CTA had pledged themselves as
NAACP members "and not just for one dollar memberships either."32
A distinct advantage for the NAACP in filing the Little Rock lawsuit was the
abundance of willing and eminently qualified plaintiffs. The organisation thus had the
luxury of selecting the person they felt best suited for the case. The standard bearer who
eventually emerged was Miss Sue Cowan Morris, head of the English Department at
Dunbar 1-ugh. Morris was born and raised in the small town of Eudora, south Arkansas,
where both her parents were schoolteachers. With a keen understanding of the value of a
good education, Morris's parents made the necessary sacrifices to be able to afford to send
their daughter to the best schools available for a black southern female at the time. Morris
was put into private school in the fifth grade at Clinton, Mississippi, moving to Spelman
College in Atlanta for her seventh and eighth grades. After graduating from Tougaloo High
School in Alabama, she gained a degree in English at Talladega College, in the same state,
before being hired to head the English Department at Dunbar High, Little Rock, in 1940.
The majority of schools Morris attended were run by the Congregationalist church, which
hired mainly white teachers, and were therefore, unlike many other schools for blacks,
32 Thurgood Marshall to Roy Wilkins, February 28, 1942, group II, series B, container 174, folder
"Teachers Salaries, Arkansas, Little Rock, Morris v. School Board (General) 1941-1943), NAACP (LC),
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accredited state institutions. Morris's education continued after her appointment at Dunbar
High. During the summer of 1941 she attended a graduate programme at the University of
Chicago where she made straight "A" grades on the course "Methods of Teaching
English." This exceptional educational career made Morris an ideal candidate for a salary
test case since her qualifications were not only as good as, but considerably better than
most white teachers in the Little Rock schools system.33
On February 28, 1942, Scipio Jones filed the teachers' salary equalisation suit on
behalf of the CTA against the Little Rock school board and Superintendent of Schools,
Russell T. Schobee, in the United States District Court at Little Rock. In the provisional
hearings Jones argued that since black and white teachers in the Little Rock schools system
did the same job, and were required to have exactly the same minimum qualifications, the
disparity in pay between the two was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution that guaranteed equal treatment under the law. 34 The immediate reaction from
the Little Rock school board and the superintendent of schools was one of defensiveness,
followed by incredulity and amazement. Russell T. Schobee called the suit "untimely and
ill-advised" and claimed that Little Rock had one of the "best educational systems for
Negroes in the entire South" which officials in the city looked to improve "whenever
possible." Why, in such a situation, wondered Schobee, at a time when "national unity"
was at stake, had black teachers chosen to disrupt the progress that had already been
made?35
Attorneys for the school board took a far more sophisticated approach. They
claimed that no racial discrimination existed in the policy of teachers pay since the criteria
the school board used to determine salaries were based solely upon the "special training,
Sue Cowan Moms, interview with John Kirk, January 8, 1993, UNOHC.
Arkansas Gazette, March 1, 1942.
35 Ibid., March 13, 1942.
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ability, character, experiences, duties, services and accomplishments" of teachers. By
ingeniously implying that black teachers were inferior to white teachers due to a variety of
imprecise indicators defined by the white school board, without actually mentioning race as
a factor, the attorneys both dodged the issue of discrimination and justified the present
situation of inequality. Judge Thomas C. Trimble upheld the school board attorney's
argument by refusing to rule on Fourteenth Amendment rights. Moreover, he dismissed the
case altogether on the technicality that the CTA was an unincorporated organisation that
could not file suit in a federal court. Trimble did not kill the suit off completely, however,
since he agreed to hear the plea of Sue Morris as an individual plaintiff at a later date.-36
At the Sue Morris trial, held between September28 and October 2, 1943, Thurgood
Marshall, alongside local attorneys Scipio Jones and Robert. A. Booker, continued to
argue that the Fourteenth Amendment rights of their client were being violated. They
contended that since their client was being paid less than white teachers who had the same,
or in many cases fewer qualifications, she was not being granted "equal protection" under
the law. John Lewis, principal of Dunbar High school, testified that in his opinion Morris
"ought to be a Group 1 [highly rated] teacher." Indeed, Lewis recommended this rating to
Charles R. Hamilton, principal of the white Garland High school, who was in charge of
setting the ratings for Dunbar High teachers above and beyond the discretion of its own
principal. In court Hamilton admitted that he based his judgements on only "three or four"
visits to Dunbar High every year. In support of Lewis's testimony, Sue Morris told the
court of her educational background and the qualifications that she held.37
In spite of gaining the early upper hand, when the school board put its case
Marshall soon found out that they had hired "top flight lawyers" who "really meant
business." The school board attorneys continued to hammer on the argument that teachers
36 Ibid., May 21, 1942.
Ibid., October 3, 1942.
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were not judged by the colour of their skin but rather on a merit system. The school board
then pulled what Marshall referred to as their "trump card" by producing a merit ratings
sheet for 1941, based upon the factors outlined in the previous hearings, which showed
that most black teachers in the Little Rock schools system were, as Marshall put it,
"lousy."38
 Furthermore, the school board attorneys bolstered their argument by calling as a
witness Annie Giffey, white supervisor of primary teachers in Little Rock, a well-known
and well-respected woman of thirty-one years teaching experience, who testified that
"regardless of college degrees and teaching experience no white teacher in Little Rock is
inferior to the best Negro teacher." From finely argued points of law to blatant racism, the
school board attorneys covered all the ground that they thought might sway the court. The
hearing, which Marshall referred to as "the hardest so far" did not leave him very optimistic
about the eventual outcome of the suit.
Judge Trimble handed down his ruling in January 1944, taking an exceptionally
long time in deliberation, a delay which Marshall referred to as "killing" for the case. 4° In
the meantime, black educators in Little Rock found that the tactics of the school board to
win the case and ensure no further "trouble" would be caused stretched beyond the legal
system as the feared recriminations began. At the end of the 1942-1943 academic year,
without any prior explanation, Sue Morris's employment in the Little Rock schools system
was terminated. After spending a brief time teaching at Pine Bluff AM&N she moved back
to Little Rock to take up a post working in a munitions factory. It was ten years before
Morris was again hired as a teacher in Little Rock, and only then after considerable
pleading on her behalf by the new black school principal at Dunbar, together with an
apology from Morris herself, which was demanded by the school board for filing the suit
38 Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, p. 120.
39 Arkansas Gazette, October 3, 1942; State Press, October 9, 1942; Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law,
p. 120.
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in 1942.41 The principal of Dunbar High, John Lewis, who testified in the case, left his
position at the end of the 1942-1943 academic year. In his letter of resignation to
Superintendent of Schools Russell T. Schobee, Lewis stated that it was the "definite
dissatisfaction" shown by the school board over his part in the teachers' salary suit that left
him with no other course of action but to leave his post. For the sake of the school and to
retain his "own personal integrity" -- refusing to back down on what he had said and done
in court -- Lewis left Dunbar High and went to run the privately funded Shorter College.
Another forced resignation came when John H. Gibson, head of the CTA, abdicated his
position after pressure from the school board.42
When Judge Trimble finally announced his verdict in the teachers' salary case he
ruled in favour of the school board. The decision pandered to both the legal and racist
arguments put forward by attorneys. On the one hand, Trimble rebutted the legal argument
of Marshall and the CTA attorneys by deciding that no ruling on the rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment was "deemed essential to a final disposition of the case."
Rather, Trimble stated, the defendants had a right to "fix the salary of each individual
teacher according to their real worth and value to the system as teachers" and were not
bound to "adhere to some arbitrary standard of college degree, years of experience, or
some other mechanical method in determining salaries." On the other hand, Trimble's
decision clearly demonstrated that his legal reasoning was based upon his own racial
beliefs. The Judge went on to praise the "sincerity, frankness" and "fair-mindedness"
displayed by Superintendent of Schools Russell T. Schobee, along with the demeanour of
all the white teachers who had testified in the case, whom he described as "men and women
of the highest calibre, civic minded [and] desiring to serve the community." Although
nothing whatsoever to do with the legal case argued in court, Trimble upheld the
41 Moms interview.
42 State Press, May 28, 1943; Patterson, History of the Arkansas Teachers Association, p. 90.
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intimidatory tactics used by the Little Rock school board in dismissing those who had
sought to challenge the racial status quo when he declared that the school board was well
within its rights to "refuse or fail to execute a new contract at the expiration of the old...
whatever their reason for doing so."
Despite the setback, Morris, on behalf of the CTA membership, continued to fight
the case to a successful conclusion in the Eighth Circuit Appeals Court at St. Louis. On
June 19, 1945, Appellant Judges Sandborn, Woodrough and Thomas ruled that "very
substantial inequalities have existed between the salaries paid to white teachers [and black
teachers] and that such inequalities have continued over a period of years." The crucial
question in the case, the Justices stated, was whether there was a "policy or custom of
paying negro teachers less for comparable service than was paid to white teachers solely on
the basis of color." In direct contrast to the ruling of Judge Trimble at Little Rock, the
Appeals Court ruled that "the record compels the conclusion that such discrimination did
exist."44 The victory marked a significant triumph for Morris, the CTA and the NAACP.
Historian Mark Tushnet describes the Little Rock teachers' salary case as "the most
important" of its kind. 45 Certainly the NAACP were overjoyed at the outcome, as they
issued a triumphant news release that "NAACP WINS DOUBLE VICTORY IN
ARKANSAS TEACHERS SALARY CASE" (the "double victory" referred to the
overturning of a lower court decision and the favourable ruling of the Appeals Court).46
Although the teachers' salary case proved that local blacks could take on figures of
white authority in the courts and win, it also illustrated the costs of black activism. The case
cost the jobs of Sue Morris, the plaintiff, John Lewis, the headmaster of Dunbar High, and
Arkansas Gazelle, January 6, 1944.
44Ibid.
Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, p. 90.46 Press release, June 21, 1945, group II, series B, legal files, container 174, folder "Teachers Salaries,
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John Gibson, head of the CTA, reminding the black population at large that anyone who
challenged white authority was subject to reprimand and recrimination. The dismissals
served particularly as a warning to those whose influence in the black community was
derived from white controlled funds and support, which at the time included a significant
section of the black elite in the city, as to the tenuous nature of their status. Moreover, the
white school board demonstrated that despite the successful legal outcome of the case for
black teachers they could still maintain a large degree of control over their pay. Whilst the
case was on appeal the school board instigated a merit ratings system of pay that anticipated
the eventual outcome of the suit. Therefore, by the time the decision for equal pay was
handed down from the Appeals Court, a new system had already been introduced which
could not be proved to discriminate against black teachers on the grounds of race.47
Although this meant a tokenistic increase for some black teachers, the initiative for pay rises
still rested with the school board. In later years this led to a continued disparity in black and
white teachers' salaries that again made it necessary to seek redress through the courts.48
Many of the advantages that the NAACP predicted as a result of a successful
teachers' salary suit came to fruition in Little Rock. The case, which focused on the
economic self-interests of the teachers, did indeed help to reinforce solidarity amongst the
CTA membership and mitigated against the internal divisions that frequently scuppered
protest activities. Local interest in the NAACP was awakened by the suit. The pledges of
membership and financial contributions demonstrated that offering help to local
communities could in return bring rewards for the national organisation. However, the
teachers' salary suit also highlighted the limitations of black rights campaigns organised
around the self-interests of the black elite. Although the case fostered some amount of
community pride in attacking discrimination, it singularly failed to awaken an ongoing
interest in protest activities. The vast majority of the black population were neither involved
47 Arkansas Democrat, September 21, 1944.
48 The Bulletin of the Arkansas Teachers Association, 19 (January 1947), p. 1.
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in, nor directly affected by, the teachers' salary suit and as a result there was no widespread
impetus for further action. As with the fight against the all-white Democratic party
primaries, narrowly defined and limited demands together with a court-based form of
redress failed to engage or tap into the potential support of the wider black population in the
city. Even though the teachers' salary suit was successful in the courts, without the
strength of numbers to back up and help demand enforcement of the victory, whites could
still exercise control and influence over the few who were involved in protest activities and
by so doing could circumvent many of the legal gains which it had initially won.
In contrast to the battle to gain a place in the all-white Democratic party primaries
and the teachers' salary suit, there was a third instance of black activism in Little Rock
during the early 191Os that did generate widespread interest in the black community and
offered the first significant signs of a mass campaign for black rights in the city. The killing
of a black soldier, Sergeant Thomas P. Foster, by a white city policeman, was part of a
nationwide upswing in racial conflict during World War Two. With over eighty per cent of
black soldiers trained at army bases in the South, many of who came from the North and
were unaccustomed to the racial mores of the region, racial tensions, particularly in large
urban areas in close proximity to those bases, often became fraught. The sight of black
troops in uniform in towns and cities, often in large numbers, sometimes armed, affronted
the southern creed that blacks should be deferential and "know their place." Both on army
bases and off, Jim Crow laws were stringently enforced and small-scale scuffles over
minor infringements could quickly develop into full-scale riots. Racial conflict between
black soldiers and white military and civilian policemen who were charged with enforcing
Jim Crow policies, a job that they took on with a great deal of zest, was a particular source
of concern. In 1941 there were reports of fighting between black soldiers and white police
at army bases across the South from Camp Davis, North Carolina, to Camp Wallace,
Texas. During 1942 interracial violence escalated still further. Early that year attempts by a
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white military policeman to arrest a drunken black soldier in Alexandria, Louisiana,
sparked a race riot that resulted in the deaths of twenty-eight blacks and nearly 3,000
arrests. Throughout the year an epidemic of race riots spread across the nation from Fort
Dix, New Jersey, to Vallejo, California.49
Arkansas had already experienced racial conflict due to the presence of black troops
in the South before the killing of Foster. In August 1941 the 94th Engineers, an all black
regiment, was called to Louisiana for manoeuvres. Made up largely of Chicago and Detroit
blacks, many of the soldiers experienced southern racism on the journey from their base in
Fort Custer, Michigan, for the first time. At Murfeesboro, Tennessee, the regiment was
harassed by highway patrolmen, and whilst stationed at the newly opened army base at
Camp Robinson, Little Rock, a fight between a black sergeant and a white city policeman
received a good deal of publicity and earned condemnation of the black soldiers from local
whites. A few days later, three hundred black soldiers from the 94th Engineers went into
the small town of Gurdon, Arkansas, on day passes, where they met with a frenzied
reaction from local whites who demanded that they be removed immediately. The soldiers
were incensed when their white commanding officers backed local whites and ordered them
to leave, which they did, whilst hurling abuse at passers by and blocking traffic in town to
show their displeasure. The following night state policemen arrived at the army camp of the
black soldiers with a warning that they should leave the area quickly to avoid further
trouble. As the soldiers moved out the next day they were again accosted by state
policemen who responded to calls complaining of an unruly black "mob" in the vicinity.
The policemen began pushing the black soldiers off the road and demanded that the white
commanding officers "get them black bastards off the concrete." A major conflict was only
avoided when white commanding officers persuaded the black soldiers to retreat into the
woods. That night, because of the treatment afforded to them and their perceived lack of
Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence," pp. 661-681.
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defence against it, sixty blacks went AWOL and fled the South. Six were eventually
charged with desertion, five tried, and their cases dismissed. No charges were brought
against the state policemen, who had broken the law by invading a military camp.5°
The incident at Gurdon and the conflict that had already occurred at Little Rock
provided the context within which a new black regiment of the 92nd Engineers arrived at
Camp Robinson later that year. The tensions that existed with the close proximity of the
black soldiers to the city came to a head in early 1942 when a chain of events that unfolded
on March 22 led to a fatal encounter between a black sergeant and a white city policeman.
The incident began when Private Albert Glover was arrested by two white military
policemen for being drunk and disorderly. Glover was in the black downtown area of West
Ninth street on a weekend pass from the army base. Intoxicated, Glover became
obstreperous and resisted the efforts of the two military policemen to take him back to the
army base.51 Two city policemen, Abner J. Hay and George Henson, who were nearby,
decided to intervene in the matter. They rushed to the scene and proceeded to beat Glover
over the head repeatedly with their night-sticks, causing a wound to his head that began to
bleed. The military policemen took Glover to a first aid station for soldiers located on the
eight hundredth block of West Ninth street to allow him to receive treatment for his injury.
In the meantime, the scuffle between Glover and the policemen in the busy downtown area
led to a crowd of around four hundred people, the majority of who were black, gathering at
the first aid station to see what the commotion was about. Members of the crowd were
prevented from entering the first aid station by city policeman George Henson, who stood
outside, with his gun drawn and trained upon the crowd. 52 Inside, Glover remained
50 James Albert Burran III, "Racial Violence in the South during World War II" (Ph.D. dissertation
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uncooperative, refused to submit to treatment for his head wound and insisted that he
would not leave the downtown area until he found "the boy I came into town with." The
military police then dragged him outside to a truck that stood waiting to take him back to the
army base.53
Just as Glover was being taken from the building, Sergeant Thomas P. Foster, a 25
year-old black North Carolinian, also of the 92nd Engineers and on a pass from Camp
Robinson, came out of a building on West Ninth street and saw the commotion outside the
first aid station. Foster walked to the scene, pushed through the crowd, and upon
surveying the situation demanded to know why the two white military policemen were
handling the case in such a manner, protesting in particular at the involvement of the two
white city police officers. Foster explained that he had direct orders from his superiors to
investigate and take charge of any incidents occurring in town involving the men of the
92nd Engineers. One of the military policemen snapped at Foster that if he didn't like the
way Glover was being dealt with he could investigate it later. Foster replied that he
intended to follow his orders and investigate the matter immediately. In an attempt to calm
rising tempers one of the military policemen offered to take Foster to speak to the
Lieutenant in charge of military police in the city and pursue the matter with him. Foster
stood his ground, refused to be taken anywhere, and demanded an immediate justification
for the heavy-handed treatment of Glover. At that point the military policemen placed
Foster under arrest and began to forcibly remove him from the scene by grabbing an arm
each and dragging him down West Ninth street. Enraged at this treatment, Foster broke
loose, whereupon the two military policemen grabbed him again, and a fight ensued.54
The crowd that had formed outside the first aid station followed the fight between
Foster and the military policemen down West Ninth street. Some in the crowd demanded
Arkansas Gazette, March 23, 1942.
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that Foster be released; when that failed, attempts were made to release the sergeant by
force. In the general milieu one of the military policemen lost his night-stick and drew a
pistol. When Foster saw the gun he grabbed hold of its cylinder in an attempt to move it
away from him. The other military policeman then hit him over the head with his night-
stick to make him release his grasp. During the scuffle, the pistol went off, and city
policeman Abner Hay fired his gun in the air to clear the crowd. Foster then pulled clear of
the policemen and stumbled across the road to a small church. A small section of the crowd
followed to where Foster was backed up into an alcove in the churchyard. City policeman
Hay offered to go and grab Foster and put him in the army truck for transportation back to
Camp Robinson, if the military policemen would make a pathway through the crowd to
enable him to do so. The military policemen agreed to the plan. 55 However, when they
parted the crowd, instead of apprehending Foster and taking him to the still awaiting truck,
Hay dived on top of the black sergeant and another fight ensued. When it appeared that
Foster was getting the better of Hay, the other policemen weighed in with their night-
sticks, hitting Foster over the head repeatedly until, dazed and semiconscious, he rolled off
Hay.56
Hay immediately stood up and emptied his gun into Foster's prostrate body, hitting
him with four shots, three in the stomach, one in the ann, with a filth bullet going astray.57
Further incensing the crowd, Hay then calmly filled and lighted his pipe and blew smoke
over the dying soldier's body as they waited for an ambulance to arrive. 58 Foster was
eventually taken to hospital in an ambulance provided by the local black undertakers
Dubisson and Co., where he was operated on, but died just a few hours later. 59
 Whilst
Foster was being treated in hospital, Glover was taken back to Camp Robinson and city
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policemen were deployed into the black downtown area of West Ninth street to quash what
the white Arkansas Gazette newspaper termed as the "riot" that followed Foster's shooting.
Immediate steps were taken by officials at the Camp Robinson army base to diffuse the
situation; a convoy of army trucks was sent into town under the command of Major H. V.
McCoy to round up all black soldiers in Little Rock and return them to camp where they
were to remain cordoned off from the city.6°
The following day investigations of the incident began. In Little Rock, Chief of
Police J. A. Pitcock and Dr. C. C. Reed, Jr., the deputy coroner, took charge of
proceedings, whilst a Board of Inquiry was instituted at Camp Robinson by the military
authorities to determine whether Foster had died in the line of duty.61 Whilst miii taiy
investigations continued, within three days the city investigation ruled that the shooting of
Foster by city policeman Hay was a "justifiable homicide." Reed declared that statements
given by the military police corroborated with Hay's testimony "in every detail" in insisting
that Foster had grabbed Hay's night-stick and was about to attack him when the policeman
shot in self defence. For his part, Chief of Police Pitcock let it be known that he was
considering banning the sale of alcohol on Saturday and Sunday nights in some black areas
of town, but beyond that, was to take no further action.62
As far as the white authorities in Little Rock were concerned the matter ended there.
'I he reaction from the black community was not so casual. In particular, black anger was
inflamed and sustained by the way that a new black newspaper, the State Press, recently
established in the city, reported the incident. The State Press was run by Lucious
Christopher ("L.C.") Bates and his wife Daisy Bates, newcomers to the city in 1939.63
L.C. Bates was born and raised in Mississippi, gained a degree in journalism from
60Ibjd
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Wilberforce College in Ohio, and worked for a short time in Colorado before joining the
staff of the Kansas City Mail in Missouri. Bates lost his job during the Depression and
turned to selling insurance. It was through selling an insurance policy to her father that L.
C. Bates met his future wife, Daisy (née Gaston) Bates. 64
 Daisy Bates grew up in the small
town of Huttig, Arkansas, where her early determination to take a stand for black rights
was influenced by the knowledge that her mother had been raped and killed by a group of
local white men when Daisy was still an infant.65 Shortly after moving to Little Rock, L.
C. Bates persuaded his wife that they should set up their own newspaper as a vehicle for
their own commitment to black activism and black rights. At first, Daisy Bates objected,
fearing that the venture would bankrupt them both. Ultimately, it was the conviction that "a
newspaper was needed to carry on the fight for Negro rights" in the city that persuaded the
couple to engage in the business venture.66
The State Press's editorials proved an important harbinger of a new militant black
agenda for Little Rock, as opposed to the existing black newspaper, The Southern Mediator
Journal, which invariably went along with the established black leadership's line of caution
and conservatism. The Bateses became good friends of W. H. Flowers and helped to
disseminate the programme of the CNO in Little Rock, carrying news of, and lending
support to its campaigns across the state. In turn, Flowers wrote for the State Press and
regarded the Bates' home as a welcome stopover whenever he visited Little Rock. 67 As in
other cities during World War Two, the existence of a dissenting voice in the black
community provided by a militant black newspaper, highlighting injustices in a
64 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, p. 33.
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36.
76
straightforward no-nonsense manner, would have a significant role in shaping black
activism in the city.68
The State Press reported the shooting of Foster as one of the "most bestial murders
in the annals of Little Rock tragedies" and gave the story extensive front page coverage.69
Unhappy with the investigation carried out by the white city authorities, the newspaper put
pressure on local black leaders to form a committee to examine the case further.70 The
findings of the black investigation committee, which included respected members of Little
Rock's black professional and business class, moved to take action through popular
demand aroused by the reporting of the State Press, were unequivocal on the matter. The
committee declared that Foster was brutally murdered by a city police officer who clearly
exceeded his authority and used unnecessary force in a legitimate enquiry by a black officer
about civilian police handling military matters. Refuting the testimony of the white
investigation, the committee claimed that they had "clearly established" from interviews
with "white and colored" witnesses that Hay was not under threat from Foster when he
shot the soldier, but rather, Hay had "deliberately stood over Sgt. Foster while he lay
helpless on the ground. ..and pumped five bullets into [him] • "7 1
As a result of the dogged reporting of the State Press and the formation of a Negro
Citizens' Committee (NCC), which comprised members of the original black investigation
team, interest in the Foster case grew both in the city and across the state. The NCC
planned to deliver its findings at a public meeting scheduled for Sunday, March 29, at the
First Baptist Church in Little Rock at 4.00 p.m. By 1.00 p.m. a large crowd was already
gathered for the meeting with blacks from "all sections of the state" turning up to hear the
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evidence. At the commencement of the meeting J. H. McConico, secretary of the NCC,
read out the principal findings of the investigation. First, the NCC found that Foster was
unarmed and prostrate on the ground when Hay shot him and that "regardless of what had
transpired previously, the shooting was unjustifiable." Second, they declared that the white
military police stood "idly by" and did not offer proper protection to prevent the shooting of
the soldier. Third, the report contended that no rioting took place in the aftermath of the
shooting as reported in the white newspapers, and that no attempts were made by the
crowd to interfere with civil or military officers, but rather "under the influence of mass
psychology [the crowdi attempted to push up as close to the centre of excitement as
possible."72
McConico's address was followed by speeches from two pastors whose views
vividly illustrated the contrast between those in the city who supported a more assertive
stand for black rights and those who continued to urge caution. In militant and angry
rhetoric, Rev. G. Wayman Blakely of Bethel AME Church demanded that black policemen
be hired to police West Ninth street. "Until this is done" Blakely demanded "place on West
Ninth Street the most experienced and level headed men who are not the negro haters you
have on the force." In a far more conciliatory and conservative speech, Rev. E. C. Dyer
offered a different solution to the situation by urging that no more black soldiers should be
sent to Camp Robinson and called the removal of black troops from the base in the wake of
Foster's death "the answer to my prayer." The meeting ended with a resolution to send the
report of the NCC, along with a petition for a more "thorough investigation" of what had
taken place, to the mayor of Little Rock, the Little Rock prosecuting attorney and the
United States District Attorney. Copies of the affidavits and petitions were also sent to
President Roosevelt, United States Secretary of War Stimson and the commanding General
at Camp Robinson.73
72 Ibid., April 5, 1942.
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In response to the letter sent to the prosecuting attorney, Sam Robinson, the NCC
received a reply that promised a thorough investigation of events. In spite of this, no less
than four subsequent reports returned the same verdict of "justifiable homicide" in the
Foster case. However, continued pressure from the State Press in Little Rock, together
with the national news headlines that the case began to attract, with German propaganda in
particular highlighting the injustices taking place in the hometown of General Douglas
MacArthur, finally brought about federal intervention in the matter.74
One specific area of concern in the case was highlighted by Virgil L. Peterson,
Inspector General of the War Department, after his review of the testimony in the Camp
Robinson investigation. Peterson found that the "Opinions of the Board" significantly
conflicted with the report of the city. Although officials at Camp Robinson stated that
Foster's death was a result of "misconduct" since he "unlawfully resisted arrest" it also
found fault with the military policemen's handling of the situation with Private Glover,
and, more importantly, with the actions of city policeman Abner Hay. According to the
report "policeman Hay was too hasty in opening fire [and] his further action of firing three
more shots into the body of Sergeant Foster and then lighting his pipe nearly caused a riot
and are major factors in the present state of tension existing between the two races in this
area at the present time."75 Peterson's office was informally advised that the Civil Rights
Section of the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice was interested in the case
since the circumstances surrounding the shooting seemed to be "far from justifiable." The
crux of the matter, Peterson believed, was the "necessity that soldiers, white or colored, be
afforded protection when on a pass in a civilian community."76
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In late 1942 the case against city policeman Abner Hay finally came before the
federal Grand Jury of the Eastern Arkansas Division in Little Rock. United States Attorney
General Francis Biddle sent a special assistant, Frank Patton, to present the case against
Hay. On the opening day of the proceedings the continued concern over the shooting of
Foster was demonstrated when blacks from the city crammed into a crowded courtroom. It
was clear from the outset that even in a federal court, the case was not exempt from white
intimidation: a 23 member jury, including only 3 token blacks, was instructed by Judge
Thomas C. Trimble to use "common sense" in returning a verdict and were advised that
they should only indict Hay if it "would... serve some useful purpose." 77 After hearing
testimony from 25 of the 43 witnesses called, including 10 blacks, it took just two days for
the jury to reach its verdict. The shooting of Sergeant Thomas B. Foster by Abner J. Hay,
the Grand Jury reported, had been "investigated, considered, and ignored" by a vote of 19
to 4. The refusal to convict Hay of the killing was aided by conflicting testimony from
witnesses, some of who backed Hay's story that he had only fired at Foster when under
attack.78
 Of more influence in the case, the attorney general's office concluded, was the
"strong racial sentiment" involved, together with the cunning ploy of the defence in
announcing that Hay had enrolled into the army for service at Camp Robinson. 79 It was
these two factors -- the racial element and the sense of not serving "some useful purpose"
by indicting a white soldier -- that allowed Hay to, quite literally, get away with murder.
The verdict of the Grand Jury left Little Rock's black citizenry far from satisfied.
Outrage in the black community was reflected in the editorials of the State Press which
launched a crusade to highlight the mistreatment of both black soldiers and civilians by
white city policemen and issued calls for the instatement of black police officers to patrol
black areas. The campaign proved so venomous that white city businessmen, fearful of the
' Arkansas Gazette, June 11, 1942.
78 Slate Press, June 12; Arkansas Gazette, June 12.
Wendell Berge to Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio, June 17, 1942, A.G. 291.21, R.G. 407, NARA.
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negative impact it might have on the city's image, attempted to put the paper out of
circulation by withholding advertising revenue. When that failed, they offered a direct bribe
to editor L. C. Bates to let up on the criticism. The Bateses weathered the boycott, refused
the bribe, and continued to campaign for black police officers. 80 Wary of the sentiments
expressed by the black population, white city newspapers began to join in the debate over
the killing of Sergeant Foster, with the Arkansas Democrat printing the claim that the
incident had nothing to do with police brutality but was rather part of a "nation-wide
campaign by the black press and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) to use the war to undermine white supremacy on the home front."81
Contrary to these claims of sedition, the State Press's demand for the appointment of black
police officers was backed by the United States Army. When a new detachment of black
troops arrived at Camp Robinson in August 1942, their white commanding officer, Major
Richard Donovan, made a speech at a local businessmen's dinner at which he suggested
that white city police officers "make less use of the night-stick technique of reasoning with
black soldiers" and that black police officers should be hired to patrol black areas in order
to prevent the same kind of tragedy as befell Foster.82
Donovan's remarks, the long-standing campaign by the State Press, and the
pressure exerted by the white business community, finally led to the appointment of Little
Rock's first black police officers to patrol West Ninth street. The appointment did not come
without substantial opposition from the Little Rock Policemen's Association (LRPA), who
complained, in an effort to guard total white supremacy on the force, that black police
officers would not strictly police black areas which would result in further lawlessness.
Although the Little Rock City Council ignored these objections, the appointment of black
officers again reflected the ability of white authorities to determine the nature and extent of
80 Bates, The Long Shadow, pp. 36-37; Arkansas Gazette, March 30, 1942; August 24, 1980.
81 Arkansas Democrat, March 23, 1942.
82 Arkansas Gazette, August 13, 1942.
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any black gains. Eventually, eight black policemen were hired to take charge of the city's
25,000 blacks. Even then, black police were only given permission to patrol the downtown
black areas with limited powers of arrest. 83 Black officers were also forced to suffer
unequal employment conditions, for example, they were refused the same pension benefits
as white officers. As a mandatory prerequisite of being hired a special clause in the
contracts of black policemen required them to waive such equal treatment. It was only ten
years later that this clause was removed as a result of the pressure exerted by a burgeoning
black electorate, in a political manoeuvre by one white city alderman, Franklin Loy, to win
black votes.84
The period of World War Two saw blacks begin to organise and mobilise in a new
and more determined push to win equal citizenship rights in Arkansas. The task was far
from easy since there were many obstacles within the black community itself preventing the
formation of a successful strategy for black activism. Conservative black leaders dominated
many of the significant organisational networks within Little Rock and throughout the state
which hindered attempts to redirect the interests of those valuable community resources
toward the pursuit of a more militant black activist agenda. Throughout the period, voices
of dissent, most notably at a state level in the efforts of W. H. flowers and the CNO and in
Little Rock via the pages of L. C. and Daisy Bates's State Press newspaper, began to assert
that the position of the black population could only be bettered through a raised racial
consciousness that would embrace the many rather than just a few. Tentatively, responding
to these calls and the rising tide of discontent amongst the black population, even more
conservative sectors of the black community attempted to challenge whites, with a mixed
degree of success. Early efforts, such as those of ANDA and the CTA, awkwardly tried to
reconcile black activism with a deeper rooted conservative impulse to pursue narrow self-
interests and to avoid unpleasantness and antagonism in the process. However, as the
83 Stale Press, August 21, 1942; Arkansas Gazette, August 19, 1942.
84 Little Rock City Council Minutes, Book A-4, January 28, 1952, City Hall, Little Rock, Arkansas.
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shooting of Sergeant Thomas B. Foster demonstrated, racial matters affected all of the
black community and only with persistent demands backed by the strength of numbers
could gains be made permanent. This growing realisation meant that class divisions within
the black community were significantly less of an obstacle to black activism by the mid-
1940s than they had been at the beginning of the decade.
Even with a new-found and developing racial consciousness within Little Rock and
the rest of the state, which was beginning to form a credible platform for extending a black
activist agenda, there still remained a wall of white opposition to any alterations in the racial
order. Whites proved more than capable of stymieing embryonic black protest through a
variety of mechanisms. Informal pressures and implicit threats of retribution effectively
prevented many grievances from ever being articulated by the black community. If black
protest did manifest itself, white authority could be mobilised at a number of levels to halt
it, as the threats to Dr. Robinson and the firing of teachers as a result of the salary
equalisation suit demonstrated. Even if black protest did manage to escape these fetters, it
met with racism in the courts. Local and state judges were tempered by the same racial
outlook as much of the rest of southern society and few were willing to rule in favour of
black rights. Only by making it through to the higher Circuit or even the United States
Supreme Court did black rights have a realistic chance of being upheld; even then there
were no guarantees. Moreover, a successful high-court outcome was again subject to local
white scrutiny when being implemented. Through slight alterations to the existing
segregated order whites could effectively limit the damage of court rulings and render hard-
won legal rights practically useless.
Yet during the post-war period the hitherto solid wall of white resistance to racial
change began to show cracks. Efforts by local blacks were increasingly bolstered by a
rising tide of black militancy nationwide. In particular, the growing numbers of black
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voters in the North, who had escaped the fetters of southern disfranchisement, were
beginning to make an impact on national politics. In 1947, responding to shifts in the
electorate, President Harry S. Truman appointed a Committee on Civil Rights to investigate
racial discrimination and charged its members with finding ways in which the issue might
be addressed. Later that year they produced a report entitled To Secure These Rights,
which proposed a package of civil rights measures including legislation designed to stamp
out lynching, to remove obstacles to black voting, and to end segregation in certain areas,
such as interstate transport. 85 A year later, according to sociologist Jack Bloom, "treatment
of blacks emerged as a central issue for the first time ever in a presidential election." 86
 The
United States Supreme Court also responded to a changing racial climate. Throughout the
early years of 1940 the Court had taken an increasingly emboldened stance against black
disfranchisement in the South, culminating in the landmark Smith v. Allwright decision. In
the late 1940s, the Court began extend its rulings against white supremacy to higher
education. 87 Whites across the South grew wary of the shifting sentiment in the nation on
the issue of black rights. With federal government less likely to turn a blind eye to civil
rights violations or support overt racism, white Arkansans found themselves having to
rethink the nature of the racial order within the state. The tensions between a rising tide of
black activism coupled with federal pressure, and the desire of whites to maintain the ethos
of segregation, helped to usher in a new era of race relations.
85 Lawson, Running for Freedom, pp. 31-40.
86 Jack M. Bloom, Class, Race and tile Civil Rights Movement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1987), p. 74.
87 Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, chapters 4 and 5, and Making
Civil Rights Law, chapters 9 and 10.
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CHAPTER THREE
CHANGES I: "ONE OF THE MOST PROGRESSIVE STATES IN THE
UNION"
The campaign by Sidney Saunders McMath for governor of Arkansas in 1948
seemed to be a promising sign that the state might respond to a changing social and racial
climate voluntarily, without the need for federal government intervention. McMath, an ex-
marine who launched his political career by taking on and beating the corrupt political
machine of Mayor Leo McLoughlin in Hot Springs en route to the state executive office,
was part of a South-wide movement that pressed for regional reform. Based upon a
platform that pledged better public health, education and welfare, a raft of new southern
politicians, often ex-servicemen, led a "G.I. Revolt" to promote economic growth and
industrialisation as a cure for southern financial and social ills. The successful election of
reformers to key offices across the South heightened expectations for change. Upon
McMath's election, president-elect Harry Truman hailed his victory as "governor of one of
the most progressive states in the Union" adding "Arkansas stands on the threshold of a
great opportunity. It can go forward with progress under... enlightened leadership."1
Although by no means militant advocates of challenging the existing racial order, McMath
and other newly elected progressive politicians understood that if the problems of poverty
and social backwardness were to be tackled in the South, blacks could not be excluded
from their programme of reform. Blacks took heart from this, with even the normally
sceptical State Press declaring that in the 1948 elections "FOR TI-JE HRST TIME IN OUR
LIVES we felt we were voting for SOMETHING."2
I Harry S. Truman to Sid McMath, January 5, 1949, series 1, box 1, folder 1, Sid McMath Papers,
University of Arkansas Special Collections Division, Fayetteville.
2 State Press, November 5, 1948. On the "G.I. revolt" and southern liberalism in the post-war era see Tony
Badger, "Fatalism, not Gradualism: Race and the Crisis of Southern Liberalism, 1945-1965, " in Brian
Ward and Tony Badger (eds.), The Making of Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement (London:
Macmillan, 1996), pp. 67-95.
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The election of McMath proved to be a false dawn. Two McMath administrations
failed to live up to the expectations of change that the 1948 election had promised. The
drive for economic and social progress crumbled as conservative retrenchment, along with
allegations of corruption that haunted many of the GI state governments, brought the brief
movement of reform to an end without any discernible enduring legacy. 3 Rather, It was the
growing federal pressure on the established racial order in the South, coupled with an
increased militancy in demands from the state's black population, which proved to be the
major factors in helping to transform race relations in Arkansas in the late 1940s and early
1950s. Encouraged and emboldened by federal support in the struggle for black rights,
blacks began test what impact the increasingly favourable rulings in the national courts
might have on segregation at a state and local level in their own communities. At the same
time, wary of the changes in attitudes to racial discrimination that were taking place in
American society, whites were far more reluctant to allow black activism to spill over into
the courts for fear of defeat and the implications of enforced alterations by federal decree to
the segregated order. What emerged as a result was a complex and often ambiguous new
era of race relations based upon informal compromises between blacks and whites that
were aimed at modifying the existing system of segregation within negotiated limits. Blacks
pushed for change, but remained wary about pushing whites too far, since they feared that
such an approach might bring up a wall of resistance to any racial progress. Whites
remained acutely aware that if they wished to maintain control over their system of race
relations without any federal intervention in the future they would have to make at least
some concessions to black demands. Under these circumstances whites looked to take a
line of appeasement that offered the most acceptable compromise to them, involving the
least substantial change to the existing racial order. Although under the threat of federal
intervention, whites still maintained the upper hand since they knew that blacks could
3 On the McMath administrations see Jim Lester, A Man For Arkansas: Sid McMath and the Southern
Refor,n Tradition (Little Rock: Rose Publishing Co., 1976).
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probably be coerced into settling for a compromise involving some sort of change in the
existing racial order rather than risk a long and protracted court battle in which there were
no absolute guarantees of victory.
The vagaries of this new era of race relations were apparent in Arkansas when the
university Law School at Fayetteville enrolled its first black student in February 1948. The
move was influenced by the increasingly strident demands of local black activists for
equality in Arkansas coupled with a series of court decisions in the area of black graduate
education won by the NAACP at a national level during the 1940s. The NAACP struck its
first blow for the admission of blacks into segregated universities in Missouri ex ret.
Gaines v. Canada (1938) when the United States Supreme Court ruled that states could not
furnish black graduates with out-of-state scholarships to avoid the issue of their existing
lack of black graduate facilities. However, although the Gaines ruling meant that it was
incumbent upon states to provide an education for their own black graduate students, the
Court still left open the possibility of maintaining segregation in higher education by
providing separate state graduate schools for blacks. This was upheld in Sipuel v.
Oklahoma State Regents (1948) when the University of Oklahoma opted to furnish separate
Law School facilities for the one black student in the state, Ada Louis Sipuel, who applied
for admission. The impracticality of maintaining separate graduate facilities for blacks was
subsequently highlighted when other prospective black graduate students in Oklahoma
applied to study in various other areas of graduate education. Faced with the impossible
economic burden of providing separate but equal facilities in a number of academic
disciplines, the University of Oklahoma reluctantly allowed the admission of blacks into
white graduate schools. At the same time, in an effort to dissuade such applications,
demeaning segregated features were maintained, such as forcing black students to sit
partitioned from whites by a screen in classrooms, providing segregated library facilities
and limiting the use of the refectory to inconvenient hours. When this segregated regime
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was challenged in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950) the United States Supreme
Court upheld the NAACP's contention that it did not provide an "equal" education. The day
afterwards, in Sweatt v . Painter, the Court declared that a separate Law School provided
for black graduates in Texas was not actually equal to that of whites in terms of facilities
and staff. By implication the Court appeared to indicate that unless graduate facilities were
identical for whites and blacks -- a situation which southern states could clearly not
financially afford and were unwilling to provide -- they were unconstitutional. Although the
Court drew back from explicitly declaring an end to segregation, its rulings, by denouncing
every conceivable alternative, essentially rendered segregated graduate education legally
indefensible.4
It was against the backdrop of increasing pressure by the NAACP in the area of
black graduate opportunities that the University of Arkansas first addressed the issue of
racial inequality. This came in 1941 when Little Rock lawyer Scipio Jones wrote to the
Dean of the Law School, J. S. Waterman, on behalf of a black graduate from Little Rock,
Prentice Hilburn, who wished to pursue graduate study in law. Jones suggested that the
best way to handle the matter would be for the Law School at Fayetteville to pay out-of-
state tuition fees, in the manner already established by other southern states, to allow his
client to attend Howard University in Washington D. C. By using the Gaines ruling as a
leverage with university officials, Jones hoped to establish a precedent for out-of-state
scholarships in Arkansas as a viable alternative to the threat of more militant action.
Unmoved by the appeal, Waterman insisted that there were no state laws which required
the university to fund the education of black graduates. This unsatisfactory reply prompted
Jones to set up a meeting with university officials at which he reminded them of the
implications of the Gaines decision should they fail to meet his relatively modest request.
As a result of the meeting, Jones managed to strike a deal whereby the university agreed to
Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law, chapters 9 and 10.
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pay a one-off sum of $134.50 as a contribution to Hilbum's tuition fees without any
further action being taken by his client.5 Shortly afterwards, W. H. Flowers managed to
win further out-of-state scholarships for black graduates and the arrangement became the
established norm in Arkansas.6
Out-of-state scholarships managed to stave off further attempts to press for
improved black educational opportunities in Arkansas until 1946 when aifford Davis, a
black student from Little Rock, with the help and counsel of W. H. Flowers, applied for
admission to the Law School. The new Dean of the Law School, Dr. Robert Leflar,
considered Davis's request seriously in the light of contemporary court rulings and drew up
five possible plans of action in response to prospective black applicants. First, Leflar
considered the option of allowing black students to enter the university in principle, but
then screening each applicant individually to find some disqualification other than race upon
which they could be denied admission. The drawback to this approach, Leflar felt, was that
it threatened to bring the university into disrepute and could not guard against further legal
action by black applicants. Second, Leflar considered the option of increasing the amount
of money awarded to black out-of-state scholarship students in an effort to make the option
look more attractive. This, however, depended upon willing co-operation by those students
and again did not prevent any further legal action being pursued. Third, Leflar considered
the idea of setting up a regional graduate school for blacks either in Arkansas or in co-
operation with other states, in order to comply with the Gaines decision. The expense this
would involve, together with its dubious constitutionality, led Leflar to reject that option.
Fourth, Leflar considered taking a conirontational approach and refusing admission to
black students point-blank. To pursue this course of action would involve taking a chance
Nichols, "Breaking the Color Barner," pp. 5-6. Nichols was Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at
the time the University of Arkansas desegregated in 1948.
6 Jolm Kirk, "He Founded A Movement': W. H. Flowers, the Committee on Negro Organisations and the
Origins of Black Activism in Arkansas, 1940-1957," in Ward and Badger (eds.), The Making of Martin
Luther King, p. 36.
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on litigation developing and then dealing with the consequences as they arose. Again, this
had the disadvantage of making the university a centre of unwanted attention. The fifth
option Leflar considered was simply to allow blacks to enrol at the university. Yet under no
circumstances was Leflar prepared to consider complete integration. Rather, he devised a
plan, similar to the one being considered by the neighbouring University of Oklahoma,
which would allow black students to enrol for classes but at the same time maintain
segregation by providing separate classrooms, study rooms, text books, dining facilities,
and allowing access to the library only through a white intermediary.7
Leflar presented his findings first to Herbert Thomas, chairman of the Board of
Trustees to the university, who agreed to discuss the matter with other Board members at
their next meeting. When the issue was raised it came as no great shock; in fact, the Board
had discussed the possibility of such an application arising, on an informal basis, for a
number of years.8 The cases before the courts in the neighbouring states of Oklahoma and
Missouri helped to intensify the debate. 9 In June 1946 the Board of Trustees met and came
to a general consensus that they would hand Leflar, who was one of the nation's leading
authorities on constitutional issues, discretionary powers to act in the matter as he saw fit
and agreed to stand firmly behind his decisions. Significantly, revealing their general
reluctance to involve themselves directly in what they deemed to be a controversial area of
university policy, the Board refused to commit to a vote on the matter and did not minute
their decision. The first Leflar knew about the outcome of the meeting was an informal
approach by Judge Henry S. Yocum, a member of the Board of Trustees, who bluntly
stated "Bob, we put it right back in your lap. We decided to leave it at your	 10
Nichols, "Breaking the Color Barrier," p. 8.
8 "Admission of Blacks to the University of Arkansas -- A Statement by Herbert L. Thomas, Sr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the Time the Action was Taken," (1972), pp. 1-2; "The Admission of
the First Black Students to the University of Arkansas," Dr. Lewis Webster Jones, p. 1, Herbert L. Thomas
Papers, Special Collections Division, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
Thomas, "Admission of Blacks," p. 2.
10 Nichols, "Breaking the Color Barrier," pp. 10-11.
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Leflar immediately began to try and win backing for his proposal to admit blacks to
the Law School on a segregated basis. In April 1947 he addressed the Arkansas Bar
Association at Hot Springs, with Governor Ben Laney, a key figure in winning widespread
approval for the plan, but also a staunch segregationist, in attendance. Leflar presented his
findings to the Bar Association, drawing particular attention to the cost of setting up a
separate law school for blacks in the state which he estimated would come to an initial
figure of $100,000, with an extra $20,000 every year for maintenance. Under his plan,
Leflar pointed out, the estimated costs incurred by the state would be just $3,000- $5,000
per annum to hire an extra lecturer. Although Laney remained unconvinced about the idea
of the admission of a black student to the University of Arkansas, he told Leflar in private
that he respected his judgement enough to know that he could leave the matter in his hands,
with a promise not to interfere.1 1
Whilst university officials pondered the issue, Clifford Davis continued in his
attempts to gain admission to the Law School. On August 25, 1946, Davis wrote to Leflar
enquiring about the status of his application. Leflar, stalling for time, advised Davis that his
application was still incomplete and that in view of the large veteran enrolment that year he
might not make the university's quota for entry. Leflar assured Davis that possible denial of
his application was not based on the grounds of race and that the university was at present
working on a plan that would enable blacks to attend graduate classes in the not too distant
future. After several more exchanges of correspondence Leflar finally revealed his plan to
admit black students on a segregated basis. When Davis raised objections about the
segregated facilities he would be forced to endure, Leflar, annoyed that the student did not
seem grateful for all his efforts, replied that if Davis was serious about enrolling at the
university in the forthcoming February semester he would have to pay an advance fee of
11 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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$70 by December 15, 1947. The deadline passed without any more communications, or
payment of fees, from Davis.12
Events came to head at the beginning of 1948, just before the February semester for
the intake of new students was about to begin. At a "Conference on Graduate and
Professional Educational Opportunities for the Negro in Arkansas" held at Pine Bluff
AM&N on January 30, Governor Ben Laney attempted to sell the idea of working to build
a regional black graduate school in order to forestall black applications to the University of
Arkansas. As Laney spoke it became abundantly clear that some amongst those attending
the conference were less than enthusiastic about the plan. Towards the end of the meeting
Wiley Branton, a student at Pine Bluff, made an announcement that he intended to apply
for admission as an undergraduate at the University of Arkansas in Business
Administration the following week. Branton made it quite clear that if this application was
rejected he fully intended to pursue the matter through the courts. Flustered, Laney brought
the meeting abruptly to a close.13
Branton's announcement took the Board of Trustees at Fayetteville by surprise.
Although they had planned for the eventuality of an application from a black graduate
student, no policy existed on the admission of undergraduates. With the first day of
enrolment for classes close at hand critical decisions needed to be made at a meeting of the
Board of Trustees the day before term started. However, with the excuse that a snowstorm
during the day prevented them from attending the meeting in the evening, none of the
Board members turned up, even though, as president of the university Dr. Lewis Jones
later noted, the blizzards did not stop the black students and photographers from arriving
12Ibid. pp. 13-14.
13 "Text as given by Wiley A. Branton for delivery at Sunrise Services on Founder's Day Program,
AM&N College, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, Sunday, April 28, 1957" in "Silas Hunt - The Growth of a Folk
Hero," Bennie W. Goodwin class paper, May 20, 1957, Special Collections Division, University of
Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Nichols, p. 14.
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the very next day.' 4 To add to the crisis of indecision, Clifford Davis announced to the
press that he too would seek admission to the University of Arkansas Law School as a
graduate student at the beginning of term. Calls from the state's newspapers soon began to
flood the line of the university president in an effort to establish what the university's
policy of admission was.15
Jones turned to Thomas for a decision. The application of Branton complicated
matters for the university since the Board of Trustees had previously agreed that black
undergraduate students would not be granted admission if similar courses were already
available at Pine Bluff AM&N. Both Jones and Thomas agreed that Branton should not be
granted admission but felt that even though no official action had been taken by the Board
of Trustees on the matter, the way was clear to admit Davis, provided he met the academic
standards required. Jones and Thomas accordingly instructed Law School personnel to
make whatever arrangements they felt were necessary for the accommodation and
instruction of a black graduate student. Thomas then began to call board members at their
homes to ask for support. Most members agreed that in light of recent discussions black
graduate students should be granted admission. The final decision came, Thomas
remembered in later years, only with the realisation that "segregation laws existing in
Arkansas never could survive a high Federal Court case."16
Thomas announced to the press that the university would refuse the application of
Wiley Branton, on the grounds that courses for undergraduate study already existed at Pine
Bluff, but that it would admit Clifford Davis. Jones later made a separate statement in
which he re-iterated the university's policy for the admission of black graduate students,
whilst at the same time reaffirming his commitment to the principle of "separate but equal"
14 Jones, "First Black Students," p. 4.
15 Thom, "Admission of Blacks," p. 6.
16 Ibid., p. 7.
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education by urging the improvement of Pine Bluff AM&N and the establishment of a
regional graduate school for the advanced training of Negroes.
No significant opposition to the decision emerged in the state, either from white
politicians or the white population at large. Undoubtedly, this was helped by the fact that
the university was located in an isolated corner of north-west Arkansas, far removed from
the delta region where feelings about racial change were particularly fraught with tension.
Nevertheless, there was also a clear recognition that outside of massive expense to the state
or the risk of losing a court case, which might lead to complete integration being ordered,
there was little else that could be done. The Arkan.sa.s Gazette backed the university in an
editorial the morning after the decision to admit black students was announced. Even
Governor Ben Laney acknowledged that the university had acted correctly under the
circumstances, but was quick to add that the "improvement of Negro educational facilities
is the prime objective of efforts to enrol Negroes in established white schools....
Abolishing racial segregation won't work in this country, and those people who have it in
their minds had better get it out."17
On Monday morning, February 2, 1948, the first day of enrolment for the Spring
Term, Dr. Lewis Jones was informed by the press that Wiley Branton and another black
student, Silas Hunt, were on their way to Fayetteville.' 8 Hunt was a last minute
replacement for Clifford Davis who decided not to apply for admission under the
segregated regime outlined by university officials. 19 Branton and Hunt had been friends
since their enrolment at Pine Bluff AM&N in 1941. Just a few months into classes there,
both were called up for active service in the armed forces. Upon their return, Hunt went
back to college whilst Branton worked in his father's taxi business in downtown Pine
17 Nichols, "Breaking the Color Barrier," p. 15.
pp. 15-16.
19 Goodwin, "Silas Hunt," pp. 7-9.
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Bluff. Dissatisfied with their second class treatment on returning from World War Two,
Branton and Hunt often discussed how they could take a stand to promote black rights in
Arkansas. One major influence was their former classmate, Ada Louis Sipuel, who had
determined to take on the authorities at the University of Oklahoma by applying to study at
its segregated Law School. Branton and Hunt subsequently attempted to follow Sipuel's
lead, but their applications to study at the University of Arkansas failed to meet with any
success. Hunt was resigned to studying law out of state at the University of Indiana when
he heard that university officials in Arkansas were willing to consider black applicants.20
When Hunt and Branton arrived at Fayetteville they were accompanied by W. H.
Flowers and Gel eve Grice, a photographer from Pine Bluff AM&N. Jones contacted
Thomas to double check the arrangements for the unexpected arrival of Hunt and was
advised to admit him "without question other than his academic qualifications." Thomas
also recommended that if possible, in line with the low profile which the university wanted
to afford to the incident, Hunt should not be allowed to make a speech or have photographs
taken of his enrolment. When the black delegation arrived in Jones's office, Hunt's grades
were checked and he was allowed to enrol for classes; Branton was denied admission as an
undergraduate student. Jones met with the delegation briefly and discussed the segregated
arrangements under which Hunt would study. Chiefly, this would consist of being taught
in the basement of the law building, using library books through a white intermediary who
would collect and return the volumes he requested, and eating alone, since he would not be
able to use the university cafeteria. When Flowers pressed Jones on the issue of
accommodation for Hunt on campus, he was asked not to pursue the matter since Jones
believed it would make the process of Hunt's admission to the university more difficult.
Apparently still amazed that a black student had been granted admission to the university at
20 Bton, "Text," pp. 14-15.
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all, Flowers accepted the request and arranged for Hunt to stay with one of the few black
families in Fayetteville.21
Hunt's admission to the Law School provoked little opposition aside from a few
irate letters of dissent to the president of the university, most of which came from outside
of Arkansas. 22 In spite of the segregated regimen envisioned by university authorities,
Hunt's stay at Fayetteville turned out to be far less lonely than expected. Students actively
chose to attend Hunt's lectures in the basement of the law building, both out of moral
support and because some believed they received better instruction in the smaller classes. A
small but significant number of white students offered their support in a variety of other
ways, from eating lunch with Hunt in his segregated classroom to calling around at his
home for shared study sessions. Unfortunately, Hunt's admission to the University of
Arkansas had a tragic ending. A recurrence of medical problems that related to his wartime
service abroad forced Hunt to withdraw from studies before completing his first semester
and just three months later he died at a Veterans' Hospital in Springfield, Missouri.23
Hunt's admission to study law in February 1948 trailbiazed an important path. The
next black student to study law at Fayetteville, Jackie Shropshire, enrolled the following
autumn semester and eventually became the first black student to graduate from the
university in 1951. The pressure of numbers in the new intake of graduates in 1949 meant
that more white students studied with Shropshire in his basement classroom. To counteract
what might be regarded by some as integration, university authorities put up a small
wooden railing to fence Shropshire off from the rest of the class. An indication of the
change in attitudes that the actual presence of black students on campus had brought, a few
days later, the railing was removed by popular demand and classes were effectively
21 Nichols, "Breaking the Color Barrier," p. 16.
22 Jones "First Black Students," p. 5.
23 Branton, "Text," pp. 18-19.
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desegregated. Others black graduates followed Hunt and Shropshire through the Law
School over the course of the next few years, including Chris Mercer, George Haley,
Wiley Branton and George Howard. Each of these new entrants would play an important
role in the development of black activism in Arkansas over the following years, in
particular providing the NAACP with able black lawyers at a grassroots level who could
pursue the cause of black rights through the courts. 24 As blacks continued to swell the
ranks of the graduate schools, then undergraduate schools of the University of Arkansas,
the barriers to segregation in various areas of university life gradually began to disappear.25
The successful desegregation of the Law School also led to a successful desegregated
graduate summer school programme being established in Little Rock in 1949.26
Another direct consequence of the desegregation of the Law School at Fayettevitte
was the desegregation of the Medical School at Little Rock. In early spring of 1948, Lewis
Jones received an urgent call from the Dean of the Medical School, Henry Chenault, at the
Little Rock Medical Graduate Centre. Upon arrival he was shown a blackboard chart listing
applicants for admission in the fall semester in descending order of merit; Elizabeth Mae
Irby's name, a black applicant, was close to the top. Jones, this time without hesitation,
told Chenault to proceed according to the already established policy and to admit Irby to the
Medical School if she applied.27
Jones addressed the matter of the admission of a black graduate to the Medical
School with the Board of Trustees on an informal basis after their spring meeting. At a
coffee break outside of the minuted discussions, Jones informed other members of the
Board that Chenault had an announcement to make. Chenault told the Board about Edith
24 Ibid., p. 19; Nichols, "Breaking the Color Barrier," pp. 18-19.
25 Christopher C. Mercer, interview with John Kirk, April 19, 1993, UNOHC.
26 A. Stephen Stephan, "Desegregation of Higher Education in Arkansas," Journal of Negro Education 27
(Summer 1958), pp. 243-252.
27 Jones, "First Black Students," p. 7.
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Mae Irby's application and expressed little doubt that she would meet the university's
qualifications for entry. Various members of the Board enquired about maintaining
segregated facilities and practices. Could a black student be permitted work on a white
cadaver they asked. Should black students only be admitted in pairs since two medical
students worked on a cadaver at once? Such suggestions were dismissed by the majority
present since it was clear that such token segregation would be unleasible at the Medical
School. Irby agreed to bring a packed lunch and not to use the refectory so that the one
possible sticking point of segregated seating at meals would not arise. An understanding
that Irby would be admitted in the fall of 1948 was reached and then the subject was
dropped as discussion passed on to other matters.28 Irby enrolled at the Medical School,
without incident, the following autumn semester. 29 As with the Law School, Irby's
admission brought other successful applications to study at the University of Arkansas
Medical School, again, helping to produce qualified, professional people who would have
a significant impact on the development of black activism in the future.30
While they constituted encouraging signs of racial progress, the desegregation of
the state Law and Medical schools were still exceptional developments, occurring in direct
response to threats from federal courts to a particular aspect of the segregated order. In
most communities across the state the segregated order remained wholly untouched and
intact. The one exception to this was Little Rock, the only place to follow the lead of the
university authorities in addressing racial issues, by instigating a subtle and complex
rearrangement of segregation in a number of areas. The first sign of change came with the
tentative experiment of desegregating the public library. This was achieved in a very low-
key and informal manner by allowing a few blacks to sit out of sight at the back of the
building and then gradually permitting a more extensive use of facilities over a number of
28 Ibid., pp. 6-8; Thomas, "Admission of Blacks," p. 16-18.29 Stale Press, August 27, 1948; Ebony "Arkansas Med School Opens Its Doors," January 1949.
30 Dr. M. A. Jackson, interview with John Kirk, February 10, 1993, UNOHC.
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years. Blacks also gained admission to a selected few of the city's segregated public parks,
but only by pre-arrangement, in small numbers, and with certain restrictions, such as a
prohibition against black use of the swimming pools or the golf course. Little Rock Zoo
began to admit blacks, but only on Thursdays, and with use of the amusement park and
picnic areas discouraged. Pfieffer's, a downtown department store, built a segregated lunch
counter to cater for black clients who were previously refused service altogether. Other
establishments took down the "white" and "colored" signs from their drinking fountains,
but still stringently enforced segregated restrooms. Downtown hotels began to relax their
policy of segregation by allowing groups such as the Urban League to hold interracial
meetings at their facilities, but still seated blacks and whites at different tables for lunch. By
the early 1950s hotels were accepting group bookings of visiting black sports teams whilst
still prohibiting any black individuals from occupying a room. The Arkansas Gazette and
Arkansas Democrat changed their policy of denying the courtesy titles of "Mr." and "Mrs."
to blacks by dropping "Mr." altogether except for members of the clergy (black and white)
and applying "Mrs." equally. The first ever press pictures of blacks in white newspapers
began to appear. The Arkansas Democrat even hired the first black reporter to work for a
white newspaper, as Ozell Sutton began to write a weekly colunm about news in the black
community.3'
The easing of certain racial restrictions was in reality little more than a tokenistic
tampering with segregation and all the measures were essentially designed to preserve the
ethos of social separation between the races strictly within what the white community
deemed to be the acceptable boundaries of Jim Crow. The fundamental goal of the changes
was to enable whites to retain control over the segregated system by self-regulating reforms
rather than taking the risk of being forced to change more radically by federal order.
Nevertheless, within such a hitherto rigid structure of racial exclusion these developments
31 Griffin Smith, Jr., "Localism and Segregation: Racial Patterns in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1945-1954,"
(M. A. Thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1965), pp. 52-53, 80, 94-95.
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were significant. As federal rulings began to undermine segregation, whites in the capital
city became increasingly worried about the threat to the racial order in their own locality,
particularly since the black community had already demonstrated that it was able and
prepared to take its grievances to the law courts. One historian of race relations in the city
during the post-war era attributed the palpable shift in attitudes away from a hard line
inflexibility on segregation within the white community to the introduction of President
Truman's package of civil rights measures to Congress in the first week of February 1948.
At the moment the Arkansas Gazette headlined with the news that "Truman Urges Law to
Bring Race Equality" Griffin Smith, Jr., claims, "the reality of outside pressure against
segregation became apparent to even the most unschooled and uninformed citizen" and
resulted in the limited relaxing of racial barriers in selected areas.32
The fear of enforced change to the raciai order was compounded by changes taking
place within the black community during the post-war era that led to a new set of leaders
and organisations coming to the forefront of the struggle for black rights. A growing
dissatisfaction with established leaders in Little Rock's black community led to a small-
scale "G.I. Revolt" in the city. In the vanguard was Charles Bussey who led a band of ex
servicemen to form the VGGA in direct response to "the way we were being treated by the
elders of the city of Little Rock -- black and white." 33 Bussey helped to form another new
group the EECL, led by Jeffrey Hawkins, to represent the interests of the run down east
end of the city which held a large number of black residents. I. S. McClinton, another
prominent member of the new raft of emergent black influentials, challenged Dr. J. M.
Robinson's claim to speak for black Democrats in the city by forming his own Young
Negro Democrats organisation, which later became the Arkansas Democratic Voters
Association (ADVA). W. H. Bass also emerged as a community spokesman through his
32 Ibid., p. 23
Bussey interview.
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affiliation with the Little Rock Urban League branch. 34 As a direct challenge to the way in
which the existing black elite addressed racial issues, this new set of influentials, typically
newcomers to the city from rural areas and predominantly drawn from lower class
backgrounds, looked to build upon an enlivened black constituency for change. Utilising
the perceived change in sympathies for their struggle at the national level and using the
potential leverage that a growth in registered black voters offered in strengthening demands
for change, these new leaders looked to exert pressure for concessions from the white
community.
Not everyone in the black community saw these post-war developments as
beneficial. In particular, the State Press remained sceptical about the potential for
meaningful change within the new context of race relations. The State Press complained
that some blacks in the community, who were posing as leaders and attempting to use the
vote to gain white concessions, were only interested in their own seif-aggrandisement and
prestige by proving to whites that they could "deliver" them the black vote and proving to
blacks that they could influence whites, rather than advancing the cause of the race as a
whole.35
 Even those who were deemed sincere were portrayed as misguided in settling for
a compromise within the bounds of segregation rather than exerting pressure to bring about
an end to the existing system of racial discrimination altogether. 36
 As the militant voice of
black community protest, the State Press echoed the ineTeasig\y eWigeTe'ntVk'1
NAACP that nothing short of a complete end to segregation would suffice. Often, State
Press editorials even went so far as to suggest that new black leaders were in fact retarding
progress by still settling for second best and that their failure was the main explanation for
the absence of black "parks, playgrounds, enough Negro police, employment.., and other
Perlester A. Hollingworth, interview with John Kirk, April 13, 1993, UNOHC.
Stale Press, December 29, 1950.
36 lbid., November30, 1951.
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lacks."37 Certainly, a hallmark of even more aspiring leaders within the black community
was a further sharpening of conflict, both between older leaders and organisations and their
new challengers, and within the ranks of new leaders and organisations themselves. This
situation was handily exploited by whites who were keen to portray the black community
as weak, divided and incapable of conducting its own affairs.
No single episode illustrated the new complexities and subtleties of black activism
and race relations in Little Rock during the post-war era more vividly than the struggle to
gain a black park in the city. The long saga of Gillam Park began on November 22, 1934,
when a meeting of the City Council's Finance and Parks Committee authorised Mayor
Knowlton to begin negotiations for the acquisition of a 497 acre tract of land located six
miles south of the city. The land was bought for two reasons. First and foremost the
purchase was to address the problem of a large number of "transients" -- homeless and
jobless people who were victims of the Depression -- residing in Little Rock in sheltered
accommodation provided by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). Many
of the city's population thought the large numbers of unemployed unsightly and complaints
flooded the City Council demanding that they be removed. The City Council subsequently
devised a plan to relocate the transient population on the very edge of the city limits. Using
federal funds the City Council proposed to put the transients to work on building a park for
the city's black population.38 The purchase of land thus addressed a second, ongoing
problem: the lack of recreational facilities provided by the city for blacks. In accordance
with Plessv v. Ferguson (18%) the city was obliged to provide "separate but equal"
facilities for blacks. However, although separate facilities were provided in a number of
areas, albeit almost uniformly unequal, in some cases no facilities for blacks were provided
at all. The lack of a park for blacks was a particular bone of contention. The overcrowding
" Ibid., September 17, 1948.
38 Arkansas Gazelle, November 23, 1934; Arka nsas Democrat, November 23, 1934, clippings in Mayor
Sam Wassell's Scrapbooks, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, (collection hereinafter cited as
MSWSB).
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of the black population in the worst parts of town, often in unsanitary and poorly
maintained areas, led to pleas from black leaders for a stretch of land that would allow
space to escape these conditions and provide an area in which recreational facilities could be
built.39
 Whilst removing the transients, the city decided it would offer the park "as sop" to
appease the black population since it was planning to build a costly segregated auditorium
for which it needed black taxpayer's dollars. At the same time city authorities hoped to
show good faith in keeping the promises of the "separate but equal" doctrine. A delegation
of hand-picked black leaders was called in to approve the plan. Delighted to receive any
advantages in their disadvantaged position, black leaders enthusiastically endorsed the
idea.40
Over the next few years the commitment of the City Council to the development of
the park waned. After defaulting on several repayments for the land, a sum of $15,000 was
finally allocated for making improvements to the black park, in a package of bond issues
that also included the $468,000 for the building a white Municipal Auditorium and $25,000
for a white city library.4 ' For the next few years little of the promised $15,000 was actually
made available for the development of the park. Even when, in September 1938, a
delegation from the black community met with the City Council to protest at the lack of
progress, nothing was done.42 Further protests from a black delegation in February 1940,
with a proposal that park facilities should be developed within the city limits on a plot of
land donated by Philander Smith college, brought some stirrings of activity on the out-of-
city site.43 A Works Progress Administration (WPA) project was put to work on building a
log pavilion, 12 barbecue pits, a baseball diamond, picnic grounds, tables, benches,
Mrs. I. S. McClinton, interview sith John Kirk, October 9, 1992, UNOHC.
40 Irving Spitiberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 1954-1964 (Ne York: Garland Publishing, 1987), p.
125.
41 Little Rock City Council Minutes, 1932-1936, Book X, November 25, 1935; January 6, 1936; May
11, 1936; Little Rock City Council Minutes, 1936-1940, Book Y, December 11, 1936; January 28, 1937.
42 Ibid., September 26, 1938.
Ibid., February 19, 1940; Book Z, July 7, 1941.
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footpaths, a lake and a swimming pool.44 Just over a year later, with little of the work
done, the City Council, over the protests of the black community, debated whether to
abandon the site altogether.45
After owning the park for seven years the City Council decided to inspect the land
for itself before making any further decisions. As the Arkansas Gazette reported, upon
reaching the site the City Councillors "quickly became discouraged with the ... location."
Several members expressed "amazement that it had been bought for a city park" with one
adding that it was "more suitable for a concentration camp." The Chief City Engineer
advised members of the council that all work should be suspended until it could be
determined whether it was possible to build a road to get to the park from the city and if the
site could be supplied with water.46 Again, during the ensuing years, little action was
taken. The City Council investigated the possibility of mining bauxite on the site in 1942; in
the same year the roof from the log pavilion, the only completed project on the site, was
stolen, ending up on the "big cat house" in the "whites only" city zoo. 47 The following
year the rest of the pavilion, which had rotted without the roof, was torn down.48
Meanwhile, the council put forward proposals to sell the site and develop a park elsewhere.
The proposed new site, however, was opposed by white residents who did not want a park
for blacks close to their homes.49
In the post-war years, as black protest became more militant, the absence of a black
city park remained a contentious issue, symbolic to the black community of their status as
second class citizens. In particular, this concern increased as a result of the attention
44 Arkansas Gazelle, June 14, 1940, clipping in MSWSB.
' Ibid., June 29, 1941.
46 Ibid., July 1, 1941.
Little Rock City Council Minutes, Book Z, July 7, 1941; March 9, 1942; Book A-i, October 19,
1942; November 22, 1942.
48 Ibid. December 16, 1940; Arkansas Gazelle, August 19, 1945, clipping in MSWSB.
Little Rock City Council Minutes, Book A-2, December 9, 1946; April 28, 1947; May 19, 1947; June
2, 1947.
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afforded the issue by State Press, which took up the lack of a black park as one of its many
crusades. In 1945, columnist A. M. Judge summed up the situation. "Every so often
somebody out of nowhere comes up with a lot of 'Negro park' bunk and keeps the
newspapers full of hot air for a few weeks, and then the whole thing dies down to where it
started" he wrote. Why, Judge asked, was the city straining to "build and keep up another
park" when it already owned "several parks." The city, Judge surmised, had "no business
trying to support a dual system for segregational purposes" that it could not afford. In line
with both the increasingly forthright calls for desegregation put forward by the State Press,
and its repeated criticisms of Little Rock's timid black "leadership," Judge declared that "if
our Negro 'leaders had the bone transferred from their heads to their backs, we would have
recreational facilities damn quick or [Little Rocki would tell the world just why Negroes are
being taxed for recreation and not permitted to enjoy it."°
Growing pressure from the black community brought new developments on the
park issue. City Attorney T. J. Gentry informed the council that they could not legally sell
the park and that by statute it had to be developed for the purpose which it was purchased,
as a black park. 5 ' To add to the dilemma, there was growing discontent in the white
community about how the council was handling the park money. A group of white citizens
voiced their concerns, whilst declining to support building a black park anywhere near their
own residential areas. With no idea how to solve the problem the counci\ nea'Xy siàe-
stepped the decision by deciding to hand the issue to the black community to resolve.
Mayor Wassell called for a response, for the first time in the matter, from the black
community. In doing so, knowing full well that various factions in the black community
had different ideas as to where a black park should be built (some supported the out of
town site whilst other groups competed to have it located near their own residential
50 Slate Press, June 13, 1947.
51 Arkansas Gazetie, February 9, 1947, clipping in MSWSB.
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neighbourhoods) Wassell hoped to blame inaction on bickering and divisions within the
black community.52
The State Press was vehement in its condemnation of Wassell's ploy. L. C. Bates
editorialised that passing the buck to the black community was a poor excuse. Bates
admitted that there were divisions in the black community about where to build the park.
However, Bates pointed out, blacks were united on other issues, such as haulage trucks
being allowed to pass through the middle of West Ninth street and black residential areas,
but the city chose to ignore their protests about that. Bates accused the council of shirking
its responsibility. Why, Bates asked, if blacks were capable of making their own decisions,
were they not allowed to stand for office under the banner of the Democratic party in order
to be able to represent their views in local and state government? If they were not deemed
capable of this why were they being asked to solve the parks problem? Why could the issue
not be solved the way the white community solved them -- through special elections? In the
last instance, Bates pointed out, the decision was not a political matter. Rather, it was up to
professional planners to choose the best possible site for a park for blacks.53
The City Council finally made the decision, without taking heed of the views of the
black community, to continue with the development of the Gillam Park site. With the
decision made, the council then declared that "money is all that is holding up the progress"
of the development of the park. 54 The State Press remained unconvinced. The paper's
policy throughout the debate was to avoid adding to the divisions in the black community
by backing any of the proposed sites for a park, but it had protested in particular the
development of Gillam Park on the grounds that the only reason the City Council wished to
52 Little Rock City Council Minutes, Book A-2, August 8, 1947.
Stale Press, September 12, 1947.
Parks and Recreation Department, City of Little Rock, Arkansas, 1947: Third Annual Report, pamphlet
number 5607, Pamphlet Collection, Special Collections Division, University of Arkansas Libraries, Little
Rock.
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pursue the site was because it was the "cheap" financial option. "Let the county or state
develop [Gillam Park] for county or state purpose" L. C. Bates editorialised, adding "Let
the Negro have a park in the city [limits] ." 55When the City Council decided to go ahead
with the Gillam Park project regardless, Bates fumed "White people will go to no end to
prove they are right when they know they are wrong. Look at all the money being spent...
on the so called Gillam Park for Negroes.... If and when Gillam Park is developed we still
ain't got a damn thing." 56 Bates invited readers to take a trip out to the Gillam Park site,
offering his own tour in the form of a published description:
The park is in the heart of the woods and at the end of about as tortuous a
road as we ever hope to drive over, even in a tank. The only building is a
outhouse 70 yards away, it is a log structure approximately 33 feet wide and
55 feet long. It is open on three sides; the other side contains five unpainted
benches and the floor is good old terra-firma. We were told that there was a
place to play ball so we looked for the ball diamond and guess what we
found? The only place large enough to play anything like ball was a boulder
strewn field. We don't know where the water park is because we didn't find
any. Maybe they have concealed faucets or something, huh?. And lastly we
came to the out house which boasts four wooden stools, one door and no
partition between the ladies and gents sides.
Now there's your park described for you in words and pictures. How do
you like your beautiful park? Does it compare favourably with the white
folks parks? Of course not! ... After you have made a survey, I'm sure you
will agree with us that we don't want this mess -- we want a park.57
State Press, No ember 28, 1947.
56 Ibid., Junc 25, 1948.
Ibid., July 30, 1948.
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Sure enough, the signs of good intentions by the white community in developing
Gillam Park disappeared throughout 1948. By August the "full steam ahead" promises of
improvements had vanished. Mayor Wassell simply stated that "What we have done
already on the Negro park is all that can be done with city funds this year." 58 When
Wassell announced he was to run for election in November, his main contender city
Alderman Franklin E. Loy, raised the issue of Gillam Park as an example of Wassell's
incompetence. Loy offered his own solution to the problem, by proposing to lease Gillam
Park to the State Parks Service for the development of a "State Park for Negroes." Loy
claimed to have discussed the plan with Governor Sid McMath who had given him the
"green light" to go ahead with the proposal. 59 As rumours began to circulate that if nothing
was done about the development of Gillam Park, some members of the black community
were considering pursuing the matter through the courts, Wassell claimed that he
"welcomed" Loy' s plan.6° Loy subsequently proposed that the Gillam Park site be leased
to the State for a rate of $1 per year, naming it a "State War Memorial Park for Negroes."
When McMath refused to seek funds for the project the plan fell through and the situation
remained at an impasse.6'
The deadlock was broken by a proposal put forward by two emerging black
influentials in the city, W. H. Bass, head of the Urban League in Little Rock, and I. S.
McClinton, head of ADVA. Their proposal was to scrap all plans for a development of the
park by the state, since they believed that the plan was nothing more than a stalling tactic
designed to delay any meaningful action. Instead, Bass and McClinton suggested another
bond issue by the city, similar to the one adopted in the mid-1930s, to pay for the
58 Arkan.sasDe,nocrai, August 15, 1948, clipping in MSWSB.
Ibid., November 19, 1948.
60 Ibid.; Arkan.sas Gazette, November 21, 1948.
61 Little Rock City Council Minutes, Book A-3, November 22, 1948; Arkansas Gazette November 24,
1948; Arkansas Democrat, November 24, clippings in MSWSB.
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development of the Gillam Park site. The amount they proposed was $359,000. If nothing
was done they threatened to take the city to court. 62 Both the white daily papers in Little
Rock backed the proposal, particularly in the light of threats about the case going to court.
"Anybody who knows how things have been going in recent years in the matter of Negro
civil rights should be sufficiently warned by that knowledge" cautioned the Arkansas
Gazette, adding "it would be a reproach to Little Rock for the Negro Park matter to reach
that stage. It is enough reproach for Little Rock that after 15 years groping and fumbling
the city has not yet met the need for Negro recreational facilities." 63 When the City Council
finally met to decide the matter they agreed to endorse the bond proposal, even though, as
the Arkansas Gazette reported, it was "apparent several Aldermen doubt[ed] the large issue
w i ould] be approved by the voters."64 To most on the City Council, the success of the
proposal was not the issue; allowing the bond to go to the voters, no matter how unlikely
the eventual possibility of getting the white majority in Little Rock to agree, would at least
show some token effort by the Council to support the proposals put forward by black
leaders and that they were being taken seriously. City Ordinance No. 7825 put forward the
bond issue to a special vote.65
The idea of providing a park for blacks in the wilds, out of the city limits, was
welcomed by neither the State Press or even by some whites in the city. As one letter from
a white taxpayer pointed out, if a swimming pooi was to be provided for blacks then if
would probably be better served located near a black neighbourhood. He concluded "Any
large amount of money spent by the city on Gillam Park will be pouring money down a rat-
hole."66 As the elections drew closer the Arkansas Democrat ran a campaign to oppose the
plans for a bond issue on the grounds that it cost too much money. In opposition the
62 , j.ka,as Gazelle, December 3, 1948, clipping in MSWSB.
63 Ibid., December 4, 1948.
64 Ibid. February 9, 1947.
65 Little Rock City Council Minutes, Book A-3, December 27, 1948.
66 ,zsjDe,p eral December 29, 1948, clipping in MSWSB.
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Arkansas Gazette continued to support the plan, making a plea to its readers to "correct a
glaring inequality" and pointing towards a "clear moral obligation" to do so. In spite of this
assertion, the real issue that the paper foregrounded was nothing to do with morals or
fairness. Rather, it suggested, the bottom line was this: vote for improved and extended
segregated facilities now or else the issue of full integration might have to be faced through
the courts sooner rather than later.67
On the morning of February 2, 1949, the population of Little Rock awoke to
headlines in the daily newspapers that the city had voted to spend the massive sum of
$359,000 to develop a black park in the city. By the narrowest of margins, with 2,936 for
the bond issue and 2,812 against, in one of the smallest turnouts in any city vote at 19%,
the bond issue for the park was passed. 68 Whether the bond passed because white voters
had been complacent or simply ambivalent about the outcome of the vote is not clear. What
was apparent was the increasingly effective ability of the new black politicians to bring out
enough black voters to make a decisive difference in city elections. The result of the
election divided both the black and white communities. The most vocal in condemning the
bond issue was Daisy Bates in the State Press who remained unconvinced at the sincerity
of the city's white population. Bates claimed that "$359,000... is entirely too much money
to be spent upon Negro recreation in Little Rock" adding that the issue had "made the city
the acme of deception and the laughing stock of the entire South." Bates concfucfedthat the
issue was nothing but a "smart political scheme to gamer Negro votes." After stating her
concerns that she doubted if the money would ever be used for black improvements, she
concluded that any advances in the lot of the black community "will have to be gained
through the courts or the ballots and not through BEGGING."69
67 Griffin Smith, Jr., "Localism and Segregation," pp. 46-50.
68 Arkansas Gazelle, February 2, 1949; Arkansas Democrat, February 2, 1949, clipping in MSWSB.
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As Bates predicted, whites were slow to use the money voted for a black park. The
City Council first decided that it should go ahead with the development of Gillam Park and
then decided that it should hire an architect and an engineer to look into where a black park
should be built.70
 Various delegations from the black community demonstrated a similar
lack of consensus over plans for a black park. One neighbourhood group demanded that a
swimming pooi should be built within the city limits rather than at the remote Gillam Park
site, whilst I. T. Gillam II, whose father's memory would be enshrined in the out of city
park, declared that "all responsible negroes favour the development of [Gillam] Park."71
Further petitions followed to demand that a community building be erected in the city with a
swimming pooi, athletic field and tennis courts built at Gillam Park. Dr. J. M. Robinson
led a delegation which requested the development of a site within the city limits, with the
claim that 90% of blacks supported the plan: but attorney J. A. Booker disagreed. 72 When
the City Council finally resolved to purchase the site put forward by Dr. Robinson, lengthy
negotiations revealed that the land belonged to a local school that was in no position to sell
the land in the first place.73
What finally broke this deadlock was the passage of the National Housing Act and
the Slum Clearance and Blighted Area Fund through the United States Congress in 1949.
The legislation made available money to develop run-down city areas which could be used
for industrial sites, public housing and recreational facilities. The city put up the $359,000
voted for a black park as an enticement to match federal funds with local money in order to
develop not only a black park, but more importantly in terms of city development, to lure
industries and provide for improvements within the predominantly white areas of the city.
When the funds were successfully secured, work at Gillam Park quickly got underway.
70 Arkansas Gazette, May 13, 1949, clipping in MSWSB.; Little Rock City Council Minutes, Book A-3,
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The decision to locate black recreational facilities at the moribund Gillam Park site meant
that federal funds were virtually guaranteed for their development. Not only would the City
Council be able to follow the same plans as its predecessors when they had purchased the
park site in the first place -- to develop a black park at largely federal expense -- they were
also embarking upon the more radical goal of racial exclusion.
By building black recreational facilities at Gillam Park and tying them in with a
proposed black housing project nearby, the city was consciously creating a segregated
black district which would affect important decisions about where to build other amenities,
for example schools, in the future. The authorities were thus engaged in a premeditated
effort to shunt the black population out to the east of the city while encouraging whites to
move westwards. In some instances this was brutally achieved by designating black
neighbourhoods as blighted areas, razing the buildings to the ground, and relocating the
residents in the east end of the city. All this was done in the light of legislation which white
city residents feared might challenge the segregated order. As an evasive pre-emptive
strike, defacto segregation was being re-affirmed even before dejure segregation had been
abolished, serving to effectively undermine many of the battles against segregation by the
black community which would unfold in the following years.74
Just how fast whites could achieve their aims with the right amount of money and
motivation was demonstrated after federal funds were awarded to the city for the parks
project in early 1950. By August the swimming pool at Gillam Park had been built and the
' B. Finely Vinson, interview with John Kirk, Februaiy 25, 1993, UNOHC; Arkansas Gazette,
September 12, 1949, clipping in MSWSB; see also the series of front page articles on slum clearance
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1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) argues that when Jim Crow statutes were introduced in
the late nineteenth century they legally solidified an already de facto segregated order in many southern
cities. Indeed, in some circumstances, Rabinowitz contends, segregation could represent a gain rather than a
loss for black southerners when weighed against the alternative of complete exclusion. Events in Little
Rock during the twentieth century demonstrate that when the segregated order was dismantled, whites
attempted both to maintain segregation on a semi-formal basis and move towards a policy of black
exclusion, reversing what Rabinowitz identified as the trend of the 1890s.
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"water-breaking ceremony" held, with I. S. McClinton and W. H. Bass, who proposed the
bond issue in the first place, at the centre of activities. Mayor Wassell finally declared
Gillam Park officially open by unveiling a plaque that read in part "this magnificent forest --
this most beautiful example of man's humanity to man." 75
 Nevertheless, there still
remained significant opposition to Gillam Park within the black community. In his
coverage of the opening ceremony, L. C. Bates acknowledged the work done by black
leaders in getting anything done at all, but remained sceptical about the project. "We are a
little puzzled over the dedication of a new pool exclusively for Negroes" Bates wrote. "We
believe it came about twenty odd years late for us to shout for joy. In this day and time
when the entire country is planning programs to stamp out segregation, it seems a little
ironical that Little Rock Negroes should be dedicating the outmoded principles of separate
but equalj."76
The State Press continued to report on developments with the park. Less than a year
after its opening the pool began leaking. 77
 The year after it began to lose money, quite
naturally the State Press pointed out, since "people do not support the things they do not
want. Negroes did not want a swimming pool built out of the city in an insect infested
mountain."78
 Events came to a head in July 1954 when a young black boy, Tommy
Grigsby, drowned in the Gillam Park pool. The death was a result of the insufficient
number of lifeguards at the pooi, the lack of any resuscitation facilities and its location so
far from the nearest hospital that neither a doctor or rescue squad could get to the scene in
time. The boy was a member of the South End Boys Club, the State Press noted, which
was located in the neighbourhood where the majority of black population in the city had
wanted the pool built in the first place. Had the pool been located there, the boy might not
"Souvenir Program, Gillam Park Swimming Pool Opening, Sunday, August 20th," Arkansas Gazette,
August 21, 1950; Arkansas Democrat, August 21, 1950, all in MSWSB; Stale Press, August 25, 1950.76 Ibid., August 25, 1950.
77 Arkansas Gazette, June 5, 1951, clipping in MSWSB.78 State Press, August 29, 1952.
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have died. To those looking on the tragedy, L. C. Bates reported, "the whole affair was a
study in second class citizenship."79
Significantly, politics provided the one arena during the post-war decade in which
blacks did manage to assert their citizenship rights, as opposed to relying on concessions
from whites. The major initiative in local politics depended on the efforts of the Bateses and
the NAACP and involved an effort to gain the acceptance of a black candidate in a local
election under the banner of the DPA. This campaign began in earnest in May 1950 when
black minister Rev. J. H. Gatlin announced his intention to become a candidate for Second
Ward city alderman in Little Rock. To stand a chance of winning the nomination for such a
position inevitably meant running in the local Democratic party primaries. The immediate
reaction to the attempt from June Wooten, secretary of the PCDC, was that he saw "no way
under the rules of the State Committee that a Negro would qualify for a place on the state
ballot." For their part, black groups, most notably ANDA, distanced themselves from
Gatlin's attempt to stand under the Democratic banner as they saw the action both as too
militant and as the beginnings of a potential rival power-base to their own organisation. Dr.
J. M. Robinson adamantly stated that Gatlin was not part of his organisation and that he
could not "be identified as a Negro Democrat in Arkansas until he joins."80
Before Gatlin could run for office a filing fee had to be paid to the secretary of the
PCDC. An attempt to do so on June 3, 1950, was rebuffed by June Wooten who returned
Gatlin's filing fee and loyalty pledge, giving as the reason for refusal the fact that blacks
could not become members of the DPA. 81 In the wake of this development the local branch
of the NAACP, while still refusing to support Gatlin's candidacy directly, since it did not
wish to become embroiled in party politics, promised to fight for his place on the ballot.82
' Ibid., July 8, 1954,
80 Arkansas Gazette, May 13, 1950, clipping in PCDCCS.
81 Ibid., June 4, 1950, clipping in PCDCCS.
82 Arkansas Democrat, June 4, 1950, Ibid.
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The deadline for filing in the city race was June 24. On June 7, Gatlin signed a letter
prepared by the legal redress committee of the Little Rock NAACP, headed by L.C. Bates,
which was then sent out to DSC members, requesting that they change the rules preventing
blacks from being put on the DPA primacy election form. In his letter Gatlin cited the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with black rights in political matters to back
up his request. Although he refused to mention the case specifically, Willis R. Smith, DPA
chairman, called a special session meeting for the following Tuesday at the Hotel Marion in
Little Rock.83
At the meeting on June 13, it was ruled, after a protest by Roy Penix, committee
member from Jonesboro, that only the State Democratic Convention had the right to vote
upon rule changes to the DPA constitution. June Wooten urged members of the committee
to think seriously about their actions since in the light of recent court decisions he believed
that Gatlin would, if the case came to court, win. As the meeting adjourned with the
decision to put the matter to the convention later in the year and only after the party
primaries were held, Wooten half-heartedly joked "if I get in jail somebody bring me a case
of cokes."84
 In response to the decision L. C. Bates indicated that the local NAACP legal
redress committee would take the matter to court. A suit was subsequently filed, naming
June P. Wooten and Willis R. Smith as defendants.85 On June 17, attorneys J. R. Booker
of Little Rock and Ulysses Simpson Tate of Dallas, a regional attorney for the NAACP,
filed Gatlin's case with the United States District Court, together with a request for an
injunction preventing the exclusion of Gatlin "or any other person qualified.., on account
of race, colour, religion, national origin or any other unconstitutional restriction" from the
Little Rock Democratic party city primaries. The case was based on the argument, stated
83 Ibid., June 7, 1950; Arkansas Gazette, June 8, 1950, Ibid.
84 Arkansas Democrat, June 13, 1950, Ibid.
85 Ibid., June 15, 1950.
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often before, that primary elections in Arkansas were tantamount to election to office and
therefore should adhere to the same federal laws as a public election.86
On July 5, 1950, Judge Thomas C. Trimble upheld the argument of local NAACP
attorneys and ordered Gatlin's name to be placed on the Democratic party primary ballot on
July 25. Trimble based his decision on precedents set in recent court rulings and finally
clarified that the primary election was "an integral part of the state election system...
tantamount to election at the general election" and that "it is not sufficient that a citizen have
a token exercise of his right and privilege Ito vote]." 87 Gatlin was duly allowed to stand,
although he met with defeat at the subsequent election. The court victory prompted other
black candidates to file for office in other elections, most notably Rev. Fred T. Guy who,
backed by ANDA, unsuccessfully made a bid for a position on the Little Rock school
board.88 The ludicrous situation now existed that blacks were permitted to stand for
election under the DPA banner, but still not officially allowed to either vote in party
primaries or to be a member of the DPA. Even for the die-hard Democrats this was a farce
that could not be realistically perpetuated for any length of time. In September 1950 a
proposed resolution to the DPA Convention was forwarded by J. Fred Parish,
recommending the removal of the "white electors" only voter qualification from party rules.
It was reportedly approved "without a murmur." The call for the abolition of statutes
upholding segregation and legal prohibition of interracial marriages created a "furore" and
Parish was forced to drop the suggestion. "One man can only do so much at one time" he
told the press resignedly.89
The following day at the DPA Convention the "white electors" clause was removed
from the party constitution. Governor Sid McMath, in his closing speech, declared that he
86 Ibid., June 16, 1950.
87 Ibid., July 6, 1950.
88 Stale Press, September 1, 1950.
89 Arkansas Gazelle, September 22, 1950, clipping in PCDCCS.
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was "proud, and I know you are proud... [that the convention] ... has said the Negro
citizen is entitled to rights and privileges of Party membership." The only real dissension
came from Amis Gutheridge, the one delegate to cast a "nay" vote on the amendment to the
party constitution. Gutheridge told the party conference that "Sid McMath is all right but is
just a man of the moment. You are going to do something here today that you may regret
for years to come." 90 Gutheridge resurfaced later in the mid-1950s as one of the leading
figures in the Little Rock White Citizens' Council in the vanguard of opposition to the
Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation decision.
The success of the NAACP in winning black representation in the DPA primaries in
Little Rock came at a difficult time for the organisation in the state, which was becoming
increasingly beleaguered by internal divisions and wrangling, centring upon a struggle for
control between W. H. Flowers and his supporters and the more conservative black leaders
in the state. When the NAACP decided to form the ASC in 1945, Flowers was given the
job of chief organiser of branches, but the presidency was given to Reverend Marcus
Taylor an older and more conservative figure from Little Rock. The decision seemed to
reflect a desire of those at the NAACP's national headquarters who wanted to impose a
balance between the younger and more dynamic Flowers and the more cautious leadership
of Taylor. Since a major part of Flowers's campaign with the CNO had been to challenge
older leaders like Taylor, in an effort to get them to accept a more militant agenda for black
activism, conflict between the two soon arose. With no real communication between the
two rival power bases in Little Rock and Pine Bluff, the NAACP quickly became divided
along broadly conservative and activist lines and as a result often operated as two separate
organisations. Jealous of the support Flowers received, Taylor began to fire accusations of
financial misdemeanours at the younger leader, suggesting to those at the NAACP's
national headquarters that Flowers was keeping half of the funds collected from the
90 Ibid., September 23, 1950.
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foundation of new branches for himself. 91 Although it was true that funds were slow at
making their way to New York from Arkansas, an investigation launched into Flowers's
activities gave no reason to relieve him of his duties.92
Despite Taylor's slights on Flowers's administration of the NAACP, the
organisation grew and prospered in the following years, in no small measure due to the
abilities of the younger leader. In fact, it quickly became apparent that far more blacks were
attracted to Flowers's brand of activism, which proposed utilising the NAACP as an
organisational tool to fight for local black rights, than to the more conservative approach of
Taylor, which called for little more than the collection of dues to be handed over to the
national offices of the NAACP so that they could fight civil rights battles at a national level.
Nowhere was this more apparent than in Pine Bluff where Flowers built the local branch
upto a membership of 4,382, a figure that constituted almost a fifth of the black population
in the town. In 1948, Flowers finally won the struggle against Taylor by gaining election to
president of the ASC. By this time even representatives from the national headquarters of
the NAACP realised that they needed his support to operate effectively in Arkansas. "I will
admit that I may have underrated Pine Bluff and its leadership" wrote Lucille Black,
national membership secretary of the NAACP. 93
 When Donald Jones, NAACP regional
secretary, attended the annual ASC conference at which Flowers was elected president in
1948, he reported that spirits were "high and militant." Jones's observations of the meeting
confirmed that Flowers was the man behind the NAACP's success in the state. Pointing
out what had been obvious to those who were already familiar with the situation in
Arkansas, he noted that "Largely responsible for the fine NAACP consciousness in Pine
91 Rev. Marcus Taylor to Ella Baker, December 4, 1945, group II, series C, container 9, folder "Little
Rock, Arkansas, 1940-1947," NAACP Papers (LC).
92 Gloster B. Current to Thurgood Marshall (memorandum, n.d.), group II, series C, container 11, folder
"Arkansas State Conference, April 1945-December 1948," NAACP Papers (LC).
Lucille Black to W. H. Flowers, January 15, 1948, group II, series C, container 10, folder "Pine Bluff,
Ark., 1948-1955," NAACP Papers (LC).
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Bluff and the growing consciousness in the state is Attorney Flowers whose.., tremendous
energy ha[s] made him the state's acknowledged leader."94
The glowing commendation by the national headquarters of the NAACP of
Flowers's ability, together with his election as president of the ASC, gave heart to others in
the state who were dissatisfied with the direction of black activism in their own localities.
Flowers's challenge to more conservative leaders for control of the statewide organisation
of the NAACP led to similar challenges at the grassroots level in other localities. The most
important came in Little Rock when, in the same year that Flowers was elected president of
the ASC, Daisy Bates filed an application to form a "Pulaski County Chapter of the
NAACP."95 The action taken by Bates was a direct response to the dissatisfaction bred by
the inactivity within the Little Rock branch of the NAACP, still under the guidance of Rev.
Marcus Taylor. By forming a county-wide NAACP chapter, Bates hoped to usurp the
power-base of older leaders like Taylor. In her application for an NAACP charter Bates
included fifty membership subscriptions, plus the branch founding fee, and nominated
herself as president. The response Daisy Bates received from the headquarters of the
NAACP to her application clearly revealed that there was a limit to the autonomy that the
organisation was prepared to grant to local activists. Gloster B. Current, director of
branches, in a short reply, pointed out that there was already an NAACP branch in Little
Rock and if people were interested in helping the organisation they should join there.96
The increasingly heated relations between local NAACP activists in Arkansas and
the national headquarters reached boiling point in 1949. Conflict was triggered over the
issue of finances when the ASC defaulted on its annual contribution to the NAACP's
Donald Jones to Gloster B. Current (memorandum, n.d.), group 11, series C, container 11, folder
"Arkansas State Conference, April 1945-December 1948," NAACP Papers (LC).
Mrs. L. C. Bates to Miss Mary Ovington, December 9, 1948, group 11, series C, container 10, folder
"Little Rock, Ark., 1948-1955," NAACP Papers (LC).
96 Gloster B. Current to Mrs. L. C. Bates, January 19, 1949, NAACP Papers (LC).
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Southwest Regional Conference fund to which it was affiliated. The delay in the
contribution, along with previous allegations of financial irregularities by Rev. Marcus
Taylor, and the increasingly assertive nature of more militant local activists, prompted the
national organisation to act quickly and decisively in the matter. At an emergency meeting
of the ASC, NAACP regional secretary, Donald Jones, recommended that Flowers be
given the opportunity to resign within fifteen days or face expulsion from the
organisation.97
Clearly, members of the local NAACP in Pine Bluff felt aggrieved at Current's
proposal, particularly since the work done by Flowers in the state on behalf of the struggle
for black rights had not been taken into account as a factor in the delay of administrative
tasks. Wiley Branton, on behalf of the local branch, responded to the NAACP's actions by
leading calls for the local organisation to withdraw from thejurisdiction of the national
organisation altogether and instead focus upon prssig oca( civi' rghts giietics sTh
had done in the days of the CNO.98 The hornets nest stirred up by the suggestion of firing
Flowers took the national headquarters of the NAACP by surprise. The response to the
dissent was to draw upon the "big guns" and have the NAACP's current executive
secretary Roy Wilkins, and former executive secretary Walter White, plead that for the sake
of unity in the civil rights struggle, the Pine Bluff NAACP should accept the decision of the
national organisation. Only when Flowers took it upon himself to resign to keep the peace,
did talk of outright mutiny cease.9
Dcnaid Jones to Glostcr B. Current, February 24, 1949, group II, series C, container 10, folder
"Arkansas State Conference 1949-1950," NAACP Papers (LC).
98 "Resolution," September 3, 1949, group H, series C, container 10, folder "Pine Bluff, Ark., 1948-
1955," NAACP Papers (LC).
99 Walter White to Pine Bluff NAACP, February 25, 1949; Roy Wilkins to Arkansas Branches of the
NAACP, May 10, 1949, group II, series C, container 10, folder "Pine Bluff, Ark., 1948-1955," NAACP
Papers (LC).
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Nevertheless, the deep dissatisfaction of local NAACP activists at the loss of such
an influential and militant force within the state continued to smoulder. Many were
extremely reluctant to accept Flowers's replacement, a Dr. J. A. White, who represented
the old guard of black leaders, imposed upon them by New York. This dissension within
NAACP ranks caused much concern. Mrs. Lulu B. White, a member of the Texas NAACP
State Conference of Branches, reported that "no place in the country is there so much strife
and division amongst Negroes as it is in Arkansas." Furthermore, White reported, such
was the disillusionment with the national organisation that "they say the work of the
NAACP is in charge of a few favourites in the state, who are Lackies, what ever that is, for
New York, and that New York is not worth a D---- to them."100
Though the initial storm after Flowers's resignation slowly abated the attitudes of
local members made it almost inevitable that a conservative president of the ASC would not
be tolerated for long, no matter how much the New York office tried to interfere with local
matters. When Dr. White fell ill and resigned from office in 1951, he was replaced
temporarily by W. L. Jarrett, a veteran of the early CNO campaigns.' 01 The issue of a
conservative versus an activist leadership in charge of NAACP activities was finally
resolved in the ensuing contest for the presidency that resulted in Daisy Bates's election to
the office in 1952. In a resigned manner Gloster B. Current questioned Bates's ability to
work with older, more established leaders in the state, and was very wary of her tendency
"to go off the deep end at times" in her forceful pursuit of black rights. But, he concluded
"[althoughl I am not certain that she was the proper person to be elected I permitted it
because there was no one else to be elected who offered any promise of doing anything to
further the work of the NAACP in Arkansas."102
100 Lulu B. White to Gloster B. Current, November 1, 1950, group II, series C, container 11, folder
"Arkansas State Conference 1949-1950," NAACP Papers (LC).
101 "Memorandum to the Staff, Branches and Regional Offices" from Gloster B. Current, August 7, 1951,
group II, series C, container 11, folder "Arkansas State Conference 1951-1952," NAACP Papers (LC).
102 Gloster B. Current to U. Simpson Tate, August 20, 1952, group II, series C, container 11, folder
"Arkansas State Conference 195 1-1952," NAACP Papers (LC).
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The admission that only an activist could advance the cause of the NAACP within
the state marked a major triumph over the forces of black conservatism and was a defining
moment in the development of black activism in Arkansas. Daisy Bates's election as
president of the ASC was the culmination of a long struggle over the direction which civil
rights protests should take. Finally, a strong local activist had secured the position at the
helm of the NAACP and at the same time was able to marry this to an important strategic
base in the state capital of Little Rock. Bates was consequently in a prime position to
mobilise a more effective push for a militant black insurgency, using the NAACP as a
vehicle to promote a greater commitment to black activism both in Little Rock and across
the state.
Daisy Bates's ascent to the presidency of the ASC coincided with a local and
national intensification of the black struggle for equality in education, focused in particular
on testing the segregation statutes in secondary schools. The first action taken in the area of
secondary education for blacks in Arkansas had been a slow-moving suit which requested
equalisation rather than desegregation of facilities, filed by U. Simpson Tate and J. A.
Booker at the Fort Smith school district, located in one of the furthest north-western parts
of the state in December 1948. 103 When the suit eventually came to trial in late 1949,
parents of black school children at Lincoln High contended that the dilapidated school
buildings of the black school, with "walls cracking from the roof to the ground, the floors
and stairways worn, walls crumbling, no decent toilet facilities land] no cafeteria facilities"
were far inferior to the white schools that were "of the finest type of construction far
beyond the facilities offered Negroes." Moreover, white high schools in Fort Smith
provided far more courses and longer terms than black schools. Such disparities were, the
parents asserted, an abuse of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
103 Slate Press, Decembcr 17, 1948.
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In response, the school board put up a defence that since the suit had been filed, it
had built a new elementary school for blacks, together with a small home economics
building and a new metalwork shop. Furthermore, the board claimed that it was planning to
renovate the black high school building altogether in the very near future. To back up its
claims, the school board placed several carefully chosen sympathetic local blacks on the
stand who testified that the school board was "nice to us" and that "no discrimination
exists." White officials from the State Department of Education testified that "when the
plans of the board are carried out, the buildings will be the equal of the white schools." On
this basis, Judge John E. Miller handed down a verdict that "while before the filing of the
suit there may have been grounds for complaint.., now since the plans have been unfolded,
there is no ground for the contention that discrimination now exists and the complaint will
be dismissed." 104 Although the attorneys threatened to carry the case further, the
intimidation of black parents who were asked by white school officials not to proceed with
the suit, coupled with the measures which the board promised to take to improve black
school facilities, led to the fizzling out of continued action.
Far more effective than the efforts of Tate and Booker working on behalf of the
NAACP was W. H. Flowers's independent first attack on unequal school facilities in
January 1949. A reflection of the increased level of black activism in local communities
across the state in the late 1940s, eighteen local parents in the DeWitt School District
formed a Citizens' Committee to launch a suit against their local school board. The
Citizens' Committee decided to employ the services of Flowers, who, in spite of his
antagonisms with the organisation, proceeded to set up a branch of the NAACP at DeWitt
into which the Citizens' Committee was absorbed. The complaint of parents at DeWitt was
that the school board there did not provide any educational facilities for blacks whatsoever
104 Ibid., November 18, 1949.
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beyond the elementary level; after the eighth grade black parents were forced to send their
children eight miles to the nearest black school in a neighbouring district. 1 05 However, at
trial, in July 1949, Federal Judge Harry Lemley maintained that although he felt it was
"impracticable for the defendant school district to establish a Negro school within its
boundaries" he acknowledged the constitutional issues at stake. Therefore, Lemley ordered
equal facilities to be built for blacks within a "reasonable time" -- effectively delaying any
further progress until the board saw fit. 106
 Although Flowers failed make any substantial
material gains in the case, statewide it was seen as the ' V ice breaking" case over schools in
that it was the first suit of its kind to come to trial.107
In a bolder attempt to attack segregation in October 1951, W. H. Flowers filed suit
on behalf of parents in the Fordyce school district. The Fordyce suit was the first to
question the basic constitutionality of the legal foundations of segregation in Arkansas
schools. In fact, Flowers asked the court to rule on several specific issues pertaining to the
legal rights of parents in the black community, such as the constitutionality of the denial of
equal school facilities to blacks; the constitutionality of the refusal of white authorities to
open white schools to Negro children; and the wider issue of the constitutionality of the
policy of segregation as a denial of rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.'08
Similar suits were filed shortly afterwards by patrons of the Gould and Hughes school
districts, again with the help of Flowers. 109 At the head of all these cases was the
equalisation of school facilities, but Flowers was determined to make clear to white school
authorities that if the courts ruled that they must provide equal facilities in each school
district across the state it would prove "mighty expensive" to defend the principals of
segregation, which were also under attack. Meanwhile, the State Press at Little Rock
105 Ibid., January 14, 1949.
106 Ibid., July 15, 1949.
107 Arkansas Gazelle, July 31, 1988.
108 Slate Press, October 26, 1951.
109 Ibid., December 14, 1951; March 7, 1952.
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enthused that the suits were conclusive evidence that the "Arkansas Negro is no longer
satisfied to act the role of puppet for the white man."1 10 Such actions did not come without
risks; the potentially explosive issue of school desegregation was brought home with a
threatening letter sent to Flowers, allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan, warning him to leave
the state before the cases came to trial.' 1
Flowers ignored the threats and continued to strive for an end to school segregation
in the Arkansas courts. Although Flowers's efforts were met with delaying tactics by
school authorities through the courts, events at a national level finally overtook the local
challenge to segregation in Arkansas schools. On May 17, 1954, the United States
Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, which
declared that segregated schools were "inherently unequal." Moreover, the Court stated that
even if equal facilities were provided for blacks in southern schools, the very fact of
separation itself meant that black students were provided with an inferior education.
Following to a logical conclusion the decisions in black graduate education throughout the
1940s, the Court maintained that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place." 12
The Brown decision appeared to herald an end to the ambiguities of race relations in
post-war Arkansas and, indeed, throughout the South. An exuberant Thurgood Marshall
declared "once and for all, it's decided, and completely decided." 13 Daisy Bates shared
similar sentiments, convinced that "the time for delay, evasion, or procrastination was
past." 14 For black activists, the United States Supreme Court decision vindicated their
110 Ibid., December 14, 1951.
111 Ibid., January 11, 1952.
112 For a comprehensive discussion to the background of Brown v. Board of Education see Richard Kiuger
Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976).
113 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, p. 43.
114 Bates, The Long Shadow, pp. 47-48.
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calls not to accept half-measures but to insist upon full equality. With the law of the land
firmly in support, over the next few years many others in the state's black population
slowly became converts to the creed of racial equality and became increasingly more
emboldened in their assertion of full citizenship rights. To whites, the Brown decision
embodied the worst of their fears. In spite of their efforts to reform the segregated order,
the Supreme Court, many believed, had now turned against them and wrested control of
race relations out of their hands. The choice of reform within the boundaries of Jim Crow
was no longer an option; federal government demanded that segregation be dismantled,
first in the schools, and then, many feared, in all other areas of southern life. The Court did
offer some respite. It delayed a ruling on how the implementation of school desegregation
should be conducted for a year in order to give the South a chance to come to terms with
the proposed racial change and draw up plans of how it would comply with the Court
decision. Arkansans found themselves at a cross-roads over race relations. In one direction
was a course of smooth, uninterrupted progress building upon and extending the changes
that had already taken place in the state. In the other was a return to conflict with the North
over race which harked back to the dark days of Civil War and Reconstruction. To the vast
majority of whites, neither held much appeal.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CROSSROADS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
As news of the United States Supreme Court ruling spread across the South the
initial reaction was generally calm and restrained. True, there were firebrand segregationists
such as Senator Eastland of Mississippi who labelled the Brown decision a "monstrous
crime" and Georgia Governor Herman Talamadge who declared, playing upon the deep
seated fears and taboos of the populace, that the ultimate objective of the exercise was to
admit the black man into the white women's bedroom. Yet alongside such die-hard
defenders of segregation were figures such as Mississippi Governor James P. Coleman
who appealed for "cool thinking" and moderation, along with Alabama Governor James E.
Folsom who stated that "when the Supreme Court speaks, that's the law." The Brown
decision failed to bring an uprising from the southern populace who, although obviously
concerned, were not surprised at the seemingly inevitable outcome of a steady attack on
segregation throughout the post-war period. In light of the way such changes had been
handled previously, however, most whites believed that through a variety of political,
economic, and legalistic strategies, the potential impact of the Court ruling could be
muted. 1
The Brown decision met with a mixed reaction in Arkansas, reflecting the range of
opinions in the upper and lower South. On the one hand, in north-west Arkansas and in
urban areas across the state, there was a general acceptance amongst the populace that they
would have to comply with the United States Supreme Court ruling. "Arkansas will obey
the law" declared Governor Francis Cherry in Little Rock, with the acknowledgement that
the state would "not approach the problem [of desegregation} with the idea of being
David R. Goldficld, Black, White And Southern: Race Relations and Southern Culture, 1940 to (lie
Prese,ii (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), pp. 75-76.
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outlaws." 2
 The Arkansas Gazette echoed the call for sensible handling of a potentially
hazardous issue by asserting that "Wise leadership at the upper levels" was needed and
warning that "emotional excursions by the leaders of either race can do great harm." On the
other hand, rumblings of dissent came from eastern Arkansas where congressman E. C.
"Took" Gathings condemned both the Brown decision and the United States Supreme
Court for their interference with racial matters. 3 Although no groundswell of opinion
advocating outright violent resistance to the law emerged, there were moves by some to
formulate measures that would allow a legal circumvention preventing, or at the very least
delaying, the implementation of the desegregation ruling.4
The regional division in attitudes toward the Brown decision was clear in the
actions of various school boards across the state. In north-west Arkansas three school
districts immediately drew up plans to desegregate, based largely on financial
considerations. Just four days after the United States Supreme Court decision the
Fayetteville school board announced that it would allow the nine black students in its
district to attend the local high school with 500 whites the following academic year.
Previously, the nine black students had been bussed to segregated schools at Fort Smith
and Hot Springs, a distance of 60 and 150 miles respectively, at a cost to taxpayers of
$5,000 a year in order to preserve an all-white schools system. Fayetteville's
Superintendent of Schools Wayne White bluntly told reporters "segregation was a luxury
we could no longer afford." The school boards at Charleston and Bentonville, both in
similar circumstances to Fayetteville, also voted to integrate. However, indicative of the
caution exercised even in places where desegregation was not perceived as a great threat to
the peace of the community, because of the small numbers of blacks involved, these school
boards only chose to make public their decisions after they had carried out their plans. This
2 Southern School News, September 1954, p. 2.
Arkansas Gazette, May 18, 1954.
Southern School News, October 1954, p. 3.
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was done as a precautionary measure in order to forestall any formal resistance against the
move from taking root both from within and outside the school district. None of the
districts encountered any hostility as a result of desegregation.5
In marked contrast, the one attempt to desegregate in eastern Arkansas aroused a
storm of opposition. The incident occurred at Sheridan, a school district just a few miles
outside the state capital of Little Rock, on the edge of the delta. Like the three school
districts in north-west Arkansas, Sheridan bussed its small black student population to the
nearest segregated schools. On May 21 the Sheridan school board voted unanimously to
integrate its 21 black students with the 600 whites at the local high school in order to
alleviate the financial burden involved in maintaining segregation. The move led to an
immediate protest from the white community that forced the school board to take a second
vote the following night, resulting in a unanimous recanting of the plan to desegregate. Still
not satisfied, 300 parents held a meeting a week afterwards and agreed to circulate a
petition calling for the resignation of the entire school board. As a result of the meeting one
school board member resigned followed by three others shortly afterwards. When the
September school term began in Sheridan black students were still bussed 27 miles to a
black school in an adjoining county at an estimated yearly cost to taxpayers of $4,000.
Segregation was to stay, residents decided, whatever the cost. No other school districts in
the delta offered any signs of compliance with the Brown decision.6
The pronounced regional difference in attitudes and approaches to school
desegregation brought a deadlock over the issue at a state level. Although eastern Arkansas
interests won concessions to prevent any major headway towards desegregation, they
proved unsuccessful at imposing their agenda for a legal circumvention of the Brown
decision. At the State Board of Education meeting in September 1954, Harold Weaver,
Ibid., Scptcmber 1954, p2; October 1954, p. 3; December 1956, p. 8.
6 Ibid., September 1954, p. 2.
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chairman of the West Memphis school board, whose district bordered the banks of the
Mississippi river, hysterically claimed that the Brown decision would "tear our school
system all to pieces." Although members not from eastern Arkansas expressed sympathy
with Weaver, and were prepared to assist in formulating a "go slow" gradualist approach to
desegregation, there was little commitment to halting the process altogether. To mollify
eastern Arkansas schoolmen, the State Board of Education advised school districts to work
towards equalising black and white school facilities and to wait for the desegregation
implementation order from the United States Supreme Court before taking any decisive
action. Furthermore, the board voted to ask Arkansas Attorney General Tom Gentry to file
a friend-of-the-court brief with the United States Supreme Court, outlining the strong
feelings that their decision had aroused in Arkansas, in an attempt to try to influence a
lenient implementation plan. Gentry agreed to help, but sternly warned the board that the
Brown decision was "the law of the land and we are going to have to abide by it" and that
all he could do was to advise the Court on how, not whether, they wanted to desegregate.7
The stalemate between those resigned to compliance with the Brown decision and
those who were calling for its circumvention was evident in the election for governor in
1954. The victorious candidate, Orval Faubus, beat incumbent Francis Cherry without
taking any firm position on the race issue. Faubus, who hailed from north-west Arkansas
and cut his political teeth in the liberal Sid McMath administration, was generally inclined
toward a moderate stance on the question of school desegregation. Yet the need to court
votes in eastern Arkansas prevented Faubus from expressing unequivocal support for
compliance with the Brown decision. What emerged instead was a convoluted and
confused stance that pandered to racial conservatism by proclaiming that 'Arkansas is not
ready for complete and sudden mixing of the races in public schools" yet still left the way
open for compliance and racial progress at a "Local Level with state authorities standing
' Ibid., October 1954, p. 3.
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ready to assist in every way possible." The non-committal approach of Faubus, which
sought to satisfy all sections within the state, provided an interesting political barometer on
the school desegregation question. The stance seemed to demonstrate that not even political
campaigners could discern a popular mood in the state either strongly in favour of school
desegregation or strongly opposed to it and were willing to wait for public sentiment to
develop before committing themselves steadfastly to any policy in the matter.8
The politically ambiguous role of the school desegregation issue was further in
evidence at the biennial meeting of the Arkansas General Assembly, the legislative branch
of state government, in January 1955. Half-way through the 60-day session a bill aimed at
circumventing the Brown decision was introduced into both Houses by east Arkansas state
senators Fletcher Long, W. E. "Buck" Fletcher and state representative Lucien C. Rodgers.
The bill outlined a plan to appoint an assignment officer in each Arkansas school district
who would decide which schools students should be allocated to on a variety of criteria
ranging from the "welfare and best interest of the child" to 'geographical location."
Essentially, the move was designed to preserve segregation by allowing for the assignment
of blacks to black schools and whites to white schools without actually mentioning race as
a factor. 9
 Opposition to the bill came from Max Howell whose constituency covered the
affluent white suburbs of Little Rock. In a delaying manoeuvre, I-lowell asked for the bill
to be read in full. Next, f-lowell asked for the bill to be tabled, effectively killing its
measures outright. By a narrow vote the Arkansas senate decided to retain the bill, but
Howell won a delay in its implementation until after the United States Supreme Court had
issued its directive of how school boards should desegregate. In an impassioned speech to
the Arkansas senate he declared that "Just because some other dyed-in-the-wool southern
state jumped in haste to preserve [segregation] doesn't mean that Arkansas should." The
8 Ibid., March 1955, P. 2. On the reactions of liberal southern politicians to Brow,z see Badger, "Fatalism
not Gradualism."
Southern Sc/zoo! News, March 1955, p. 2.
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delay robbed eastern Arkansans of a pre-emptive strike against the Supreme Court's school
desegregation implementation order and kept hope of constructive progress on the issue
alive in the state.10
The finely balanced position of the state between a willingness to accept the 1954
Brown decision as the law of the land and attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court ruling
served to heighten the importance of the Little Rock school board's stance on
desegregation. With the largest school system in the state, located on the geographical
border between north-west and eastern Arkansas, other communities looked to Little Rock
for guidance and leadership. Positive steps by the state capital for compliance held the
potential to significantly weaken the crusade for the circumvention of school desegregation
in eastern Arkansas, whilst a posture of defiance would prove highly damaging for further
compliance.
Recognising the pivotal importance that Little Rock would have on school
desegregation throughout the state, the local branch of the NAACP had attempted to
establish negotiations with the city's school board in the years prior to the Brown decision.
Through the offices of an interracial group, the Little Rock Council on Schools (LRCS),
NAACP representatives, along with a handful of white sympathisers, petitioned the Little
Rock school board to consider a proposal for limited desegregation. The proposal, which
outlined a plan for black students to use the print shop at Little Rock (later Central) High
school, since Dunbar High did not have such a facility, was considered seriously by
several board members. Only the presence of the Superintendent of Schools Harry A.
10 Ibid., April 1955, p. 7. Pupil assignment laws were the most common response by southern legislatures
to Brown, with virtually every state adopting them in some form by 1955. However, the measures were
moderate compared with the litigation which accompanied them in some states, s hich variously proposed
the use of police power to stop integration, financing litigation opposing desegregation, investigation of
pro-integration organisations and leasing public schools to private corporations in an attempt to avoid
federal orders to desegregate. Not until much later did Arkansas engage in such extremist measures (see
Benjamin Muse, len Years of Prelude: The S1or of Integration since the Supre,ne Court's 1954 Decision
(Beaconsfield: Darwen Finlayson, 1964), pp. 64-72.
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Little, a committed segregationist, cast a shadow over the proceedings. Nevertheless, the
school board did agree to meet with the LRCS further.' 1 Before another meeting could be
arranged, however, one of the local NAACP's lawyers, Thaddeus Williams, in an effort to
try and enhance his prestige in the black community, leaked news of the meeting with the
school board to the press. The move backfired as it breached the board's insistence on
confidentiality and thus scuppered the prospect of further negotiations.'2
The fact that the Little Rock school board was at least prepared to give consideration
to proposals for change gave heart to those who believed that Arkansas's capital city would
lead the way for compliance with the Brown decision in the state. Certainly, this was the
view of those in the black delegation who gathered to hear what the new Superintendent of
Schools Virgil T. Blossom had to report about the plans of the Little Rock school board
four days after the United States Supreme Court ruling was handed down. As he started to
outline the school board's plans, however, Blossom noticed that the "high spirits" with
which the meeting began soon transformed in a "rapid [loss ofi enthusiasm." Blossom told
the black delegation that the school board did not intend to move ahead with desegregation
immediately. Instead, he stated, a decision had been taken to wait for the Supreme Court
implementation ruling before instigating any further action. In the meantime, Blossom
indicated that he would take on the job of drawing up plans for what might happen if the
Little Rock schools were indeed eventually forced to desegregate. After Blossom finished
his speech, L. C. Bates stormed out of the meeting in outright disgust at the school board's
perceived lack of conviction to forge ahead with a desegregation programme. Others
stayed, but it was clear from their comments that disappointment with the school board's
decision was widespread amongst those representatives from the black community who
were present. Rev. Fred T. Guy, pastor at one of Little Rock's largest black churches, told
Gcorg C. Iggers to Tony Frcyer, September 17, 1980. Supplied courtesy of Professor Georg C. Iggers.
12 Georg C. Iggers, "An Arkansas Professor: The NAACP and the Grass Roots," in Little Rock, U.S.A.,
Wilson Record and Jane Casscls Record (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1960), p. 285.
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Blossom that "Next to the law of God the constitution of the United States means the most
to me. When you start to tinker with the constitution it becomes awfully important to us."
Blossom assured Guy that the school board were not proposing to "delay for delays sake,
but to do the job right."3
The initial disappointment at the school board's response to the Brown decision
was quickly followed by attempts from the black community, spearheaded by the NAACP,
to press for a definite declaration of plans for desegregation. At a meeting with Virgil
Blossom, NAACP representatives were informed that before any desegregation could take
place the school board planned to build two new schools, Horace Mann High in the
predominantly black eastern part of the city, and Hall High in the affluent white suburbs of
the west. Blossom stressed that although the two new schools were designated in black and
white residential areas respectively they would have no set racial designation. Rather,
Blossom assured NAACP members, the school board planned to desegregate all three of
the city's high schools, Horace Mann, Hall High and Central High, along colour-blind
edace totes i. 1957, w th elem.entary schools to follow some time around 1960.14
The so-called "Blossom Plan" met with a mixed reaction amongst members of the
Little Rock NAACP. On the one hand, more militant members like L.C. and Daisy Bates
opposed the plan on the grounds that it was "vague, indefinite, slow-moving and indicative
of an intent to stall further on public school integration." On the other hand, a clear majority
supported the plan and cautioned against pushing the school board too hard. Most felt that
Blossom and the school board should be given a chance to prove their good intentions, that
the plan they had drawn up was reasonable, and that, importantly, the plan would be
Virgil Blossom, Ii Has Happened Here (New York: Harper, 1959) pp. 11-13.
14 Jggcrs, "An Arkansas Professor," p. 286.
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acceptable to the white community. The local branch therefore decided that it would await
further developments before taking any action.15
In April 1955, in anticipation of the United States Supreme Court implementation
order, Vernon McDaniels, a field worker for the NAACP who had spent six months in
Arkansas assessing the school desegregation situation in various communities across the
state, addressed a meeting of NAACP members in Little Rock. McDaniels admitted that
different communities would offer different degrees of resistance to school desegregation,
but insisted that with increased efforts by blacks at a grassroots level across the state to
bcaL cbo boatds into com.çliance with the Brown decision, Arkansas represented
the "brightest prospect among the southern states for integration." 6 This upbeat
assessment was based upon the encouraging developments of the past year. A few school
districts in north-west Arkansas had already moved to desegregate, whereas in many other
southern states no progress had been made at all. Also, unlike other states, no widespread,
organised campaign of resistance to school desegregation had developed. Moreover, the
one direct attempt to circumvent the Brown decision in the legislature had been delayed by a
majority vote, indicating that there were law-abiding influences in Arkansas that could
stymie any dissenting voices of protest. Although the situation over school desegregation
was still largely in the balance, there were grounds for cautious optimism that a definite
timetable for desegregation issued by the United States Supreme Court would tip the scales
decisively toward moderation and compliance.
To those who held faith in the ability of the United States Supreme Court's
implementation decision to clear a path for compliance with its previous school
desegregation decree, the words of the Justices on May 31, 1955, came as a major blow.
Instead of following up on its initial conviction, the Court equivocated. The Supreme Court
15 Ibid., p. 286-287.
16 Southern School News, May 1955, p. 2.
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implementation order, which became known as Brown II, ambiguously told school boards
that they must make a "prompt and reasonable start" to desegregate "with all deliberate
speed." No definite deadline was set for when integration had to begin and no indication
was given of what exactly constituted compliance with the Brown decision, for example, in
terms of how many students were to be integrated and at what grades. Indeed, the Court
even listed the "local problems" that might be given as reasonable excuses for delay. The
task of administrating school desegregation, moreover, was handed to federal district
Judges, who had no means of enforcing their rulings, and local school boards, drawn from
local communities that could exert pressure (if, indeed, any pressure was needed) to drag
out the process of integration for as long as possible. The overall message to the South
seemed to be that it could take as long as it wanted to desegregate schools; to many, this
meant never.17
The reasons behind the Supreme Court's indecisiveness were manifold and
complex. Rumours abounded that in exchange for unanimity on the initial school
desegregation decision, some southern Justices had managed to win the South the benefit
of the doubt in awarding a "go-slow" implementation order. The lack of political backing
also seems to have played a major role. President Eisenhower continually refused to
support the Brown decision strongly in public and in private admitted that he feared
catastrophic massive resistance in the South if its racial mores were put so quickly and
directly under threat. Southern leaders, emboldened through the delay between the school
desegregation decision and implementation order, warned of impending violence and,
playing upon the fears of massive resistance voiced by the president, warned of the need
not to alienate the white population through forcing racial change too fast. White
southerners, told by their leaders that they were being alienated, increasingly sought to live
up to that role as the reluctance to implement the Brown decision began to crystallise into
' 7 Goldfjeld Black, White And Soiithzer,z, p. 81.
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direct opposition to it. As a result of the pressures of a perceived lack of support from other
branches federal government and the public at large, together with divisions with its own
ranks, the Court climbed down from its lofty stance for racial change and offered an
ambiguous and confusing compromise instead.18
Brown II proved a significant turning point for school desegregation, race relations
and black activism in Arkansas. A slow but steady polarisation of opinion in both the black
and white communities began to develop as a result of the Court's equivocation. Whites
who had initially resigned themselves to eventual compliance with the Supreme Court
desegregation ruling began to back-pedal furiously and stressed that if desegregation
occurred at all it would take far longer than they had at first envisaged. Even more critical,
Brown II signalled the beginning of a movement towards outright defiance of the law and
total opposition to school desegregation. Prior to the Supreme Court implementation decree
the most outspoken opponents of school desegregation in Arkansas had looked to find a
way to circumvent school desegregation through legal means. Emboldened by the
reluctance to enforce the Brown decision shown by the Supreme Court, the first calls for
resistance by any means came from an organised band of segregationists. The hardening of
sentiment against desegregation in the white community helped, in turn, to strengthen the
resolve of blacks. Increasingly, the NAACP, hitherto a fringe organisation, became the
leading force in the black community, as the earlier optimism that whites would implement
the Brown decision evaporated. The growing militancy in the black population coupled
with the increasing ambivalence in the white community to school desegregation eventually
culminated in an NAACP sponsored lawsuit against the school board in Little Rock.
The feeling that the Supreme Court's implementation decree meant that school
boards could take as long as they liked to desegregate was clearly evident in the reaction of
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Virgil Blossom, who, shortly after Brown II, indicated that certain modifications were
planned in his original school desegregation proposals. The most significant development
was the introduction of a transfer system that would allow students to move out of the
school attendance zone to which they were assigned. Under the original Blossom Plan it
was clear that schools were being geographically gerrymandered to provide catchment areas
that would ensure a majority black student population at Horace Mann High and a majority
white student population at Hall High. The subsequent assignment of black students to
Horace Mann High, even though they lived closer to Central High, had confirmed the
intentions of the school board to limit the impact of desegregation as much as possible.
Even so, the original plan meant that quite a substantial amount of integration would have
occurred. The new plan, however, allowed whites to "opt out" of attendance at Horace
Mann High, without giving blacks the right to choose to "opt in" to 1-Jail High. To
encourage the shift of white pupils from Horace Mann High the school board clearly
designated the school as a black institution by assigning an all-black teaching staff to it.
Furthermore, the school board declared that it intended to open Horace Mann High as a
segregated black school in February 1956, a move that would establish a precedent for
black attendance the year before the school was due to desegregate.'9
The revised Blossom Plan incensed members of the NAACP, even those who had
been willing to go along with the original plan.2° To add insult to injury Blossom did not
even bother to consult NAACP members about the changes. Daisy sates tohi portt'rs tht
the Little Rock NAACP were demanding a meeting with the school board and that further
action would depend upon the outcome of these talks. "We haven't met with the school
board since the May 31 ruling of the Supreme Court" explained Bates, who insisted that
they wanted Blossom "to outline what he called his position on when and where Little
Rock should begin desegregation." Bates added that she was definitely against the
19 Souther,, Sc/tool News, July 1955, p. 3; Iggcrs, "An Arkansas Professor," p. 287.
20 Ibid., p. 287-288.
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rumoured new plan because it was too vague and would take too long to accomplish. "We
aren't trying to put pressure or make threats" Bates concluded "we just want to know what
the plans are -- officially." 2 ' When the NAACP met with the school board to request the
immediate integration of the city's schools, Dr. William Cooper, president of the school
board, told them that they would receive a written reply to their request within a week.
Shortly afterwards the school board rejected the NAACP's proposal outright. 22
 The
ambivalence over school desegregation in Little Rock set the pattern for other school
districts across the state. Ignoring a declaration by the executive committee of the ASC
which stated that any school board which was not ready to enact a plan for desegregation
by September 1955 would be liable to court action the three other largest school systems in
the state, at Fort Smith, North Little Rock and Hot Springs, all drew up plans which
purposefully delayed any desegregation taking place in schools until Little Rock made the
first move.23
The fact that Brown II encouraged not only ambivalence to school desegregation in
Arkansas amongst those who had previously been resigned to compliance, but also actually
helped to create a movement of opposition and resistance, was demonstrated in the unlikely
place of Hoxie, a small settlement in north-east Arkansas. With a population ofjust over a
thousand, Hoxie was close enough to the Arkansas delta to have a split school term to
allow for the cotton picking harvest, yet it was atypical in that, with only fourteen black
families living in the town, it did not reflect the density of the black population in other
delta areas. 24 On June 25, 1955, the school board at Hoxie voted to desegregate,
ostensibly on the same money-saving basis that had motivated other school districts to do
so. In fact, Superintendent of Schools Kunkel Howard Vance gave three reasons for the
21 Soulher,: School News, August 1955, p. iS.
22 Ibid., September 1955, p. 10.
23 Ibid., July 1955, p. 3; August 1955, p. 15; September 1955, p. 10.
24 Mildred L. Bond to Roy Wilkins, August 6, 1955, box 4, folder 10, Daisy Bates Papers, State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison (collection hereinafter cited as DBPW).
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decision; first it was "right in the sight of God," second it was "the law," and third it was
"cheaper."25 On July 11, the first day of integrated classes, a small group of disgruntled
local men gathered outside the school to witness proceedings. Some parents voiced their
misgivings, with one, a Mrs. John Cole, worriedly telling newspapermen that her eight
year old daughter Peggy "feared Negroes." But despite the apprehensions surrounding
integration the general consensus of opinion was that "we have to obey the law." Although
there was some tension in classes at first, teachers soon made black students feel welcome
and normal school life quickly resumed. By noon recess black boys were being invited by
whites to try out for the school baseball team and even the fearful Peggy was captured on
film by photographers playing and walking arm in arm with black female students.26
Ironically, it was the very success of school desegregation at Hoxie that made it the
rallying point for massive resistance forces in the state. Life magazine reporters were
present to document the event and ran a story the following week under the title of "A
'Morally Right' Decision." The article included an extensive array of pictures showing
black and white students attending classes and playing together with a pronouncement that
desegregation could work successfully in the South. 27 Whereas other school boards were
at pains to avoid the glare of publicity, desegregation at Hoxie became a national story, and
as a result the town became a centre of attention for segregationists throughout the region.
With the help and encouragement of segregationists in other states, particularly the closely
neighbouring Mississippi, a meeting was held in Hoxie at which Herbert Brewer, a local
soya bean farmer and part-time auctioneer, was elected as chairman of the Citizens'
Committee Representing Segregation in the Hoxie Schools. 28
 Brewer and the Hoxie
Citizens' Committee (HCC) picketed and petitioned the Hoxie school board to try and
25 Southern School News, August 1955, p. 15.
26 "A 'Morally Right' Decision," Life 39 (July 25, 1955), pp. 29-3 1.
27 Ibid.
28 CabelI Phillips "Integration: Battle of Hoxie, Arkansas," The New York Times Magazine, September
25, 1955, pp. 12, 68-76.
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persuade its members to reverse their decision to desegregate. Although the school board
held firm in its conviction and rebuffed the demands of segregationists, in an effort to
provide a cooling off period, the board subsequently closed the schools two weeks before
the scheduled end of term.29
The concession to close the schools early proved unfortunate since it only served to
encourage further disruption from the segregationists who stepped up their campaign of
intimidation. The gathering storm also helped to draw support from other segregationists
across the state. White America, Inc., which was formed in Pine Bluff as early as 1955,
and according to historian Neil McMillen had hitherto "languished in obscurity" sent one of
its leading spokesmen, lawyer Amis Gutheridge from Little Rock, to tell Hoxie citizens that
"integration will lead to intermarriage; they [blacks] want in the white bedroom." Next to
arrive was James Johnson, head of the newly formed segregatonistfacton, the White
Citizens' Councils of Arkansas, who continued to exploit incendiary interracial sex taboos
by playing a recording of a speech allegedly made by "Professor Roosevelt Williams" of
Howard University to an NAACP meeting in Mississippi which expounded the virtues of
sleeping with white women. The fraudulent recording, manufactured by the Mississippi
White Citizens' Council, became a regular feature in Arkansas rallies of which there were
to be many more. The meeting of segregationist factions at Hoxie led to a pooling of
resources in the formation of the Association of Citizens' Councils of Arkansas (ACCA)
which became the main vehicle for white resistance to school desegregation in the state alter
the Hoxie campaign.3°
The events that unfolded at Hoxie demonstrated two unique traits of white
resistance in Arkansas. First, unlike other campaigners in the South, the Arkansas White
29 Southern School News, September 1955, p. 10.
30 Neil R. McMillen "The White Citizens' Council and Resistance to School Desegregation in Arkansas,"
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 30 (Summer 1971), pp 97-100; Jerry Vervack, "The Hoxie Imbroglio,"
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 48 (Spring 1989), p. 22.
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Citizens' Councils could never count citizens of prominent and influential community
standing among their numbers. Whereas in other states White Citizens' Councils could
count merchants, bankers, landowners and politicians among their brethren, who could
exert economic, political and social influence alongside the angry rhetoric at mass rallies, in
Arkansas the militant segregationist voice came predominantly from those who had little
standing in the community.3 ' Indeed, the crusade for segregation was often the one thing
that gave such spokesmen status and prestige. Herbert Brewer provides a typical case
study. Prior to assuming leadership of the HCC, Brewer was besmirched by several local
scandals, including a conviction for theft from a local black minister. Often apologising at
meetings for possessing only a third grade education, Brewer lived in a run-down part of
town just four houses away from the leading spokesperson for the small black community
there. When interviewed, others in the community professed little knowledge of Brewer;
one man who did know him remarked that upon becoming the head of the HCC it was the
first time he had known Brewer to be "better than a nigger." A mixture of Brewer's own
perceived lack of standing within the community and feelings of social, educational and
economic inadequacies appeared to motivate his actions rather than any deep-seated racial
convictions.32
 Likewise, Jim Johnson utilised the segregationist crusade in an attempt to
boost a hitherto unsuccessful political career and Amis Gutheridge became a spokesman for
segregationists only after proving a marginalised voice in the Little Rock Democratic party
and a less than prestigious lawyer.33
A second feature of organised white resistance to desegregation in Arkansas was
that its bark was far out of proportion to its ability to bite. In spite of the bluff and bluster
which surrounded school desegregation at Hoxie, segregationists found only a long and
31 The best guide to the White Citizens' Councils is Neil R. McMiIIen, The Citizens' Council: Organised
Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971).
32Vervack, "The Hoxie Imbroglio," pp. 20-2 1.
3 Tony Freyer The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1984), p. 68.
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protracted defeat there. The Hoxie school board obtained a court injunction against
segregationist interference with school desegregation that was successfully upheld through
numerous appeals. A suit launched to harass school board members by claiming variously
that they had broken the law by employing their spouses in the district, conducted business
illegally, and refused to call a mass meeting to discuss the school budget, was dismissed
out of hand by the courts. Likewise, a petition to the courts from the HCC to investigate the
affairs of the school board was summarily dispatched. 34 A similar experience befell ACCA
affiliates in Arkansas, Crittenden, Drew, Loanoake and Jefferson counties.35 None of the
ACCA's affiliates could boast a large membership comparable to that of the Citizens'
Councils in the Deep South; even the strongest branch, the Capital Citizens' Council (CCC)
in Little Rock, counted only five hundred members at its peak, of which no more than three
hundred actually lived in the city. In direct contrast to the White Citizens' Councils in other
states who could boast a successful organisationa] base for massive resistance, Arkansas's
efforts by comparison were a dismal failure.36
In spite of the White Citizens' Councils poor standing in the state, the appearance of
a highly vocal group of organised segregationists did nothing to help the cause of school
desegregation in Arkansas. Although unable to muster widespread support, the White
Citizens' Councils kept the sensitive issue of desegregation in the headlines and maintained
the deep-rooted nagging fears that school desegregation would ultimately lead to greater
racial equality in other areas of southern life and eventually undermine white supremacy in
the state, even to those who were unwilling to actively take a stand to prevent it. The
NAACP were keenly aware of the dangers of organised white resistance. The stand-off at
Hoxie prompted an increased urgency within the ASC to step up the pressure for school
desegregation before the idea of resistance spread to other parts of the state. Shortly alter
Ibid., pp. 28-33.
McMiIIen, "The White Citizens' Council," p.100.
36 Ibid., pp. 95-122.
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the passing of the September 1955 deadline, which the ASC issued to school boards as an
ultimatum to produce plans for integration, the first lawsuit was filed. On October 28
attorney Thurgood Marshall filed suit on behalf of 24 black students at Fort Smith in an
attempt to win a court order to force the Van Buren Independent School district to
desegregate its schools. 37 The case was strategically selected in north-west Arkansas,
where three school districts had already desegregated without any problem, yet failed to
bring the desired result. Instead of ordering immediate action, presiding Judge John E.
Miller ruled only that the school district was bound by law to take into account the Brown
decision in future plans and refused to offer any ruling on a timetable for desegregation.38
Despite this setback, toward the end of 1955 there were indications that further legal action
would be taken. On October 29, Ulysses Simpson Tate, a regional NAACP attorney from
Dallas, Texas, told members of the Little Rock NAACP that they didn't have to "horse
trade with school boards anymore" and that if they wanted "the banner of the NAACP, you
must settle for no less than complete and immediate integration." On November 27, at a
meeting in Little Rock, the NAACP policy board for Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and
Oklahoma declared that it was "very disappointed" with progress over school desegregation
and vowed that the NAACP would be "more impatient in the year to come."39
The escalating battle over school desegregation in Arkansas culminated in a lawsuit
at the state capital of Little Rock. In the local black community disillusionment with the
Little Rock school board had continued to grow since the revision of the original plans for
desegregation in June 1955. Repeated approaches by the Little Rock NAACP in an attempt
to find common ground with the Little Rock school board resulted in failure. Finally, in
December 1955, exasperated at having exhausted every other possible channel of action,
Soui/zer,z Sc/tool News, November 1955, p. 3.
38 1b1d. February 1956, p. 11.
Ibid., December 1955, p. 9.
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the Little Rock NAACP voted to file a lawsuit against the school board to gain some
indication that they intended to desegregate the city's schools sometime in the near future.40
A significant part in originating the suit was played by Dr. Georg C. Iggers, a white
college teacher at Philander Smith, who proved to be an important catalyst for racial change
during his brief stay in the city between 1950 and 1956. Iggers was a German Jew who
had fled to America from the Nazis in 1938. During his college days at Richmond,
Virginia, influenced by his own experiences of persecution, Iggers became actively
involved with interracial groups, working to promote a better understanding between the
races in the South. After graduating with a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1950,
Iggers moved to Little Rock with his wife to take up a teaching post at Philander Smith.
From his first days in the city, Iggers was an active advocate of racial reform. In 1950 he
successfully campaigned on behalf of his college class for a complete desegregation of the
public library and through informal talks with downtown businessmen persuaded them to
remove some of the city's segregated water fountains. These exploits earned the respect of
local NAACP members and won Iggers appointments to various committees within the
organisation. As chair of the education committee, it was Iggers who drew up the
proposals for limited integration in the city's schools prior to 1954.41
Iggers's participation in the struggle for black rights in the city was part of a
discernible if still very limited growth of white support for racial change. As in other cities,
there was a wide range of views amongst a small band of white sympathisers for the plight
of blacks, ranging from those who believed in improving the conditions of blacks strictly
within the bounds of the segregated order to those who believed that only integration would
begin to address racial inequalities. Amongst the former group were members of the Little
Rock Urban League, formed in 1939, who were amongst the first whites in the city to
40 Jggcrs, "An Arkansas Profcssor," p. 289.
41 Iggers to Freyer, September 17, 1980, pp. 1-2.
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show an interest in co-ordinating efforts to improve the conditions of the city's black
population.42 Some members of the Urban League found the organisation a first step to
further action in helping to secure black rights. Adolphine Fletcher Terry, for example,
wife of a former Arkansas congressman who came from one of the state's most prestigious
families, was an Urban League board member who played an influential role in getting the
Little Rock public library to relax its policy of segregation in 1948. Terry also played a
pivotal role in organising resistance to segregationists in later years. 43
 According to Iggers
by the mid-1950s "New and more systematic channels of interracial communication
developed" including support from religious organisations such as the Quakers, Unitarians
and some members of the Pulaski Heights Christian Church. 44 Another, even more
significant development, was the re-organisation of the SRC local branch in the city as the
Arkansas Council for Human Relations (ACHR) which proved an important meeting point
for those in the white community who backed integration. 45 Nevertheless, Iggers's own
membership and outright support of the NAACP represented a rare commitment to racial
change at the time. Not until the 1960s would other whites have a genuine impact on the
struggle for black rights in Little Rock.
Although united in the goal of achieving the desegregation of the city's schools, the
decision to launch a lawsuit against the Little Rock school board revealed divisions within
the local NAACP over the best way to pursue its aims. In particular, Thaddeus Williams,
who usually handled cases for the local NAACP branch, was concerned that litigation
against the Little Rock school board might have a harmful effect on the process of
desegregation. Williams believed that only school boards which had made no attempt to
draw up plans for desegregation should be targeted for legal action. Williams expressed
concern that if the court upheld the Blossom plan it would lead to the adoption of similar
42 Edwin E. Dunaway, interview with John Kirk, May 5, 1993, UNOHC.
43 Sara Murphy, interview with John Kirk, April 29, 1993, UNOHC.
44 Iggers, "An Arkansas Professor," p. 284.
45 Iggers to Freyer, p. 5.
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stalling tactics by every other school board in the state.46 In spite of these reservations, a
general consensus emerged within the branch that Little Rock should be the target of a
lawsuit because of its significance in the state. Since local lawyers were reluctant to take on
the Little Rock school board, Iggers contacted NAACP regional attorney U. Simpson Tate
for advice and informed him that the local branch was especially concerned at plans to open
Horace Mann High as a segregated school in February 1956. In response, Tate cautioned
against the local NAACP's plan to seek an injunction against the opening of the school
since he believed this would be seen as a negative action that would present the local
organisation in a bad light. Instead, Tate urged the branch to take the positive step of
petitioning for admission of black students to Central High school when Horace Mann
High opened.47
The Little Rock NAACP agreed to take Tate's advice and voted to pursue their
demands for an increased urgency in addressing the issue of school desegregation by
attempting to register black students at several of the city's white schools in January 1956.
Support for the action was forthcoming from the national headquarters of the NAACP who
offered, through the Legal Defence and Educational Fund (LDEF), to tend legal assistance
if the local branch could raise the money to pay for a local attorney and would agree to pick
up all other costs involved in the case.48
Iggers was left with the task of finding plaintiffs, funds and a lawyer for the case.
He tackled the first prerequisite by canvassing parents in the black community door to door
with the help of other NAACP executive board members. Indicative of the strong feelings
that the school desegregation issue aroused, the NAACP received an unprecedented and
overwhelming degree of support for their stand. In addition to those parents who were
Frcycr, Tue Little Rock Crisis, pp. 42-43.
Iggers, "An Arkansas Professor," p. 288.
Ibid., p. 289.
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originally contacted, on the opening day of school registration many more parents who had
learned of the intended lawsuit on the community grapevine turned up with their children to
offer help.49 The second prerequisite, of finding funds for the case, proved more of an
obstacle. The Little Rock NAACP initially set a target of collecting $300 before taking their
case to court. After a disappointing fund-raising drive most of the money for the suit
eventually came from Iggers's appeals to friends and relatives in the United States and
Canada. Once the suit was filed, however, it helped to galvanise the black community, both
in support of the action against the school board and for the local NAACP branch. Within
just four weeks of the case going to court the local black community helped to raise over
one thousand dollars to sustain the action. 50 The third prerequisite for the lawsuit,
obtaining a lawyer to try the case, turned out to be trickier than first anticipated. The two
black attorneys in the Little Rock NAACP, Thaddeus Williams and J. R. Booker, who
usually handled litigation, were reluctant to offer their services to the local branch because
of feared reprisals from the white community and asked for fees that the organisation could
not afford. The problem was finally solved when Wiley Branton, recognising the
importance of the case to the ongoing struggle for black rights in the state, offered his legal
services for a minimum retainer to cover his expenses.5'
With preparations for the lawsuit in place, on January 23, 1956, thirty-three black
students applied for admission to four different white schools in Little Rock. All principals
of the schools refused entry to the students and referred them to Virgil Blossom. Daisy
Bates accompanied nine of the black students to Blossom's office where he explained to
them that he wanted to be "as kind as I can" but that he had to "deny their request... in line
with the policy outlined [by the school boardi." Blossom was adamant that school
desegregation would take place, as planned, in 1957. Daisy Bates told reporters after the
49 Ibid., p. 289; Iggers to Frcycr, p. 5.
SO Iggers to Freyer, p. 6.
Si ibid., p. 4.
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meeting that "I think the next step is obvious. We've tried everything short of a court
suit."52 On February 8, 1956, Wiley Branton filed suit against the Little Rock school board
for desegregation on behalf of thirty-three students under the title of Aaron v. Cooper.53
Blossom responded to the NAACP lawsuit by assembling a team of top attorneys
from the city's most prestigious law firms to assist Archibald House, the regular school
board lawyer, in the case. House subsequently drew up a two-pronged strategy for the
trial. On the one hand, House believed the team of lawyers should push the eminent
reasonableness of the school board's desegregation plan that did, after all, indicate a
willingness to abide by the Brown decision. On the other hand, House wanted to convince
the court of the "aggressiveness" of the NAACP's lawsuit which he believed was an
attempt to push the school board into a hurried compliance with the Brown decision. As he
put it to the team of attorneys, House wanted to place before the court the choice of "slow
and orderly" desegregation as outlined in the Blossom Plan or "prompt action with a
disregard of the economic and educational factors involved" which he claimed the
NAACP's suit represented.54
House's strategy did not work particularly well when depositions were taken on
May 4, 1956. Over Wiley Branton's opposition, trial Judge John E. Miller allowed school
board attorneys to call NAACP leaders to the stand and to requisition the local NAACP's
correspondence, but both proved unhelpful. When school board lawyer Leon B. Catlett
cross-examined J. C. Crenshaw, president of the Little Rock NAACP, and Daisy Bates,
president of the ASC, his attempts to get them to admit that the Blossom Plan was
reasonable in its provisions failed. Although Daisy Bates testified that school board
members had been courteous and co-operative in their dealings with the NAACP, she also
52 Sout/ier,z School News, February 1956, p. 11.
Ibid., March 1956, p. 4.
Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, pp. 46-48.
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pointed out that they were still operating a segregated schools system and had given no
clear indication of an end to this practice in the immediate future. Moreover, both Bates and
Crenshaw were vague about decisions made to instigate the lawsuit. Neither could
remember exactly when the local branch voted to press ahead with litigation or what the
vote was when the decision was made. Repeated questions from school board attorneys
designed to evoke an answer that would suggest that divisions existed within the local
NAACP branch over the action, repeatedly objected to by Branton and repeatedly sustained
by Judge Miller, were unsuccessful in bringing about the desired response as Daisy Bates
flatly denied all the accusations.55
In the event, the most controversial aspect of the trial turned out to be the manner in
which the questions were asked rather than the questions themselves. During Catlett's
interrogation of Daisy Bates he referred several times to the "nigger" leaders in the
NAACP. Catlett also discourteously referred to Mrs. Bates simply as "Daisy" to which she
vehemently objected. Catlett curtly replied that he wouldn't call her anything at all in the
future. The fracas between Bates and Catlett captured local and state news headlines and
thus helped to draw attention to the case, particularly inflaming eastern Arkansans who
resented Bates "answering back" a white attorney; one reader of the trial in the Arkansas
Gazette wrote to advise Catlett to "make it a little stronger next time."56
Although the depositions turned out to be a disappointment for school board
attorneys they ultimately triumphed at the trial which began on August 15, 1956. To a large
degree, however, this reflected confusion within NAACP ranks about the nature of the trial
rather than the persuasive arguments of the opposition. The local branch of the NAACP
built its case on very specific terms that asked only for the enforcement of the limited
desegregation outlined in the original Blossom Plan. In order to present its case, the local
Ibid., pp. 50-54
56 Ibid., p. 54.
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branch went to great pains to target specific examples of individual students who faced
particular discrimination and hardship under the modified Blossom Plan that proposed to
open Horace Mann High as a segregated school. The test cases assembled included those
high school students who would have to pass Central High on the way to Horace Mann
High; those who lived close to Central High but would have to attend segregated schools
elsewhere; those who wished to take courses at Central High not available at Horace Mann
High; those who wanted to enrol on courses available only at Technical High; and junior-
high and elementary students living in a small enclave in West Rock, in the affluent white
Pulaski Heights area, who under the revised plan were to be bussed five miles to a black
high school every day because local white schools refused to enrol them.57
Attorney Tate had different ideas about the case. As previous dealings between
national, regional and local Arkansas members of the NAACP revealed, each often had its
own agenda of concerns to pursue which could cause conflicts of interest and
misunderstandings. The NAACP regional counsel did not confer with local branch officials
prior to the trial and when he flew into Little Rock the day before the scheduled hearings in
the case he claimed that he was too tired to take instructions and immediately retired to his
room to rest. The next morning in court Tate proceeded to argue the national NAACP line
calling for the immediate and complete integration of all schools. The local branch, which
based its case on immediate relief for specific plaintiffs, and sought to press the school
board to continue with its original plans, did so expressly in the belief that a suit for
wholesale desegregation would not succeed.58
The local branch was right. Tate's line of argument lost the local NAACP the case
in court by playing straight into the hands of the school board. Rather than forcing them to
Iggers, "An Arkansas Professor," p. 290.
58 Ibid. The Little Rock suit was unique at the time in that, unlike the other sixty-five school suits being
conducted ith NAACP support in the upper South, it asked for existing desegregation plans to be
implemented rather than suing for complete integration (see Muse, Tei: Years of Prelude, pp. 84-85).
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live up to the promises they had already made, the blanket argument for immediate
integration allowed the school board to contend that they were acting in good faith in
accordance with the guidelines laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Brown II
by proposing desegregation with "all deliberate speed." As a result, Judge Miller was able
to rule that the NAACP lawsuit did not raise a constitutional question. Miller asserted that
the primary issue was whether the school board was working within the guidelines of the
Brown implementation decision which required only "the adequacy of any plans... to
effectuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system." Miller found that the
Blossom Plan represented a prompt and reasonable start to school desegregation in Little
Rock and declared that "The plan which has been adapted after thorough and conscientious
consideration... is a plan that will lead to effective and gradual adjustment of the problem,
and ultimately bring about a school system not based on color distinctions." There was
some consolation for the NAACP when Miller stated that failure to carry out the court
approved plan would be a breach of good faith on the part of the school board that could
not be tolerated. Therefore, Miller decided to retain federal jurisdiction in the case to make
sure that the school board held firm to the promises it had made in court.59
The NAACP remained less than happy at the outcome. Daisy Bates felt that far
from showing good faith the school board were simply employing "delaying tactics" to
forestall desegregation.6° In consultation with the national NAACP headquarters a decision
was made to appeal the case, with Thurgood Marshall replacing Tate to assist Wiley
Branton. The Appeals Court at St. Louis heard arguments in Aaron v. Cooper on March
11, 1957, at which school board attorneys argued that setting "fixed dates for complete
integration" would effect "educational standards" whilst NAACP attorneys argued that
there was "no justification for delay" and asked the Appeals Court to "apply the yardstick
59 Frcycr, The Little Rock Crisis, pp. 56-58.
60 Southern School News, September 1956, p. 15.
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laid down by the Supreme Court" to ensure desegregation with "reasonable speed."61
When the Appeals Court announced its decision on April 29 it upheld the modified
Blossom Plan, stating that the school board were operating within a timetable that was
reasonable given the local problems of desegregation in the South. The Appeals Court also
added, reaffirming Judge Miller's proviso, that the school board were obliged to carry out
their plan of desegregation as it now stood, beginning with the desegregation of high
schools in September 1957.62
Wiley Branton reported that in spite of the defeat he was pleased by "some aspects"
of the decision, particularly the affirmation by the Appeals Court that desegregation must
take place the following school term. Branton felt that the ruling offered an important
"cloak of protection against some die-hard, anti-integration groups who might still try to
delay integration." 63 After much speculation in the Little Rock press about a possible
further appeal of the case to the United States Supreme Court, on July 13, Branton
announced that no appeal would be filed.64 In a letter to A. F. House, the head of the
school board attorneys team, Branton assured him that "the plaintiffs feel just as strongly
about the issues" but that "time has made many of the problems moot and the opinion of the
appellate court clarified some of the issues more favourably for us." Branton believed that
the court decision had left room for "give and take" on both sides which could "make for a
spirit of goodwill and harmony among the students and patrons in the initial phase of
school desegregation at Little Rock." Adamant that the school board were now compelled
to carry out its plan of desegregation in September, Branton concluded his letter by
informing House that he had a continuing vested "personal interest in helping to solve any
61 Ibid., April 1957, p. 15.
62 Ibid., May 1957, p. 2.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., June 1957, p. 9.
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problems which may arise as a result of the school boards attempt to comply with the
courts decree and in carrying out the duties of their office in this regard."65
Branton's confident tone despite the court defeat for the NAACP came within a
context of continuing developments in Arkansas which indicated that the state was still
prepared to accept gradual racial change. In the schools, with Little Rock under federal
court order to desegregate, four other major municipal school districts at Pine Bluff, Hot
Springs, North Little Rock and Fort Smith all drew up integration plans for September
1957.66 By then, all of the state's publicly supported colleges and Universities had begun
to admit blacks. Alongside this were other significant developments. In politics, six blacks
were appointed to the DSC by Governor Faubus, two blacks elected to the City Councils of
Hot Springs and Alexander, and two blacks elected to school boards at Wabbaseka and
Dollarway. Local groups and associations across the state made goodwill gestures
promoting interracial harmony. For example, several religious groups integrated, with an
interracial Ministerial Alliance formed in Little Rock in 1956. Some county Medical
Societies also integrated their memberships, along with the American Association of
University Women in Conway and Fayetteville and the Little Rock League of Women
voters.67 The most striking development came just after the Little Rock school
desegregation suit was filed, in April 1956, when four municipalities at Little Rock, Hot
Springs, Pine Bluff and Fort Smith successfully desegregated their public transportation
systems after a misunderstanding over a ruling issued by the United States Supreme Court.
The mix-up involved a complicated ruling by the Court in the Fleming case which had been
wrongly reported by many national newspapers as heralding the end of segregation in
public transport. Amidst the confusion several bus companies, not only in Arkansas, but
65 Ibid., August 1957, p. 7.
66 Ibid., July 1957, p. 10.
67"What is Happening in Desegregation in Arkansas," January 1957, box 29, folder 302, Arkansas Council
on Human Relations Papers, Special Collections Division, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
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also in other upper South cities, took the initiative to desegregate. 68 The success of the
policy in Arkansas led to its continuance even alter the mistake was discovered and
subsequently all interstate waiting rooms for bus and rail transportation were desegregated
without incident. 69 This was in direct contrast to Montgomery, Alabama, where it took a
much publicised non-violent bus boycott led by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., to move
the city to desegregate its public transport, which was only finally achieved several months
after Little Rock had voluntarily done so.7°
A memo from the ACHR to the offices of the SRC, written less than a month
before Central High was due to desegregate, revealed that sentiment in Arkansas over
school desegregation was still much as it had beenjust alter the Brown decision -- "mixed"
-- with "defying forces.. jasi in other sections of the South" along with "progressive
affirming forces." On the side of defiance, the memo pointed to the congressional support
for the Southern Manifesto, the interposition Amendment and the pro-segregation laws. On
the side of progress it pointed toward the voluntary desegregation of buses, state supported
colleges and universities, five school districts, some public libraries and several ministerial
associations. The memo concluded that "the defying forces and the affirming forces just
now seem squared off for a tussle." Prophetically, it predicted "In the matter of school
desegregation this may prove a fateful year."7'
The outcome of the delicately balanced position in Arkansas lay very much in the
hands of Governor Orval Faubus. One of the advantages Arkansas had in the aftermath of
the Brown decision was the election of Orval Faubus who was generally sympathetic to the
68 Catherine A. Barnes, Journey Fron Ji,n crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit (New York:
University Press of Columbia, 1983), pp. 118-119.
69"What is Happening in Desegregation in Arkansas," p. 2.
On the Montgomery Bus Boycott see Fairciough, To Redeem the Soul of America, pp. 11-35; Garrow,
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idea of school boards working towards compliance with school desegregation at a local
level. To that end Faubus had continually refused to interfere in the process, despite
numerous calls from segregationists for him to do so. Throughout his first term in office
Faubus stuck to his laissez-faire policy of allowing local communities to cope with the
process of desegregation in their own time. In his inaugural address, Faubus did not even
mention race as an issue, and when the Pupil Assignment bill passed into the legislature he
steered well clear of the controversy. When trouble flared at Hoxie Faubus declined to
intervene and allowed the protests of segregationists to fizzle out in due course. Although
the governor's stance did nothing to actively help the course of school desegregation, his
refusal to become embroiled in the issue at least prevented the White Citizens' Councils
efforts to give the race question mainstream political exposure. Moreover, Faubus's low-
key approach allowed racial progress to continue throughout the state unchecked as the
desegregation of public transportation in Little Rock and developments in other areas
demonstrated. Indeed, Faubus quietly played a part in encouraging racial progress as the
first southern governor to appoint blacks to the Democratic State Committee and to other
positions on various state boards and commissions. Many of these appointments were
patronage rewards for political support. Faubus was one of the first leading Democrats to
actively and successfully court black political leaders and make substantial inroads with the
black electorate in the state, a far cry from the renouncement of the black vote by Governor
Adkins less than a decade earlier.72
As Faubus's re-election campaign began in 1956 his relatively benign stance on
school desegregation slowly began to drift towards strong support for maintaining
segregation. The shift was a result of national, regional and local developments. At a
national level, the impact of Brown II and the reluctance of either the United States
Supreme Court or the president to stand firmly behind school desegregation precipitated a
72 Orval Faubus, intcrvicw with John Kirk, Dccembcr 3, 1992, UNOHC.
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palpable shift in southern opinion away from acceptance of its implementation. This was
cemented with the signing of the Southern Manifesto by congressmen in March 1956,
including all of the Arkansas congressional delegation, which criticised the Brown decision
as unconstitutional. 73 Faubus acknowledged that Arkansas's congressmen would have
faced defeat in elections if they had refused to sign the Southern Manifesto and that moving
with the shifting public sentiments over school desegregation was becoming a mandatory
part of winning political office in the South.74 This was confirmed when Alabama's
Governor Jim Folsom was defeated by Charles W. McKay for election on to the National
Democratic Committee in May 1956. McKay, a political unknown, used Folsom's
perceived moderate stance on school desegregation to win a convincing victory. 75 In
Arkansas segregationists became increasingly critical of Faubus's moderate stance on
school desegregation lampooning him in their publications as "Awful Faubus" and
demanding that he declare himself "either for the white folks or for the NAACP." 76 Within
the context of growing support for a stronger pro-segregationist stance, Faubus, who had
hitherto ignored the taunts and slights of the marginalised militant segregationist faction in
the state, increasingly became wary of their political influence with the electorate.
Fuelling Faubus's fears was the emergence of Jim Johnson as a potential rival for
the position of governor in the 1956 elections. Johnson hailed from Crossett in south-east
Arkansas and had proved an effective political campaigner in the area for Francis Cherry in
his successful 1952 bid for governor. Subsequently, however, Johnson had failed to
translate his ability to foster regional support into a potent state-wide force during an
unsuccessful bid for the position of state attorney general in 1954. The school
desegregation issue helped to revitalise Johnson's political career. As head of the ACCA,
Brctt J. Aucoin, "The Southcrn Manifesto and Southern Opposition to Desegregation," Arkansas
Historical Quarterly 55 (Summer 1996), pp. 173-193.
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Johnson shored up local support in Arkansas's south-eastern counties through his strong
segregationist stance and as the issue began to gain political currency throughout the rest of
the state his potential popularity grew. The highly publicised campaign to halt
desegregation at Hoxie provided Johnson with further exposure in the state's media.77
Johnson's pet theme in his challenge to Faubus was the demand for an amendment
to the state constitution that would uphold the idea of interposition. The largely discredited
and constitutionally dubious theory of interposition contended that a state could use its
position of independent sovereignty to prevent federal laws being enacted upon on its own
citizens. In regard to school desegregation, Johnson's proposed amendment to the
constitution meant that Arkansas could refuse to carry out the orders of the United States
Supreme Court even with the insistence of federal government that it do so. Johnson filed
the amendment with Attorney General T. J. Gentry in January 1956 and successfully
managed to raise a petition with the signatures of 33,000 voters in order to win a place for
the proposal on the November 1956 state ballot. In May 1956 Johnson announced his
candidacy for governor in the Democratic party primaries.78
In January 1956 the impact of Johnson's political manoeuvring on Faubus's school
desegregation stance first became apparent. In a written response to questions from New
York Ti,ne reporter Damon Stetson, the governor revealed he had cornmssioed a
which showed that 85% of people in Arkansas were against school desegregation. In his
first unequivocal statement on the issue since his election in 1954, Faubus declared that in
light of the results he could not "be party to any attempt to force acceptance of a change to
which the people are so overwhelmingly opposed." The poll which Faubus referred to was
conducted by Eddie Newsom of Paragould, Arkansas, who was head of Mid-South
Opinion Surveys. Under closer scrutiny the statistics provided far less conclusive evidence
Frcycr, The Little Rock Grisis, pp. 68-70.
Ibid., pp. 68 71,80-81.
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for widespread opposition to school desegregation than the governor claimed. Newsom
polled only 500 people, all from eastern Arkansas, which could hardly be taken as
representative of the state as a whole. Moreover, 18% of the people questioned had
expressed no opinion on the matter and were therefore excluded from the figures
altogether. Nevertheless, the governor used the poll as a spring-board for further
pronouncements and policy decisions on the school desegregation issue.79
Faubus's first action to demonstrate his revised stance on school desegregation
came with the appointment of a five-man committee which was charged with studying
measures taken to legally circumvent Brown in Virginia, a state which was at the forefront
of massive resistance campaigns in the South. All members of the Bird Committee came
from eastern Arkansas and three owed their political offices to Faubus's patronage. Marvin
Bird, chair of the committee, was re-appointed chairman of the State Board of Education by
Faubus in 1954; J. L. ("Bex") Shaver was Faubus's legislative secretary in 1955; and
Charles T. Adams was a Faubus appointee on the Game and Fish Commission. The other
two members were R. B. McCulloch, an attorney who had helped to prepare Arkansas's
friend-of-the-court brief indicating the concern of school boards in the state over the Brown
decision before the United States Supreme Court, and Charles T. Adams, a planter,
businessman and former political leader. Four of the five spent two days in Virginia in
early February on a fact-finding mission, meeting with Governor Thomas B. Stanley and
other politicians to discuss suitable measures to circumvent school desegregation in
Arkansas.80
Faubus released a report based on the findings of the Bird Committee on February
25. It was indicative of the influence which Faubus had on the membership of the
committee that its recommendations were relatively tame. The first of the two main
Southern Se/zoo! News, February 1956, p. Ii.
80 Ibid., March 1956, p. 4; Freyer, pp. 78-79.
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proposals involved a diluted revision of the interposition advocated by Jim Johnson. Rather
than a constitutional amendment, the Bird Committee's proposal, by one of its own
members admission, represented little more than a token gesture, a resolution "not an
amendment, not even a law" that would place Arkansas on the record against the Brown
decision but preclude any further action. The second main proposal was a Pupil
Assignment law that provided a list of eighteen reasons that could be used to maintain
segregated school districts without mentioning race as a factor, similar to the legislation that
had already passed through the Arkansas General Assembly in 1955.81
Although by no means radical, Faubus used the proposals to stake out his pro-
segregationist stance in his campaign for re-election to the office of governor in 1956 by
endorsing the "aims and intentions" of the proposals and telling the press that this marked a
shift on his own part from a passive to active stand on school desegregation, demonstrating
that Arkansas was now "solidly with the Solid South." 82 There were clearly those who
were less than convinced by Faubus's protestations, including Jim Johnson and a clutch of
eastern Arkansas senators, amongst them Lucien C. Rodgers and Fletcher Long, the
drafters of Arkansas's earlier Pupil Assignment law, who all called for a special legislative
session as soon as possible to get the proposals enacted without further delay. At the same
time, there were those who were willing to take Faubus's proposals at face value, such as
Ainis Gutheridge, who was reportedly happy that the governor had "finaYly dec'iared
himself for the principles which White America stands for."83
The Bird Committee report proved invaluable to Faubus during his re-election
campaign. On the one hand it stole the thunder of his most viable opponent, Jim Johnson,
by appropriating his main proposal of interposition, albeit in a watered down form. This
81 Ibid., June 1956, p. 10; Frcyer, pp. 79-80.
82 Ibid., July 1956, p. 9.
83 Ibid., April 1956, p. 10.
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allowed the incumbent governor to assume a segregationist mantle and thereby earn
segregationist support. On the other hand, while courting segregationists, Faubus managed
to retain his moderate base of support, along with many of his supporters in the black
electorate, by presenting himself as a calm and reasonable figure especially when contrasted
with his opponent who was an extremist on the race issue and made his political career as a
"purveyor of hate."84 On the campaign trial Faubus demonstrated that he could carry off
the segregationist or moderate stance to order. At an election speech in Pine Bluff, for
example, Faubus began a sentence by asserting that segregation was not an issue in the
campaign, which brought boos and jeers from the audience, and then finished the same
sentence with the assurance that there would be "no breakdown of the state's traditional
segregation pattern" which brought cheers of support. 85 Faubus skilfully managed to be all
things to all people. As a result, few were absolutely clear exactly what Faubus really
believed regarding school desegregation.
Faubus's ambiguous stance on school desegregation seemed to reflect the
indecision and equivocation of the electorate. Election results in 1956 still sent mixed
signals about the nature of public sentiment over the issue. The most decisive vote was in
the DPA primaries when Arkansans demonstrated that they believed Faubus was the most
capable of the candidates to be governor, returning him with a relatively easy victory over
Jim Johnson in the first primary ballot without the need for a run-off election to decide
between the two. 86 At the November election, however, voters supported both of the
proposals put forward by the Bird Committee for an interposition resolution and a Pupil
Assignment law, backed by Faubus, and in addition supported Jim Johnson's far more
radical Amendment 47. Johnson's amendment called not just for token support of
interposition, but actually called for laws that forbade Arkansas's officials from enforcing
Ibid., August 1956, p. 3.
85 Ibid., August 1956, p. 3.
86 Ibid., September 1956, p. 15.
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rulings that were contrary to the state's segregation statutes. It even demanded nullification
of the Brown decision.87 The more tokenistic measures put forward by Faubus received
fairly convincing mandates from the voters, with the interposition resolution winning by
199,511 to 127,360 votes and the Pupil Assignment measures winning by 214,712 to
121,129. The vote over Amendment 47 was much closer, winning by the relatively narrow
margin of 185,374 to 146,064.88 Although the results clearly showed that a majority of the
Arkansas electorate favoured measures to preserve segregation, they also indicated that the
more radical proposals suggested by Johnson for the defiance of federal laws were
perceived as too extreme by a large number of voters. Even Faubus's modest measures still
attracted a significant amount of opposition, particularly given the heightened emotions
surrounding school desegregation in the South at the time.
The election results certainly did not seem a large enough mandate tojustify the
passage of further hard-line segregationist legislation which resulted from the General
Assembly in 1957. Yet again, however, Faubus's potential voice of calm and moderation
was obscured by immediate political necessities. After winning re-election Faubus's next
major hurdle was to pass legislation that would set the agenda for his second
administration. Top of Faubus's list was a $22 million package which included money for
socially progressive programmes such as raising the salaries of Arkansas's teachers in an
effort to bolster education in the state and increasing welfare benefits. Such measures
would involve controversial tax rises and their success depended upon the willingness of
key eastern Arkansas conservative politicians to co-operate. Eastern Arkansas politicians,
in turn, brought their own pressing agenda to the General Assembly as they sought to stop
school desegregation from proceeding in the state. Faubus utilised the concerns of eastern
Arkansas politicians over school desegregation to broker a compromise. In return for the
Frcycr, The Lit/Fe Rock Crisis, pp. 70-71.
88 Southern School News, December 1956, p. 8.
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passage of his measures, Faubus agreed to sign into law four pro-segregation bills. 89 The
bills were far more radical than any previous legislation to circumvent desegregation. The
first bill required "certain organisations" to submit regularly updated lists of members to the
state, a measure clearly designed to target the NAACP by intimidating members of the
organisation and rendering them vulnerable to recriminations by whites. The second bill
provided for an amendment to the state constitution that removed compulsory school
attendance if whites were forced into desegregated classes with blacks. The third bill
proposed to make available state money to help fund the legal costs of school districts who
were taken to court for trying to avoid desegregation. The fourth bill provided for the
creation of a State Sovereignty Commission, to be made up of ten men, three appointed by
the governor, five by the legislature, with both the governor and speaker of the House as
ex-officio members, to help co-ordinate the fight against desegregation throughout the
state.90
The proposed segregationist measures attracted a great deal of criticism from those
who felt that eastern Arkansas politicians were hijacking the General Assembly in order to
introduce laws which did not reflect the true climate of opinion on the issue within the state.
Winthrop Rockefeller, chairman of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, was
one of the most vociferous opponents of the bills, claiming that the legislation was
"dangerous" to the state's moderate image and threatened resignation if they were passed.
Nevertheless, after a public hearing at which auhus ta.lce1 	 ttxe ac1ica(	 o
proposed laws, and a concerted campaign by powerful eastern Arkansas state politicians to
influence the proceedings, the bills passed through the legislature despite the strong
differences of opinion that still existed.91 One state senator proclaimed to the press that "If
89 Da id Wallace, "Orval Faubus: The CcntraJ Figure at Little Rock High School," Arkansas Historical
Quarterly 39 (Winter 1980), pp. 320-32 1.
90 Sout/zer,i Sc/zoo! News, March 1957, p. 13.
91 Ibid.
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members of the senate had voted their convictions, those bills wouldn't have gotten more
than five votes."92
Faubus's subsequent actions seemed to support this statement. With the package of
measures for his second administration safely passed through the state legislature, the
governor failed to implement any of the pro-segregation legislation. Of particular
annoyance to those who had sponsored the legislation was Faubus's reluctance to name
members to the State Sovereignty Commission, the cornerstone of the pro-segregation
programme. Without the governor's appointments, the Commission was rendered
impotent, unable to convene a meeting and act upon the measures passed by the General
Assembly. Eventually, eastern Arkansas politicians only forced Faubus to fill the quorum
of places on the Commission by launching a successful lawsuit to compel him to do so.93
The delay effectively muted many of the pro-segregation measures in the lead-up to school
desegregation in Little Rock and in the three other large school districts at Fort Smith, Hot
Springs and North Little Rock, since the Commission was not able to hold its first meeting
until August 30,just a week before desegregation in those places was due to occur.94
Faubus's relapse into a more moderate stance on the school desegregation issue
once the immediate political necessity of a hard-line rhetoric had passed was also evident in
his dealings with the militant segregationists of the White Citizens' Council in Little Rock.
Although there had been a show of interest in the proposed interposition amendment to the
state constitution in the November 1956 elections, both the ACCA and CCC still struggled
to secure any real grassroots support as far as active members were concerned. The CCC
proved incapable of preventing any of the changes in racial arrangements that took place in
the capital city; most notably they failed dismally to arouse community opposition to the
92 Wallace, "Orval Faubus," p. 321.
Southern School News, August 1957, p. 7.
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desegregation of public transportation.95 With meagre resources and support, the CCC
began to focus its attention solely on the school desegregation issue. Yet even these efforts
made little impact. At school board elections in March 1957 two segregationist candidates
were convincingly defeated by two moderates who adhered to the Blossom Plan for limited
integration in the city's schools.96
 Throughout the summer of 1957, in a last desperate
attempt to forestall school desegregation, the CCC petitioned the school board, disrupted its
meetings and launched a letter writing campaign in the local press in an effort to garner
support. The CCC also encouraged rumours of impending violence should the schools
desegregate, with Amis Gutheridge warning that there would be "hell on the border" come
September and Reverend J. A. Lovell, an imported agitator from Dallas, declaring at a
CCC meeting that "there are people left yet in the South who love God and their nation
enough to shed blood if necessary to stop the work of Satan." 97 One particular target of
segregationist frustration was the governor, whom CCC members repeatedly petitioned to
invoke the interposition amendment and use his authority as head of a sovereign state to
prevent school desegregation from taking place. Yet again, these increasing efforts still
appeared to have little effect. By August, no groundswell of support for resistance to
school desegregation was apparent and Faubus scoffed at any notion that he might
intervene, telling the press that "Everyone knows no state law supersedes a federal law"
and "If anyone expects me to use them to supersede federal laws they are wrong."98
Events rapidly came to a head during August 1957 with a flurry of litigation in the
local courts. On August 13, Amis Gutheridge, in yet another attempt to win newspaper
coverage for the CCC, filed a libel suit against the Arkansas Gazette in the Pulaski County
Circuit Court, claiming that an article the paper had printed about him earlier that summer
Arkansas Gazette. June 25, 1956.
96 Soother,, School News, April 1957, P. 15.
Ibid., July 1957, p. 10.
McMillen, "The White Citizens' Council," p. 104
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painted him as an "irresponsible, incompetent and unethical lawyer." On August 16, ten
local black ministers filed suit in the U.S. District Court, supported by the NAACP, to try
and establish that the four measures passed by the legislature were unconstitutional and that
they could not be used to prevent school desegregation from taking place. In a counter
move, on August 17, local Little Rock businessman William F. Rector sought a declaratory
judgement from the Pulaski County Chancery Court that the four segregation measures
were indeed legal, in order to remove "the present conflict between the federal statutes,
state statutes and court decisions." On August 19, Amis Gutheridge filed suit on behalf of
Mrs. Eva Wilbern and her daughter Kay, demanding that white students had the right to
attend segregated classes, as decreed in the amendment to the state constitution in the
previous General Assembly. The case was brought after the Little Rock school board
refused to reassign white students to segregated schools when requested to do so by the
CCC. On August 20, state Attorney General Bruce Bennett asked the courts to put aside the
suit by the ten local black ministers designed to attack the constitutionality of Arkansas's
pro-segregation laws, until William F. Rector's suit had been heard. On August 25,
NAACP lawyers asked the courts to ignore Bennett's call to put aside the suit of the ten
ministers.99
 On August 26, Bennett launched two suits. The first, against the NAACP,
charged that the organisation had not registered its operation as a business concern before
last April and therefore owed the state $350 in backdated corporation taxes. The second
against the LDEF, charged that the organisation had never registered as a concern with the
Arkansas secretary of state, and asked for a $5,000 fine to be levied.100
This fluny of litigation stirred up a great deal of controversy and confusion over
school desegregation in the courts and helped to increase community anxieties over the
issue. More worrying than the suits launched by Amis Gutheridge, which were clearly last
gasp efforts by the CCC to stall the desegregation process, were the interventions of Bruce
99 Southern School News, September 1957, p. 6.
100 Ibid., October 1957, p. 3.
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Bennett and William F. Rector. Neither Bennett or Rector were openly affiliated with the
CCC or the ACCA and their interventions marked new potential threats to school
desegregation. Bennett, elected to the office of attorney general the previous November,
seemed to be engaged in his own political manoeuvring that some believed to be an opening
salvo in a potential challenge to Faubus for the office of governor the following year.
Rector's suit was somewhat more puzzling, although some observers close to events
suggested that the suit was lodged at the behest of the Little Rock school board, which was
beginning to panic as the date of desegregation drew closer, and even had the assent of the
governor himself. 101 The litigation coincided with a highly publicised speech by Georgia
Governor Marvin Griffin and former speaker of the Georgian State Congress, Roy Harris,
in Little Rock. The highest profile speakers procured by the CCC to date, the two
Georgians proclaimed that desegregation would never be allowed to take place in their state
and that "every white man in Georgia" including the governor, General Assembly, and the
population at large, would rally to prevent it.102
Taken together, the litigation in the courts and the speeches of Griffin and Harris
created an intense atmosphere of unease surrounding school desegregation in the city.
However, none of these events were decisive enough in themselves to derail school
desegregation in Little Rock. What finally halted progress towards a successful
implementation of the Blossom Plan was a suit filed by a new segregationist group, the
Mother's League of Central High, in the Pulaski County Chancery Court, on August 27.
The group consisted of mothers of white students who were due to attend a desegregated
Central High school the following week. Most of these women were the wives of blue-
collar workers with strong segregationist convictions. 103 Spokesperson for the Mother's
lot Nat Griswold "The Second Reconstruction in Little Rock," c. 1968, book 1, chapter 2, Pp. 15-18.
MazlUscflPt supplied courtesy of Walter Clancy, who succeeded Griswold as executive director of the
ACHR.
102 Southern Sc/zoo! News, September 1957, p. 6.
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League was Mrs. Clyde Thomason whose suit on behalf of the organisation asked that the
school board be prevented from continuing with its desegregation plans on the grounds that
they would force white students to attend integrated classes, contravening the pro-
segregation laws passed by the General Assembly earlier in the year. Moreover, Thomason
raised the spectre of violence if school desegregation plans went ahead, telling the Court
that she believed that there would be "civil commotion" if white and black students were
forced to go to school together. Playing upon recent legal challenges to school
desegregation, Thomason told the court that "uncertainty of the law, conflicting court
decisions and a general state of confusion and unrest" meant that the only course of action
was to delay the process of integration. To back up its argument, the Mother's League
called Governor Faubus as a witness; Faubus testified that he believed violence would
occur if plans for school desegregation went ahead, citing reports of increased weapons
sales in the city and of the recent confiscation of revolvers from both white and black
students. Faubus's testimony turned the Mother's League suit from just another
segregationist attempt to delay school desegregation into a legitimate state sanctioned
request to halt the process. To the delight of segregationists, Chancellor Murray 0. Reed,
based on the evidence presented by Faubus, issued a restraining order against the school
board preventing it from carrying out its integration	 04
Reed's injunction placed the school board in a no-win situation: a federal court
order demanded that they implement their desegregation programme yet doing so would
now place them in contempt of the Chancery Court decision. To clarify the situation,
attorneys for the school board petitioned the federal District Court, asking for their own
injunction forbidding the implementation of Reed's order which would interfere with their
desegregation plans, as well as asking for protection against a contempt citation by the
Chancery Court. 05 In the federal District Court Judge Ronald Davies heard the school
104 Corrine Silverman, The Little Rock Story (Alabama: University Press of Alabama, 1958), pp 6-7.
105 Ibid.
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board's petition. Davies had been in Little Rock just three days, flying in from his usual
constituency of North Dakota to help clear the backlog of cases left by Judge Trimble's
retirement the previous year. When Judge Miller asked to be relieved of the school
desegregation case after hearing of the decision by Murray Reed in the Chancery Court,
Davies assumed his duties as well. Davies upheld the school board's petition and ordered
desegregation to proceed as planned.'°6
With Faubus now apparently throwing the full weight of his office behind the
segregationists, the situation in Little Rock rapidly deteriorated into a well-documented
crisis. On Monday night, September 2, the day before Central High was due to
desegregate, Governor Faubus surrounded the school with National Guardsmen to prevent
the entry of nine black students who were scheduled to attend classes under the Little Rock
school board's desegregation plan. The following day the school board were again told by
the courts that they must proceed with desegregation. On September 4, when a lone black
female student turned up to enrol at Central High, a mob of four hundred whites chased her
away from the school. Over the next two weeks Governor Faubus and President
Eisenhower held fruitless discussions in an attempt to resolve the stalemate. Meanwhile, in
spite of numerous appeals, the courts continued to reaffirm that the school board's
desegregation plan must be carried out. The crisis came to a head on September20 when
Judge Davis ordered Faubus to remove the National Guard. Faubus complied and the
following day when black students enrolled at Central High, school officials were forced to
send them home halfway through the morning since they could not guarantee their safety in
the face of the continuing mob hostility. The scenes of lawlessness finally prompted
Eisenhower to act decisively in the matter. The president federalised the National Guard
and sent in the crack army unit of the 10 1st Airborne Division to ensure the safety of the
nine black students. On September 24 the nine black students entered Central High under
106 Frcycr, The Liule Rock Crisis, p. 102.
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federal escort. Classes remained desegregated with an armed federal presence for the whole
of the 1957-1958 school term.107
Understandably, Orval Faubus has proved the centre of attention for many of those
seeking to explain the Little Rock school crisis. Yet one recurring interpretation of
Faubus's actions, that he cynically exploited the issue of race purely for his own political
gain, fails to do justice to the complexities of the situation. 108 Although, in retrospect, it
proved easy to place all the blame for the school crisis on the governor, particularly in light
of his manipulation of the politics of race in his re-election to office in 1956 and in the
General Assembly of 1957, this explanation misses one important point. Up to 1957
Faubus never actually sought to initiate a stand on desegregation, but rather only assumed
the rhetoric of segregationists in times of political expediency. From non-interference with
school boards across the state who had already desegregated, to his failure to put in motion
the measures he signed into law in the 1957 General Assembly, the reluctance of the
governor to actively engage in halting racial progress had been a consistent thread to his
political career. In this light, Faubus's calling out of the National Guard in September 1957
is very much at odds with his previous dealings on the issue of school desegregation.
What, then, caused Faubus to act in the way he did? Answering this question
requires us to look beyond Faubus to an assessment of both the actions and inaction of
other key figures in the community. Of central importance was the pivotal role played by
the Little Rock Superintendent of Schools Virgil Blossom. A key stumbling block to
desegregation in Little Rock was the fact that the man charged with carrying it out did so
only in the spirit that it was a necessary evil. Although he acknowledged that he had a duty
to obey the law, Blossom indicated early on in drawing up his desegregation plan that he
107 Silverman, Tue Little Rock Story, pp. 6-11.
108 The most vigorous exponent of this thesis is Robert Shemli Gothic Politics in the Deep South (NY:
BalcfltiflC Books, 1969), pp. 79-124.
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would only do so with great reluctance and with an emphasis on the bare minimum of
09 Indeed, Blossom drew up a desegregation plan that he proudly boasted
could provide a model for the entire South in offering token compliance with the law whilst
in practice preventing any meaningful desegregation. So enamoured was Blossom with the
plan that he had developed that he stubbornly refused to accept help from anyone else in
guiding its implementation, and, it seems, utilised the task as a vehicle to stake his claim as
an important member of the Little Rock community by impressing its influential leaders
with his shrewd and skilful management of a difficult issue.1 10 Insofar as Blossom was
nominated Little Rock's "Man of the Year" in 1955, the ploy appeared to be working.' 11
As a result of Blossom's own personal agenda, his plan for the city's schools was
motivated by the desire to promote the minimum amount of desegregation rather than taking
into account practical social realities. Importantly, the Blossom Plan fundamentally ignored
the class tensions within the white community surrounding school desegregation. By
building a white high school in the west of the city to which the affluent members of the
white community could send their children to school, whilst focusing desegregation on
Central High school, which would affect predominantly working and lower middle class
families, the Blossom Plan was open to criticism that it forced integration on one section of
the community whilst sheltering its impact from others.1 12 Since the main constituency of
hard-core support for continued segregation emanated from the very people which the
Blossom Plan targeted, and at the same time distanced those in the white community who
had an ability to help steer a course of acceptance and moderation, from the very beginning
it appeared misconceived. The fact that only one school was to desegregate also proved an
109 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, pp. 10-11; Murphy interview; Iggers, "An Arkansas Professor," p.
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unfortunate logistical mistake since it played into the hands of the CCC who, with only
limited resources, could concentrate all their efforts of agitation and disruption at one
particular site. 1 13 Compounding these problems was the fact that in selling his plan to the
community for acceptance, in line with his desire to impress influential whites, Blossom
spoke almost exclusively to high-profile white community groups, again, consisting of
those largely unaSfected by his desegregation plans, whilst ignoring those directly
involved. 1 14	 Blossom mishandled preparations for successful school desegregation
amongst the white community, he also alienated many in the black community with his
concern of minimising the impact of school desegregation whilst totally disregarding their
feelings, concerns and comments. 1 15
As Blossom's school desegregation plan came under pressure during the summer
of 1957 the flaws both in the way it had been conceived and in the way it had been
presented to the community became apparent. Without even the barest involvement of
influential community figures, the school board became increasingly isolated against the
howls of segregationists who rallied support to halt the process of school desegregation.' 16
Afraid to tarnish his carefully crafted image of confidence and competence with Little
Rock's business community, Blossom increasingly looked to Faubus for help. The more
that segregationists intensified their calls for defiance of the Brown decision as the date of
school desegregation drew closer, the more frantic Blossom became.1 17 Blossom's
telephone calls and meetings with Faubus rapidly multiplied and were characterised by
increasingly hysterical predictions that there would be violence if the governor did not
intervene.' 18
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Blossom's ultimate goal was to try and elicit a statement of support from the
governor for token compliance with the Brown decision. 119 This was rather naive
considering Faubus's continued reluctance to back desegregation actively in the past. On
more than one occasion, Blossom floated the idea of calling out the National Guard to lend
support in preventing any trouble at Central High.' 2° Faubus knew that to throw the full
weight of his support behind any type of perceived plan of integration would be political
suicide in the prevailing climate in Arkansas. However, the governor may have seen
Blossom's anxiety as a way of hatching a plan through which he could both satisfy his
political commitments to eastern Arkansans and bring about the eventual peaceable
desegregation of Central High. Faubus indicated that he might be amenable to helping
relieve the immediate pressure on Blossom and the school board by backing an appeal to
the courts, to be filed by them, for the delay of school desegregation based upon the threat
of violence and more specifically the uncertainty surrounding the existing segregation
statutes in Arkansas as amended by the 1957 General Assembly. Although Faubus believed
that the courts would not uphold the statutes and would eventually order desegregation to
take place, such a course of action offered the potential to demonstrate to eastern Arkansans
that he had managed to help win a delay over school desegregation and had attempted to
use every legal means at his disposal before it finally went ahead. Hopefully, this would
satisfy those who wanted to promote any legal means for delay, and might even bring a
begrudging acquiescence to desegregation when they realised that such a course of action
was ultimately futile.121
Even though Blossom had no intention of asking the courts for a period of delay,
since this would have meant an admission of defeat, he indicated that he might be willing to
go along with the suggestion. 122 These discussions apparently formed the basis for the suit
119 Griswold, "The Second Reconstructi on ," book 1, chapter 2, p. 17.
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initiated by William F. Rector, asking for a clarification of the pro-segregation statutes
passed in the General Assembly.123 When nothing came of Rector's suit, and the school
board did not subsequently initiate an appeal for delay, Faubus pushed forward with his
own initiative in the form of the Mother's League suit. In court, Faubus testified about the
fear of impending violence based largely upon Blossom's hearsay, although he refused to
reveal the source of his information. When Blossom was called to the stand, amazingly, in
the light of his numerous conversations with Faubus, he denied all knowledge of any
threats of violence. 124 Several days later, when the Faubus-backed suit had won the school
board a delay of implementation for its desegregation plan, Blossom asked the federal court
to reverse the order and restrain any interference from carrying out the plan, which the
court granted. In filing for a restraining order, Blossom probably believed that he would
now elicit support from the governor since the option of legal delay had disappeared and
Faubus could do nothing to stop desegregation from taking place. For his part, Faubus
fumed at being, as he put it, "double-cross[ed]" by the school board. The court decision
considerably narrowed Faubus's ability to redeem the situation, yet his backing of the
Mother's League suit had placed him right at the centre of the school desegregation
controversy. 123
Faubus's perceived isolation was exacerbated by the lack of willingness of others to
take joint responsibility for school desegregation. In talks with Arthur B. Caidwell, a native
Arkansan and head of the Civil Rights Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Faubus
had been told that beyond issuing a court decree to desegregate the federal government
could do nothing to help unless an incident occurred. 126 The Department of Justice only
served to make matters worse when they leaked news of Caidwell's meeting with the
governor to the national press, exposing him to accusations of consorting with federal
123 Ibid., pp. 14-16.
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126 Frcyer, The Lillie Rock Crisis, p. 101.
174
government officials over school desegregation, a sure-fire vote 	 27 None of the
Arkansas congressional delegation stepped forward to mollify the situation. Even perceived
moderates like Brooks Hays and J. William Fulbright shied away from the issue: the
former kept silent, while the latter was conveniently out of the country on a trip abroad.128
Local government officials were beset by their own problems at the time and offered little
support; Mayor Woodrow Mann was presiding over a lame-duck administration since the
city had recently voted to transfer from an alderman to city manager form of government
and there were only limited contingency plans to keep the peace should any trouble occur at
Central High.' 29 The loudest voices from the clergy, who might have exercised some
moral guidance within the community, belonged to members of the CCC; others remained
silent for fear of criticism or even removal from their posts by their congregations, with
only a few dissenters existing in the smaller congregational churches.'30
The greatest potential source of local support for Faubus was the white business
community. Yet it too was silent. Little Rock's white business elite, according to historian
Elizabeth Jacoway, was a compact and easily discernible group of owners and managers of
commercial and industrial operations, along with accountants, lawyers and other
professionals. This elite had proved particularly adept at mobilising support for several
projects in the aftermath of World War Two, exercising a great deal of community
influence in the process. The most recent campaign of this business elite had revolved
around an ad hoc group called the Good Government Committee. Through a skilfully
managed campaign this group exerted enough influence to change the city's government
from the allegedly corrupt alderman and mayor system to representation by a city manager
and board. Other projects of members of this group, organising under different banner each
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128 Griswold, "The Second Reconstruction," book 2, chapter 1, pp. 2-5.
129 Ibid., p. 8; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 256.
130 Griswold, "The Second Reconstruction," book 2, chapter 2, pp. 8-28; see also Ernest Q. Campbell and
Thomas F. Pettigrew Christians in Racial Crisis: A Study of Lithe Rock's Ministry (Washington: Public
Affairs Press, 1959).
175
time, had included influencing the opening of an Air Base near Little Rock during World
War Iwo and the construction of an Industrial Park on the outskirts of the city in the early
1950s.' 3 ' The active participation by businessmen in matters affecting the community
provided a precedent for assuring that the massive upheavals which school desegregation
would inevitably bring were handled in a calm and controlled manner so as not to adversely
effect the continued growth and progress of the city's fortunes. Moreover, there was an
even longer tradition of the business community intervening at times when race threatened
to destabilise the city's progress, as for example in the aftermath of the lynching of John
Carter in 1927 and in the appointment of black police officers in 1942.
For a variety of reasons, the business community failed to play much of a role in
assisting the process of school desegregation in September 1957. By so doing it severely
damaged the city's image of racial progress carefully cultivated in the past. As outlined
above, part of the reason for the white business community's recalcitrance to engage with
school desegregation was down to the plans drawn up by Superintendent of Schools Virgil
Blossom, which distanced them from the issue, and the way he went about implementing
them, actively discouraging any kind of help or assistance. Yet this does not wholly
account for the businessmen's inaction even though it provides a convenient excuse for
what eventually happened. When Elizabeth Jacoway interviewed members of the white
business community of the time in later years, various other reasons were provided for
their inaction, including the feared destruction of their businesses due to a threatened
boycott by segregationists and the intensity of public feeling over the issue, the obligation
to protect their clients and employees from potential retributions, and the harm that
interfering with school desegregation might have on the campaign for local government
reform. However, Jacoway concluded from her interviews that an important underlying
factor which the business community had in common was the latent support for Faubus's
131 Jacoay, "Taken By Surprise," pp. 17-19; Spitzberg, Racial Politics, pp. 38-41.
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actions, both in terms of maintaining segregation and standing up to "outside" interference
from federal government. 132 Without the fall-out of Faubus's actions on the wider
community fully apparent in September 1957, the white business community were still
prepared to allow resistance to school desegregation to take place within the community.
Over the following years, there would be a significant change in these attitudes that would
prove crucial to ending the school crisis.
Between the manoeuvring of Blossom and the school board, the reluctance of
federal, state and local government officials to intervene, the lack of support from the city's
clergy and white business elite, and the heightened tensions in the city caused by the late
flurry of litigation and rallies by the CCC, Faubus was backed into a corner. If he allowed
desegregation to occur, he would be tarred as the person who gave in to the integrationists
and faced the prospect of defeat in the elections for governor the following year,
scuppering his ambitions to be only the second person ever to win three consecutive terms
in the office. In meetings with Sid McMath and Winthrop Rockefeller shortly before calling
out the National Guard, Faubus rejected their calls for moderation based on the explicit
premise that such a course would lead to defeat in a bid for a third term in office, either to
Jim Johnson or the newly emerging threat of the state Attorney General Bruce Bennett.'33
Instead, Faubus embarked upon a course of defiance, a calculated although still risky
manoeuvre, which gambled on the fact that most Arkansans would follow a policy that
aimed to prevent school desegregation taking place. This decision came only after all other
options that might allow school desegregation to take place and still allow Faubus to be re-
elected had been exhausted. After almost three years trying to avoid confronting the issue
of school desegregation the governor made his choice. Once the choice had been made
there could be no turning back. With his hand played, Faubus found his actions almost
impossible to reverse and he pursued his chosen path to the bitter end. Compounding this
132 Jacoway, "Taken By Surprise," p. 28.
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problem was the fact that Faubus's risk did indeed pay off: the gamble over Central High
made Faubus the most successful campaigner for the position of governor in Arkansas
history with an unprecedented six consecutive terms of office. 134
 When Faubus discovered
what political capital there was over the issue of school desegregation, from September
1957 onwards, his actions increasingly became more reckless and belligerent in the matter,
further distancing the city from any easy return to moderation from the denouement.
134 Griswold, "The Second Reconstruction," book 1, chapter 2, p. 21.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CRISIS: LOCAL PEOPLE AND A NATIONAL STRUGGLE
The events of September 1957 consolidated the shifts in influence and leadership
within the black community which had been underway since the United States Supreme
Court Brown decision in 1954. Throughout the period the older, traditional Leadership had
been pushed firmly into the background. With increasing racial hostility in the city came a
breakdown in the usual channels of communication between members of the white and
black elite upon which much of the prestige and influence of older black leaders had rested.
Without access to influential whites traditionally respected figures in the black community
had little in the way of leadership to offer. Meanwhile, the more hostile racial climate also
paralysed the new guard of influentials who had used politics rather than petition as their
primary vehicle to advance black rights. With whites refusing to exchange favours for
votes with black politicians, in case they were condemned by militant segregationists for
consorting with the "enemy," the influence and room for manoeuvre of black politicos
narrowed considerably. Since the black elite and the emergent black politicians both needed
some degree of support and co-operation from whites, the retreat of the white and black
community behind their respective racial lines as a result of the school crisis meant that the
traditional mechanisms for brokering matters of racial controversy vanished.1
Beyond the NAACP, only two other organisations openly continued to campaign
for black rights in the city. The first was ADVA, under the leadership of I.S. McClinton,
which attempted to challenge the growing influence of the segregationists in a variety of
ways. ADVA was one of the chief signatories of a petition that urged state legislators at the
1955 Arkansas General Assembly not to vote for the adoption of a Pupil Assignment bill.2
1 Dunaway interview.
2 Southern Sc/zoo! News, April 1955, p. 3.
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Gamely still attempting to exercise black political power, ADVA refused to commit black
electoral support to either Jim Johnson or Orval Faubus in the 1956 Democratic party
primaries because of the way the two candidates exploited race in the campaign. 3 In another
effort to co-ordinate the potential power of the state's black electorate, ADVA spearheaded
opposition to the pro-segregation measures proposed on the November 1956 state election
ballot.4
 The second group to try and take a bold stand for black rights was the Arkansas
Christian Movement (ACM), an association of black ministers formed specifically to
challenge the constitutionality of the pro-segregation measures passed through the 1957
General Assembly. 5 This rare clerical engagement in the struggle for black rights in Little
Rock was prompted by the arrival of newcomer Rev. Roland Smith to the city. Smith, a
founder member of the SCLC and a friend of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who had headed
the Montgomery bus boycott in Alabama in 1956, looked to build upon the precedent for
black activism set by the clergy there.6
The efforts of ADVA and the ACM were significant, but ultimately only played
supporting roles to the NAACP. The NAACP's move from the periphery to the very centre
of b/ack coimnirnity influence daring the years after the BroWn decision was the most
significant development in black activism in the city. When the black elite and black
politicians, denied their usual channels to the white power structure, failed to win school
desegregation, the black community increasingly placed its faith in the less compromising
hands of the NAACP. Certainly, blacks had lost whatever confidence they may have had
that the Little Rock school board would actually implement the United States Supreme
Court school desegregation ruling and many resolved to support a more forthright stand for
black rights. The most visible sign of this new determination came when black parents
were persuaded to join the NAACP in helping to file a lawsuit against the Little Rock
Ibid., August 1956, P. 3.
4 lbid., July 1956, p.9.
Ibid., August 1957
6 Rev. Rufus King Young, interview with John Kirk, February 16, 1993, UNOHC.
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school board, an effort that the wider community subsequently backed with financial
donations to sustain the action. As school desegregation increasingly became the focus of
attention of the wider struggle for black rights in the city, community support for the
NAACP grew.
In particular, Daisy Bates came to personify the work of the NAACP and the
authority and respect the organisation gained within the black community. While NAACP
lawyers spearheaded the Aaron case through the courts, Daisy Bates became the interface
between black grassroots activism in the city and the legal battle in the courts. Bates quickly
became identified by both the black and white communities alike as the public figurehead
for the NAACP in Little Rock. A study conducted by black sociologists Tilman C. Cothran
and William Phillips, Jr., from Pine Bluff AM&N, revealed the extent to which Daisy
Bates had become the leading spokesperson for the black community by 1958. Twenty-two
out of twenty-six black leaders interviewed by Cothran and Phillips identified Bates as "the
most influential Negro in the community" 7
 whilst twenty-four out of the twenty-six
described her as "the most influential Negro in determining policy on educational
desegregation." 8
 One interviewee described Bates as "the only outspoken Negro leader"
adding that "the other Negro leaders have remained silent and have allowed her to become
spokesman."9
 A parent of one of the black students at Central High agreed that "the
NAACP President is the only leader who has stood up for these children. She has been
more helpful than anybody." Indicating the criticisms which many in the black community
levied on the inactivity of traditional community leaders, the parent added "We have a
shortage of leaders.... There are a lot of would-be leaders, but the problem is that when the
trouble starts they won't stand up and be counted."0
' Tilman C. Cothran and William Phillips, Jr., "Negro Leadership in a Crisis Situation," P/zlon 22
(Summer 1961), pp. 111-112.
8 lbid., p.112.
9lbid.
'°Ibid., p. 113.
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In the lead up to the school crisis in September 1957 Daisy Bates managed to
maintain grassroots black community interest and involvement in court action by continuing
to mobilise parents and students for action pending a successful outcome of the lawsuit. By
doing this, in contrast earlier court-based efforts for redress, a wide-based reservoir of
support for and a direct attachment to the consequences of litigation meant that there was
continued local pressure to back up legal demands.1 1 Daisy Bates took an active role in
encouraging parents and their children to seek admission to Central High school. Initially,
around eighty volunteers came forward. In response, Virgil Blossom told school principals
to interview the applicants and warn them of the problems that they would encounter and
assess if they were "mentally and emotionally equipped" for the ordeal. After this process
whittled potential applicants down to thirty-two, Blossom interviewed each applicant
personally, again seeking to dissuade students from attempting to enrol at Central High. In
one case, Blossom told a black parent that her daughter lacked the right "scholastic
background and emotional stability" and in another warned two talented high-school
football stars that they would not be able to continue with the sport if they went to Central
High.' 2
 With the help and support of Daisy Bates, nine applicants, all members of the
NAACP Youth Council in Little Rock with which Bates had a close affiliation, made it
through the rigorous interviewing process and were given permission to attend Central
High.t3
Daisy Bates acted as mentor to the nine black students who underwent the ordeal of
desegregating Central High. When trouble erupted in September 1957 Bates helped
safeguard the students by liasing with the school board and city police to ensure their
protection. Bates helped to co-ordinate the task of getting the students to Central High in
11 Iggers, "An Arkansas Professor," pp. 289.
12 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, p.20-21.
13 Bates, The Long Shadow, p. 59; Bates interview.
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the absence of federal or local government help in early September 1957 by keeping in
touch with the students and their parents and even personally taking on the responsibility of
driving the students to the school. When the federal soldiers finally arrived, Bates
continued to monitor the students' progress throughout the school year and developed a
close relationship with them, offering an open house for support, advice and guidance. For
the nine black students who desegregated Central High -- Terrance Roberts, Thelma
Mothershed, Gloria Ray, Jefferson Thomas, Minnijean Brown, Ernest Green, Carlotta
Walls, Melba Pattillo and Elizabeth Ecklord -- Bates's help was vital in what turned out to
be a harrowing experience. The students were subject to a series of verbal and physical
torments throughout their first year at Central High from a group of white students whose
actions went largely unpunished. Nevertheless, aside from one incident when Minnijean
Brown was expelled for reacting to tormentors by calling them "white trash" and emptying
a'Dow\ of cniWi over 'tnem, ne 'thadk s'uierfts maria geà to survive ne year wWnou't señous
incident. On May25, 2958, Ernest Green became the first black student to graduate from
Central High.'4
Testimony to the effectiveness of the NAACP and its state president were the
retributions to which both were subjected because of their actions. Bates's home became a
focus for segregationist attacks. Her house windows were broken; crosses were burnt on
her lawn; she received threatening telephone calls and was the victim of verbal abuse from
passing cars.1 S The intimidation directed towards Bates and the NAACP as a result of the
school crisis was not just restricted to lawless elements within the white community.
Alongside verbal and physical intimidation from hoodlums came a concerted attack through
the courts by the state authorities. White officials clearly believed that if they could keep the
NAACP and Daisy Bates in protracted litigation through the courts it would bring an end to
14	 a full account of Daisy Bates's role see her memoir The Lozg Shadow. For a first-hand account from
a student's perspective see Beals, Warriors Don't Cry.
15 Bates, The Long Shadow.
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militant black activism and demands for school desegregation both in Little Rock and
throughout the state. At the forefront of this attack was Attorney General Bruce Bennett
who had launched his campaign to destroy NAACP activities in Arkansas just prior to the
school crisis. On August 23, 1957, Bennett sent a letter to Daisy Bates demanding
information about the operations of the NAACP and the associated LDEF, enquiring
specifically about the financial set-up of the two organisations and the funds they had spent
on litigation in the state. 16 Bennett filed his questions under legislation passed in the 1957
General Assembly, which required organisations working for integration to provide such
information. Bates was permitted the mandatory 15 days to reply. Before receiving an
answer, Bennett filed suit against the LDEF on August 26, demanding a $5,000 penalty for
its alleged failure to register as a business concern in Arkansas. Another intimidatory letter
to Bates followed on August 31, questioning the tax deductible status of contributions to
the NAACP in the state.'7
Daisy Bates refused to co-operate with Bennett's request for names and addresses
of NAACP members, explaining that the "current climate in the state" meant that people
were "hostile to persons working for desegregation" and that coming forward with such
information would only serve to open those people up to "reprisals, recriminations and
unwarranted hardship." Bates also refused to divulge the whereabouts of NAACP records
in the state, but did supply a list of twenty-seven branches and admitted that the state
organisation had been in contact with the LDEF about litigation. Bennett dismissed the
contention that Bates was protecting NAACP members and claimed that the organisation
was in "violation of the corporate laws of Arkansas." 18 On September 19, Bennett filed
Suit in Little Rock's Chancery Court against the NAACP in an attempt gain a ruling to force
the organisation to pay $350 in corporate taxes for operating as a business concern for a
16 Arkansas Democrat, August 23, 1957, clipping from Daisy Bates Scrapbooks, State Historical Society
of Wisconsin, Madison (collection hereinafter cited as DBSW).
17 Ibid., September 1, 1957.
18 Arka,zsas Gazene, September 17, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
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period that he estimated to be seven years. 19
 Bennett followed this with a suit in the Pulaski
County Circuit Court on October 10, which charged the NAACP with an identical offence
to the LDEF and asked for a $5,000 penalty to be levied against the organisation for not
registering with the state as a business concern.20
Along with the three lawsuits against the NAACP and LDEF, Bennett launched a
further attack to acquire NAACP membership lists. Early in October 1957, Bennett sent
draft proposals for an Ordinance to mayors of all Arkansas's towns and cities, calling for
"certain organisations" to make public "certain information" about their activities. Failure to
furnish the required information within 15 days of the request carried a fine of between $50
- $250 per day on a misdemeanour charge after the deadline passed. 2 ' Both Little Rock and
North Little Rock adopted "Bennett Ordinances" on October 14.22 In a twist to the
proceedings, the day after the Ordinance was adopted, Mayor Mann of Little Rock, whose
lame-duck board had just been ousted by a change in the way the City Council was elected,
called in membership lists for all organisations, including the CCC. All organisations, apart
from the NAACP, but including the CCC, filed membership lists shortly afterwards.23
Meanwhile, Bennett continued to press for the release of LDEF documents through the
courts, demanding to see all correspondence relating to Arkansas cases from the New York
offices of the organisation.24
Proceedings against the local NAACP came to a head when the 15-day reply
deadline for information required under the Ordinance expired. At the last minute, George
Howard, a local NAACP attorney, filed for a restraining order against implementation of
19 Arkansas De,nocrat, September 20, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
20 Ibid., October 11, 1957.
21 Ibid., October 12, 1957.
22 Ar/,zsas Gazelle, October 15, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
23 ArkansasDe,nocrat, October 15, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
24 ArIi,zsas Gazette, October 26, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
185
the Bennett Ordinance. Federal Judge Roy W. Harper refused to hear arguments on the
case before the lapse of the deadline since he decreed that his docket was already full and
that the NAACP had already had sufficient time to file its complaint. 25 Following this
ruling, the Little Rock City Council met on October31 and issued warrants for the arrest of
Rev. J. C. Crenshaw, president of the Little Rock NAACP, and Daisy Bates, president of
the ASC, for failing to provide the information required by the Ordinance. 26 On November
1, Rev. J. C. Crenshaw, a frail 74-year-old, handed himself over to the authorities at the
Little Rock police station to answer his first ever criminal charges. Crenshaw posted bond
of $300, amidst confusion over what he should actually be charged with, which no-one
seemed able to fathom since the Ordinance had only recently been drafted. 27 Later that day,
Daisy Bates returned early from a speaking tour of New York to go through the same
procedure of posting bond.28 Shortly afterwards, with the apparent complicity of the police
ce,the. CCC cetea iftyecscf Daisy Bates's "mug shots" from the police station and
listed her "criminal record."29
The arrests of the NAACP officers added to the bickering that continued in the
courts. On November 4, Municipal Judge Harry Robinson delayed the case against
Crenshaw and Bates until December 3, whilst Judge Harper in the Chancery Court delayed
a ruling on the NAACP lawsuit against the Bennett Ordinances until the same date. 30 In the
meantime, Bennett continued to press for the NAACP s recoràs to be 'hanôeà over, wbfist
the NAACP put all its energies into resisting these requests. 3 ' The legal log-jam of cases in
the courts was eased somewhat by a deal struck between the NAACP and Little Rock city
attorneys on November 15. The deal involved an agreement by the NAACP not to press for
25 1b1d., October31, 1957.
26 Ibid., November 1, 1957.
27 New York Herald Tribune, November 2, 1957; New York Daily News, November 2, 1957; Arkansas
Gazette, November 2. 1957, clippings in DBSW.
28 Ibid., No ember 2, 3, 1957.
29 Ibid December 18, 1957.
30 Arkansas Democrat, November 4, 5, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
31 Unidentified Newspaper Clipping, November 14, 1957, DBSW.
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an injunction against the Bennett Ordinance in the federal courts in return for an agreement
by the city not to charge daily fines against the NAACP or arrest any more NAACP officers
until the lower courts ruled on the case. Part of the deal, however, was that the two
NAACP officers charged already would be tried. 32 In the lead-up to the trials of Crenshaw
and Bates, the NAACP paid the fine in the Pulaski County Chancery Court suit for
delinquent taxes of $437, held in escrow with the court pending the outcome of the case
against them, a manoeuvre designed to stop the records of the organisation being
sequestered in the meantime.33
On December 3, 1957, the case against Crenshaw and Bates was heard before
Judge Harry Robinson in the Little Rock Municipal Court. The proceedings revealed the
hurried and shambolic way in which the Bennett Ordinances had been adopted. Whilst
Robinson called Crenshaw to the stand, he asked city attorneys for a copy of the Bennett
Ordinance which he had not yet read. J. R. Booker, the NAACP attorney, supplied
Robinson with a copy of the Ordinance and asked that the case against Crenshaw be
dismissed on the grounds that he had never been asked for the information which the city
required. Deputy City Attorney Joseph Brooks abashedly admitted that the city could find
no record of a letter requesting information from Crenshaw. Robinson ruled that if the city
couldn't "support the case with facts" he could not try it and summarily dismissed the
suit.34
When Bates was called to the stand, Robinson asked the prosecution if it had any
witnesses who could testify that Bates had received a letter from the city requesting
information relating to the Little Rock NAACP. The city, admitted Brooks, had none.
Robinson complained that the city was handling the case in a very "loose" manner, but
32 Ibid., November 16, 1957.
ArktznsasDe,nocrai, November 20, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
34 Ibid., December 3, 1957; Arkansas Gazelle, December 4, 1957.
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delayed the hearing until later in the day to give the prosecution a chance to find some
evidence. Eventually the city produced the secretary who had typed and mailed the letter to
Daisy Bates. Defence attorney Booker told the Judge that Bates openly admitted to having
received the letter, but that as Bates was not the president of the Little Rock NAACP
Branch, she was not the person obliged to obey the Ordinance. Rather, Booker told the
court, Bates was president of the ASC. Robinson considered this argument, but dismissed
it, ruling that Bates headed "some branch or something in the NAACP." Moreover,
Robinson fined Bates $100, ignoring the protests of Booker that the maximum fine allowed
under an Ordinance, which was not a state statute, was only $25. Booker's point was
m	 'ii ¶h Ciiuit Cou'rt, which iiorietheless still upheld the lower court's
verdict on the question of Bates's guilt.35
While the various cases progressed slowly through the courts, Bennett continued to
harass the NAACP. On December 10 the Arkansas Supreme Court granted Bennett the
authority to prosecute organisations for the illegal practice of law in the state. 36 Armed with
this new weapon, Bennett fired what he termed his "big gun, after numerous skirmishes"
with lawsuits against the NAACP and LDEF for the alleged illegal practice of law in
Arkansas. Filed in the Pulaski County Circuit Court on December 23, 1957, the suits asked
that the NAACP and LDEF be prevented from "engaging, either directly or indirectly, in
the practice of law in any respect" in Arkansas on the grounds that it constituted an
"invasion of the legal profession" in the state. 37 The move by Bennett was the last new
piece of litigation for some time as the lawsuits already filed passed through the courts.
Bennett brought the suits primarily to keep the NAACP busy with time consuming
defensive procedures and therefore distract it from filing any more litigation for
desegregation. Throughout the next seven months Bennett continued an ultimately
351b1d.
December 10, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
37 Arkansas Gazette, December 24, 1957, clipping in DBSW.
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unsuccessful pursuit of NAACP records, filing numerous questions and subpoenas, whilst
the NAACP battled each case through appeal after appeal in different courts.38
Although ultimately unsuccessful in enforcing its legal aims and objectives,
Bennett's raft of litigation met with great success in terms of curtailing the impact of black
activism over school desegregation. Critically, Bennett's actions managed to sideline black
activism into the courts where whites could have more success in delaying any progress.
Also, by targeting Daisy Bates and other NAACP activists as litigants, Bennett ruptured the
all-important linkage between the black community and court-based activism that had
proved vital to successes in the past. Robbed of leadership that could effectively co-
ordinate and mobilise public support for black activism the issue of school desegregation
became distanced from the direct influence of the black population and entered the remit of
a few black leaders and lawyers. As a result, the momentum for protest and the grievances
felt in the black community over the events of September 1957, which held the potential to
translate into a greater commitment for more militant action, slowly began to dissipate as
the matter was drawn out through the courts taking up the time and resources of Daisy
Bates and the NAACP along with it.
Throughout the following years of the school crisis Bennett continued to harass
Daisy Bates and the NAACP. When the schools were due to open in 1958, for example,
Bennett chose the moment as an opportune time to launch his "Southern Plan for Peace,"
which essentially amounted to the wholesale destruction of the NAACP in the region.
Bennett's six point plan for racial peace in the South included the withdrawal of tax
privileges to deplete NAACP funds, filing barratry suits against NAACP attorneys, arrests
and economic reprisals against those who "appeared to be attempting" to foster racial
division, and the withdrawal of welfare payments for illegitimate children since Bennett
38 See miscellaneous clippings in DBSW.
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claimed that these were being used illegally by black women to fund the NAACP.
Accompanying these measures, playing upon Cold War hysteria, was the attempt to smear
the NAACP as a "tool of the Kremlin" with Bennett arranging Arkansas's own anti-
communist hearings and investigations. 39
 Although totally outrageous and never
substantiated, the task of answering charges and defending lawsuits effectively took up
more of the limited local NAACP resources. In the absence of any co-ordinating leadership
local blacks subsequently played less of an influential role in the unfolding school crisis,
often reduced to by-standers in a three ring circus between state government, federal
government and the courts.
By the end of the 1957-1958 academic year at Little Rock attention began to move
away from court battles involving the local NAACP and became focused again on the
schools themselves. When President Eisenhower removed the federal troops from Central
High on May 29, 1958, the battle to decide what would happen the following September
when the next school year was due to begin was already well underway. The Little Rock
school board petitioned Federal District Judge Harry J. Lemley on February 20, 1958, to
grant an indefinite delay of further implementation of desegregation orders until the concept
of "deliberate speed" the phrase used in the United States Supreme Court Brown II
implementation order, could be defined. Lemley ruled that these plans were too vague and
indefinite, whereupon the school board earmarked January 1961 as the date at which they
wished to continue with their desegregation programme. Wayne Upton, president of the
school board, told Lemley that by this time Governor Faubus might be out of office and the
situation might have calmed. The NAACP immediately objected to the school board
proposals which they claimed were "inappropriate and irrelevant" to the issue at hand,
since, they argued, neither the actions of the governor or the segregationists should prevent
a federal law from being enforced. After Lemley scheduled a hearing on the case the school
3 Arkansas Gazette, October 3, 1958, clipping in DBSW.
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board filed a brief outlining the reasons for delay, which included an alleged deterioration
in school standards due to racial incidents, interference by the White Citizens' Councils, the
lack of support they had received from local, state and federal authorities, and the lack of
prosecutions of those causing the trouble in Little Rock.40
Lemley appeared to be a potentially sympathetic Judge for the school board, since
his usual judicial constituency included eastern Arkansas and he had previously proclaimed
in the Arkansas Gazette that the South was "almost a religion to me." Yet the school
board's attorneys made little headway in the case: this seemed to reflect the fact that even
they were far from optimistic about the chances of gaining a delay. In court the attorneys
were forced to admit that none of the black students, whose rights would be denied if a
delay was granted, had been responsible for the troubles that occurred at Central 1-ugh.
Rather, the primary argument put forward in defence of their request was that integration
put an undue strain on white teachers and pupils. The NAACP attorneys had the far easier
task of arguing that the violence which occurred at the school should not usurp the rights of
those students who had already been admitted to Central High, along with other black
students who intended to apply to white schools in the future.41
In view of the arguments presented, both sides were amazed when, on June 21,
1958, Lemley granted the school board's petition for a two and a half year delay for
implementation of the Blossom Plan until January 1%1. 42 Lemley stressed that his
decision constituted a "tactical delay" in one particular case and did not mean that the mere
presence of public disapproval was sufficient reason to stall plans for integration. Lemley
stated that he believed there were exceptional circumstances in Little Rock, involving
widespread public disorder, outbreaks of violence and the presence of parties dedicated to
40 Southern School News, March 1958, p. 2-3.
41 Ibid.; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lone! Me,z, pp. 183-184.
p. 185.
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preventing orderly desegregation, to such an extent that the situation had required federal
intervention, which meant that a delay was justified. In handing down his decision, Lemley
continually referred to the United States Supreme Court's Brown Ilimplementation order
of 1955, particularly the "local problems" clause, to legitimise his position in the case.
Lemley pointed out that the Court had explicitly stated that once a start was made toward
compliance with school desegregation additional time might be required to carry out plans,
and that so long as "good faith compliance at the earliest possible date" remained the
objective of the school board, a temporary delay was permissible.43
NAACP lawyers immediately asked for implementation of Lemely's order to be
delayed until they had a chance to appeal the ruling through the courts. At a hearing on June
23, Lemley refused the NAACP request on the grounds that allowing the integration order
of Judge Davies to stand would only serve to worsen the situation in Little Rock. 44 The
next step in the judicial process open to the NAACP was to take their case to the Appeals
Court at St. Louis to have Lemley's decision overturned. However, due to the urgency and
perceived importance of the case, NAACP attorneys asked the United States Supreme
Court to intervene in the matter by extending its current sitting or holding a special summer
term to hear their appeal. The NAACP expressed concern to the Supreme Court that if the
Lemley decision was allowed to stand it would pave the way for lawlessness and
disruption as a tactic to delay school desegregation right across the South and thus prove
harmful to those school districts preparing for a peaceful compliance with the Brown
decision in the 1958-1959 school year. On June 29 the Supreme Court refused to hear the
appeal but expressed confidence that the Appeals Court at St. Louis would overturn the
Lemley decision before the next school term at Little Rock began. Ten days later a full
seven member special hearing of the Appeals Court convened. As the Justices considered
' Southern Sc/zoo! News, July 1958, pp. 3-4; Silverman, The Little Rock Story, Pp. 17-18.
44 Son i/tern School News, August 1958, p. 6; Silverman, The Little Rock Story, P• 18.
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the NAACP appeal, for the first time the Department of Justice entered the case in support
of the NAACP, urging the court to reverse Lemley.45
On August 18 the Appeals Court reversed Lemley's decision to permit a delay in
desegregation at Little Rock in a six to one vote. Although the Justices agreed with the facts
which Lemley presented as a basis for his decision, they dissented over the conclusion he
had reached and upheld the NAACP's claim that the judge's ruling constituted an invitation
for school desegregation to be delayed on very tenuous grounds. The Court therefore
declared that "the time has not yet come in these United States when an order of the federal
court must be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in the face of violent
and unlawful acts of individual citizens in opposition thereto."46
The ruling in itself, however, did nothing to solve the immediate problem.
Although the Appeals Court had upheld the rights of black students to attend white schools
in Little Rock, the mandate would not come into effect until alter the schools were due to
open on September 2. Moreover, the school board attorneys successfully requested a
further delay in implementing the Appeals Court order until they could argue their case
against overturning the Lemley decision before the United States Supreme Court. Lemley's
ruling would thus stay in effect until the Supreme Court considered the issues. It could not
do this until October 6. If the Supreme Court did not reconvene early, Governor Faubus
would have the chance to order the transfer of black students back to black schools before
the hearing and gain a significant victory.47
This complex, but potentially vital situation prompted Thurgood Marshall to take
over from local attorneys in the case. Essentially, this removed local blacks from the legal
Soul/tern School News, August 1958, p. 6; Pehason, Fifly-Eight Lonely Me,z, pp. 185-186;
Silverman, The Little Rock Story, pp. 18-19; Tushnet Making Civil Rights Law, p. 259.
46 Southern School News, September 1958, p. 2; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, p. 186.
' Ibid., pp. 186-187; Silverman, The Little Rock Story, p. 19.
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scene entirely and marked another level at which the struggle for desegregation in Little
Rock transcended its roots within the local black community to become a national issue.
Although in tactical terms this was no doubt the best move for directing black activism in
the courts, by employing the resources of the national organisation and the skill and
experience of Marshall an attorney, the further distancing of local blacks from the local-
based suit would have important ramifications for local black activism in Little Rock.
Marshall's first act in taking over the suit was to petition Supreme Court Justice Charles
Whittaker to either set aside the Appeals Court delay or alternatively overrule the Lemley
decision himself. Either move would mean that Judge Davies's original order to integrate
Central High school would be in effect and that the school board would be obliged to
The ry' s sàoos n Sepember. '
Although Whittaker turned down Marshall's requests, on August 25 Chief Justice
Earl Warren announced that the Supreme Court would meet in special session on August
28, 1958, to rule in the case.49 In the meantime, Governor Faubus moved to pre-empt
what seemed to be the inevitable decision by the Supreme Court to overturn Lemley's delay
of school desegregation by calling his own special session of the Arkansas General
Assembly. The General Assembly opened on August 26 and proceeded to vote into law six
bills proposed by the governor. The most important of these was Act 4 which gave the
c	 'ras	 er to c\ose any school integrated by federal order and
allowed the population of the local school district to decide, by referendum, whether it
wished to open its schools on an integrated basis or close them altogether. In preparation
for school closure, the General Assembly passed a measure to facilitate the founding and
funding of private segregated schools, which allowed the governor to withhold aid from
public schools and redistribute them to the private institutions. Other bills added to the
armoury of the state in circumventing school desegregation, such as allowing for
48 Sozthern Sc/zoo! News, September 1958, P. 2; Silverman, The Little Rock Story, p. 21.
49Ibid.
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segregated classes within integrated schools, permitting white students to transfer from
integrated schools and providing for a recall of the entire school board with a petition of
15% of the districts voters. At the same time, bills were passed to enable further
harassment of the NAACP by prohibiting the organisation from practising law in the state,
requiring submission of its membership lists and allowing access to branch files on
request.50
With a gauntlet of defiance already laid down, the Supreme Court convened its own
special session on August 28. A packed courtroom listened to the arguments of NAACP
attorney Thurgood Marshall and school board attorney Richard C. Butler. The Justices then
went into recess, reconvening at 5.00 p.m. to announce that they would hear further
arguments on September 11 after they had received briefings from both sides. The Little
Rock school board subsequently announced that it would delay opening the schools until
September 15, after the Supreme Court hearings. On September 11 Butler, on behalf of the
school board, put forward essentially the same argument as at the Lemley hearing, that
because of the opposition of the people of Arkansas and the conflict that existed between
federal and state governments, the schools could not be integrated without an armed federal
presence which would inevitably lead to the disruption of normal school life. Butler
concluded that it was better "to defer certain intangible constitutional rights of a few [black]
students than to destroy the full educational opportunities of two thousand students." With
a reasonable amount of time, Butler claimed vaguely, the current conditions might be
overcome.'1
Under scrutiny the school board's argument fell to pieces. Butler was asked what
the school board planned to do if it won a delay. He replied there were no plans. Butler
50 So,ther,z School News, October 1958, p. 5; Silverman, The Little Rock Story, pp. 2 1-22; Peltason,
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was then asked what would happen if the climate had not changed within two and a half
years. He replied that he did not know. Finally, Butler was asked if the Court would not in
effect be permanently denying the rights of black children if it agreed to delay an order
issued originally in 1954 until 1%1, as the school board wanted. Butler had no answer.52
In favour of overturning the Lernley decision, United States Solicitor General J.
Lee Rankin argued on behalf of the federal government that if the decision stood, it would
affect "the maintenance of law and order not only in this community.., but throughout the
country." Marshall, on behalf of the NAACP, proclaimed that he did not worry about black
children so much as the whites who were being taught "that the way to get your rights is to
violate the law and defy the lawful authorities." With regard to Butler's assertion that the
school board was trapped between the orders of state and federal authorities, Marshall
reminded him that Article VI of the Constitution clearly stated the supremacy of national
i çtejj tk wa'j for tht torrtct course of action. On September 12,
without waiting for the formal preparation of its opinion, the Supreme Court overturned the
Lemley decision for delay and unanimously upheld the Appeals Court, emphasising that the
decision to continue with desegregation would take effect immediately.53
The Court ruling seemed to bring an end to the impasse over desegregation in Little
Rock. After years of equivocation since the original Brown decision, the Court finally
upheld a definite timetable for desegregation. Importantly, the federal government indicated
that it was now prepared to back that decision to the hilt as plans were made to support the
Little Rock school board with the use of federal marshals if necessary. As an extra
precaution the local police force was also strengthened to prevent disorder. In contrast to
52 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, p. 189; Silverman, pp. 23-25; Tushnet Making Civil Rights Law,
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the complete unpreparedness that surrounded the desegregation of Central High in
September 1957, all precautions to prevent a civil commotion were now in place.54
Faubus still refused to surrender without a fight. On the day the Supreme Court
announced that the Little Rock schools must be opened on an integrated basis, the governor
invoked Act 4 passed at the special session of the 1958 General Assembly and closed all of
the city's high schools. Preparations were made to hold a referendum at which the
governor hoped the electorate would back his authority against that of the Supreme Court
by popular mandate. In an effort to win support, Faubus promised Little Rock voters that if
they decided to close the schools he would arrange for a Little Rock Private Schools
Corporation (LRPSC), which had already been chartered by a group of segregationist
supporters, to take over the public schools on a privatised and segregated basis with a
pledge of public money to support them. Although clearly unconstitutional -- and sixty-
three of Little Rock's most prominent white attorneys took out a full page in the Arkansas
Gazette to point this out -- Faubus was content to take his chances. If nothing else, the
move would buy time for further delays. In addition, the fact that Judge John E. Miller,
who had ruled with segregationists previously, would preside in legal matters affecting the
schools gave the governor further grounds for optimism. 55 Miller, who had heard the
original Little Rock case in 1956, was temporarily assigned to replace Judge Lemley, who
had retired from the bench after his decision to delay school desegregation was overruled
by the Supreme Court.56
True to form, Miller helped strengthen Faubus's hand. When Faubus asked the
school board to comply in handing over the public schools for private lease, its members
asked Miller for guidance. Miller ruled that he could not give an advisory opinion. Two
M Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Me,:, p. 192; Silverman, The Little Rock Story, p. 27.
5 Souther,z School News, November 1958, p. 8; Peltason, Fifr-Eight Lonely Men, pp. 195-196;
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56 Souther,, School News, November 1958, p. 9; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, p. 156.
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days before the schools referendum was due to be held, the NAACP petitioned Miller, with
the support of the United States Department of Justice, for a restraining order to prevent the
closure of Little Rock schools. Miller refused and ruled that only a three judge court could
grant such an injunction. In fact, Miller's declaration was inaccurate, since it was perfectly
within his jurisdiction to issue the order requested by the NAACP. To the voters of Little
Rock, Miller's decision not to do so signalled judicial approval for school closure.57
At the school closure referendum held on September 27, Faubus handily stacked
the cards in the segregationists favour. Not only did the referendum require a majority of all
qualified voters to re-open the schools, rather than the usual simple majority, but the
wording of the referendum also favoured the segregationists since it put the issue in terms
of either closing the schools or accepting "complete and total integration." In doing so, the
referendum ruled out any middle ground by denying the option of token integration of the
city's schools as the Blossom Plan had provided. In the second largest ever voter turnout in
the city, 19,470 voted to close the schools and 7,561 voted for integration.58
One important consequence of the school closing referendum was the formation of
the Women's Emergency Committee (WEC) by a group of influential white women in the
community to oppose the closing of the schools. Headed by Adoiphine Fletcher Terry, the
WEC represented the first signs of an attempt to organise some kind of opposition to the
grip which Faubus and the segregationists had on the white community. Made up largely of
the spouses of influential white male professionals and businessmen, the WEC was a direct
response to the lack of action taken by the influential white business elite in the ongoing
school crisis.59 Deeply disturbed at the way Little Rock had allowed a minority of vocal
Peltason, Fifty Eight Lonely Men, pp. 197-198; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, p. 15658 Southern School News, October 1958, p. 7; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, p. 196; Freyer, The
Little Rock Crisis, p. 156; Silverman, The Little Rock Story, p. 28.
59 Lorraine Gates, "An Organisation of Impeccably Respectable Southern White Women": The Women's
Emergency Committee and the Little Rock School Crisis," (History Senior Essay, Harvard University,
April 1993), p. 10.
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segregationists to hold the city to ransom, the WEC attempted to influence voters to choose
integration as the only means to keep the schools open. The WEC tried to win support for
opening the schools in a number of ways including organising a headquarters from which
over one hundred members canvassed the community for support by telephone, holding
meetings at which the lawyers who had declared the school closing plan unconstitutional
told the public of the dire effects that the election could have on the city, and taking out
advertisements in the local media to promote their cause. Although defeated, the WEC
provided the only voice of moderation in the election, and was largely responsible in
persuading just under a third of voters to support integration. Moreover, once organised,
the WEC continued to campaign against Faubus and the segregationists, thereby providing
an important rallying point for the increasing dissatisfaction over the way the schools
situation was being handled.60
Immediately after the results of the referendum were announced the LRPSC went
into negotiations with the Little Rock school board over leasing the city's public schools.
Meanwhile, the NAACP were in court looking to overturn Judge Miller's refusal to issue
an injunction to prevent the schools from closing. The NAACP went to the recessed Eighth
Circuit Appeals Court where there were two judges resident in Omaha, Nebraska, who
could grant such an injunction. NAACP attorneys intended to be at the Appeals Court as
soon as it opened for business the following Monday at 10.00 a.m. Faubus, however,
remained one step ahead. Whilst the NAACP were waiting for the courts to open the
LRPSC persuaded the school board, under heavy pressure from the governor, to lease
them the public schools. The school board agreed to the plan without giving the NAACP a
chance to appeal its case first. The lease for private schools was signed at 8.30 a.m.,
September 29, 1958, just one hour and a half before the Appeals Court opened.61
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As the two-man Circuit Court convened in Nebraska to hear the appeal of the
NAACP later that day, the United States Supreme Court handed down its full written
judgement in the Little Rock case, which declared that the leasing of public schools as
private segregated institutions violated the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal protection"
clause and was therefore unconstitutional. Following this precedent, the Appeals Court
issued a restraining order to prevent the leasing of public schools, immediately served on
all members of the school board, teachers and staff, with only the physical presence of a
state trooper preventing it being served on Governor Faubus in person. The Appeals Court
told Judge Miller that he should advise the Little Rock school board to take affirmative
steps to desegregate the schools. Miller, on holiday at the time, dragged his feet in the
matter and did not eventually rule in the case until January 1959.62
Faubus again outmanoeuvred and outpaced the slow-moving legal system.
Although his plan to lease the public schools to the LRPSC had failed, the delay in a
definitive ruling on school desegregation allowed for a new development in his efforts to
circumvent school integration. The governor began to focus his efforts on helping the
LRPSC to solicit funds to buy private buildings in order to funnel funds to them from the
public schools. When the Appeals Court ruled that public funds could not be used to
support privately segregated schools, Faubus helped the LRPSC to solicit private donations
to finance private segregated schools. For one full term the segregationists managed to
provide limited school services for some of the city's white students. The plan came to an
abrupt halt when funds quickly began to dry up. As a result, the LRPSC went bankrupt
thus leaving no provisions for the education of any students in Little Rock. 63 Nevertheless,
although the struggle to fend against school desegregation by providing private schools met
with what many knew would be an inevitable defeat, the battle won the segregationists
62 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lone/v Men, pp. 199-200; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, pp. 156-157
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more time to draw out a delay and helped to bolster their fortunes in the November
elections.
It was during the November 1958 elections that the influence of the segregationist
forces in Little Rock reached their zenith. Candidates who backed a hard-line
uncompromising position on school desegregation met with resounding success. 64 Faubus
became only the second governor in Arkansas political history to win a third consecutive
term of office with a landslide vote in his favour. Talk even began to circulate of Faubus
running for the presidency of the United States, possibly as head of a third party
representing the South. Jim Johnson, head of the White Citizens' Council, completed a
renaissance from political no-hoper in a successful campaign to gain election to the
Arkansas Supreme Court.65 No one event encapsulated the strength of the segregationists
more than the defeat of Brooks Hays in the congressional elections by segregationist
candidate Dale Alford. Hays, a well-respected congressman who had held his seat for
sixteen years, lost his office because of his perceived moderate stance on racial issues.
Alford's campaign was run by Claude Carpenter, a close advisor to Governor Faubus,
who personally sought to distance himself from the contest in accordance with an earlier
promise to Hays. Although Hays had narrowly fought off opposition in the Democratic
party primaries earlier in the year, Alford ran as an "independent Democrat" at the general
election when he employed the constitutionally dubious tactic of providing an adhesive strip
with his name and a cross next to it at election polls, thus allowing voters simply to stick
his name onto the ballot paper. Upheld by segregationist Attorney General Bruce Bennett,
the tactic used by Alford survived a congressional investigation with the help of another
Arkansas congressman, Wilbur Mills, who chaired the influential United States Congress
House Committee on Committees.66
64 Ibid., p. 201; Frcyer, Tue Little Rock Crisis, p. 158
65 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, pp. 201-202.66 Southern School News, December 1958, p. 12; Freyer, The Little Rock Grisis, pp. 157-158;
Silverman, The Little Rock Story, p. 29; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, p. 201.
201
Yet even as they reached the height of their influence, there were already indications
that the segregationist bandwagon was beginning to run up against opposition. When the
Appeals Court ordered plans for integration to continue, five members of the Little Rock
school board resigned declaring their position as one of "utter hopelessness, helplessness
and frustration." In "the light of recent events" the school board felt that the people should
have the chance to elect an entirely new school board. Wayne Upton, president of the
school board, declared that he was "fed up of being Governor Faubus's whipping boy."
As one of their final acts in office, the school board voted to buy up the contract of Virgil
Blossom since they believed that he would not get a "fair hearing" from any newly elected
school board. Only Dale Alford remained as the lone school board member, but with his
position coming up for re-election, along with his obligation to assume his congressional
seat, he resigned from office leaving all the school board positions open.67
The school board elections, set for December 6, 1959, witnessed the first
indications of an attempt to contest the segregationist forces by the business leadership in
the city. At the forefront of this action was E. Grainger Williams, executive vice-president
of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce. Williams met with other members of the
Chamber, who also felt that something should be done to stop the accumulation of power
by the segregationists. An initial suggestion was to enter a slate of professionals for the
school board elections made up of doctors, lawyers and businessmen. 'Williams
approached ArkansasDemocrat editor August Engel and asked him to suggest the idea in
his newspaper in a move designed to provide community support for the action from the
city's more conservative newspaper. When Engels refused, the plan fell through. Next,
Williams approached the presidents of the major banks in Little Rock to run for office.
Four out of six agreed to the plan but the other two, afraid of the influence their actions
67 Southern School News; January 1959, p. 14; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, pp. 158-159; Silverman,
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might have in eastern Arkansas where many of their deposits were held in small town
branches, refused to stand. Finally, Williams persuaded five candidates -- William Rector,
a real estate developer, Russell Matson, a contractor, Everett Tucker, an industrial
development executive, Ted Lamb, an advertising executive, and Mrs. Charles Stevens, a
housewife -- to run as representatives on a business slate for the school board. The one
position not contested by the businessmen was that of Ed McKinley who, although
standing as a segregationist, was also a member of the exclusive Little Rock Country Club.
Williams believed that he would therefore "not cause any trouble."68
The "businessmen's slate" was rivalled by a "segregationist slate" in the election.
However, the latter was seriously weakened by splits in the CCC that led to a breakaway
group forming a States' Rights party and fielding their own set of candidates. Although
Faubus refrained from openly taking sides in the contest, he did not object to his name
being used in press advertisements for the segregationist candidates whilst publicly
condemning the interference of business leaders. The final vote demonstrated how high
feelings were in the community and how divisive the issue of school desegregation had
become. Three segregationists and three businessmen were eventually elected, in a split
decision, by very narrow margins in each case. Terrell E. Powell, principal of Hall High,
was subsequently elected superintendent of schools as the school board faced the difficult
problem of how to comply with Supreme Court's orders whilst all the city's schools
remained closed.69
When Judge Miller finally returned to court in January 1959, he gave little help to
the new school board. Instead of any clear mandate, Miller asked the new members of the
board to report to him within thirty days what it had done and what it intended to do to
desegregate the schools. Eleven days later the school board informed Miller that they had
68 Spitzberg, Racial Politics, pp. 96-98.
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no plans and that in the current situation, with closed public schools and a strong
community feeling against integration, it would be impossible to carry out the Blossom
Plan. Instead, the school board asked permission to hire experts and make new plans for
school desegregation. Both government and NAACP attorneys strongly objected to this.
The NAACP attorneys pointed out that if the school board were allowed to carry out this
plan it would be tantamount to upholding the Lemley delay decision that had already been
ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. Government lawyers argued
that the school board should be held in contempt of court if they did not follow their
mandate to carry out the Blossom Plan immediately. Miller still refused to act. Although he
denied the school board permission to open segregated schools, he also denied the
accusation by the NAACP and the Department of Justice that the school board was acting in
bad faith. Miller ruled that the school board's only obligation, in view of the closed
schools, was to do nothing. Essentially, Miller's declaration meant that the school board's
only course of action was to take no negative steps to forestall desegregation rather than to
positively enact its programme. The legal stalemate thus continued.70
As the courtroom battle continued white community leaders became increasingly
bold in their attempts to resolve the situation, helped by a rising awareness of the overall
effect that school closing was having on the community. Teachers were leaving the public
school system in droves, the education of all the city's children was disrupted and, of more
immediate concern to the businessmen, the city's economy was suffering badly. According
to one report by Gary Fullerton of the Nashville Tennessean newspaper, not one new
industry had chosen to locate in Little Rock since the school crisis, costing the city an
estimated five new industrial plants bringing in an estimated revenue of one million dollars
and 300 new jobs. The bad publicity surrounding the city because of the school crisis was
70 Southern School News, February 1959, p. 14; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, p. 159.
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posited as the major reason for the abrupt halting of Little Rock's impressive post-war
industrial record.71
A boost for a more assertive stand within the white business leadership came in late
December 1958 when E. Grainger Williams became president of the Little Rock Chamber
of Commerce, following the established tradition of the annual succession of the vice-
president to the office. At his inaugural speech on January 14, 1959, Williams for the first
time before a public audience raised the issue of the negative impact of the school crisis on
the community. Williams told the Chamber of Commerce that "no matter what our personal
feelings might be" the "time has come for us to evaluate... the cost of the lack of public
education." The speech at first brought a "gasp of surprise" from members that such a
controversial subject had been broached, but was met by a burst of applause at its
conclusion.72 Despite their intervention, the business community still remained generally
cautious about speaking up against the segregationists and continued to move slowly. On
January 26 the Chamber publicly backed the school board's plan to reopen the schools on a
segregated basis and to submit a new integration plan. On February 23 the Chamber
announced that it had polled its members and that the majority favoured opening the
schools under a "controlled plan of minimum integration" rather than keeping them
closed.73
Whilst the courts and the white business community equivocated, Faubus continued
to manipulate legislation in favour of maintaining segregation at the Arkansas General
Assembly in 1959. Fifty-eight measures relating to desegregation were discussed, with
thirty-two bills sent to Faubus for ratification at the end of the session. Top of the agenda
were the four measures Faubus personally put forward to the General Assembly. Foremost
71 Gary Fullerton, "New Factories Thing of the Past in Little Rock," Nashville Tennessea,,, May 31,
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amongst these was an amendment to the state constitution to relieve the state of its duty to
provide free public schools and instead place this function in the hands of local school
districts. Local school boards were given the power to abolish their public schools system
and distribute school funds equally amongst pupils who could then spend the money
wherever they wanted to get an education. As a backup, since a constitutional amendment
could not take effect until voted upon in the November elections, Faubus's second and
third bills involved putting similar plans of student financial aid into operation by state
statute, which could be enacted at any time. A fourth bill enabled teachers in public schools
to teach in private schools without losing pension benefits.74
Matters came to a head in May 1959 when the Little Rock school board met to
discuss the renewal of teacher contracts for the following year. Leading up to the meeting
there had been indications from the pro-Faubus segregationist forces that a purge of
teachers not sympathetic to their cause would be attempted. Oii the first vote of the meeting,
to renew the contract of Superintendent of Schools Terrell Powell, the Board split 3-3,
between those who represented the segregationists' interests and those who represented the
interests of the businessmen. Further votes about considering all 808 high school teachers'
contracts in one vote, school by school, one by one, or whether to adjourn for one week,
all split along similar lines.75
After a break for lunch, the school board members representing the business
interests returned to the meeting and announced that they were withdrawing from
proceedings which would mean that there would be no quorum to make decisions affecting
the schools. However, after the business representatives had left, Ed McKinley, the
segregationist president of the school board, ruled that since a quorum had existed at the
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beginning of the meeting business could continue as normal. For the rest of the afternoon
the segregationists embarked upon a series of arbitrary decisions, hiring T. H. Alford --
father of DaJe Alford who had defeated Brooks Hays in the congressional elections the
previous November -- as superintendent of schools, reducing school taxes and raising
teachers' wages. Most dramatic of all was the decision not to renew the contract of 44
people employed in the public schools system, including seven school principals, 34
teachers and three secretaries. Included in the purge were the principal and two vice-
principals of Central High, as well as the principal of Horace Mann High, along with other
teachers who had years of experience and were well-respected educators in the schools
system.76
Over the next few nights angry meetings of PTA's were held in the city's schools
opposing the teacher purge. On May 8, three days after the school board meeting, VJ9
downtown business and civic leaders met to form a new organisation, Stop This
Outrageous Purge (STOP), dedicated to recalling the three segregationist board members
for an election in which the voters would decide whether the segregationists should be re-
elected and the purge allowed to go ahead. Immediately after the formation of STOP
segregationist groups began to circulate petitions for the recall of all the business
candidates. In order to achieve this, on May 15 the CCC, the Mother's League of Central
High and the States' Rights party formed CROSS (the Campaign to Retain Our Segregated
Schools).77
Throughout the campaign that followed, STOP fought a battle to keep the issue
focused on the teacher purge whilst CROSS members defined their fight as strictly one of
76 Southern School News, June 1959, p. 2; Alexander, The Little Rock Recall Election, pp. 12-16;
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"integration" versus "segregation." President of the school board Ed McKinley told the
press that if any of the teachers were prepared to renounce integration they could have their
jobs back. The stakes were raised by CROSS in an advertisement run in the Arkansas
Democrat which claimed that the teachers had been purged for "teaching alien doctrines,
incompetency, breaking and entering, trespassing on private property, invasion of privacy,
improper punishment, intimidation of students [and] immorality." CROSS claimed this
information had come directly from Ed McKinley. Thirty-nine teachers responded by
taking out a $3,900,000 libel lawsuit against McKinley and the chairman of CROSS.
Faubus's proclamations during the campaign leant heavily toward the segregationists and
for his own part, the governor tried to exploit class divisions in the community by referring
to the "good honest hard-working people of the lower middle classes" of CROSS in
opposition to the "charge of the Cadillac brigade of wealthy and prominent leaders" in
STOP.78
On election day, May 25, the voting, albeit narrowly, went the businessmen's way.
Out of around 25,000 votes cast, most of the school board members had only a one
thousand margin of victory and defeat, as all three businessmen were elected, and all three
segregationists dismissed. In June, the Federal Court, including Judge Miller, but this time
with two other Justices presiding, ruled that Faubus had acted against the mandate of the
United States constitution in closing the public schools. The Court explicitly warned the
school board that they were now "permanently enjoined from engaging in any acts which
will, directly or indirectly, impede, thwart, delay, or frustrate the execution of the approved
plans for the gradual integration of the schools of Little Rock." 79 The school board carried
out the mandate by preparing for the desegregation of schools under a Pupil Assignment
78 Souther,: School News; June 1959, p. 3; Alexander, The Little Rock Recall Election, pp. 23-29;
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plan passed in the 1958 legislature. Under the assignment system desegregation was kept
to the bare minimum: initially, one black student was assigned to Central High, three to
Hall High and none to Technical High. After eighteen other black students asked to be
reassigned from Horace Mann, one extra was added to Central and three more to Hall.
The Little Rock school crisis demonstrated the complex interaction between local,
state and national agendas in shaping black activism and white resistance. At a national
level, local black activism paved the way for the NAACP to challenge white resistance in
the courts which narrowed the legal basis for the circumvention of school desegregation
across the South. In Little Rock, although whites managed to effectively exercise a great
deal of influence over the nature and rate of change, since when the schools re-opened they
were still only desegregated on a token basis, local black activism did make a significant
impact. The efforts of Little Rock's black community to focus attention on the school
desegregation issue led to the white community employing various forms of resistance
ranging from physical intimidation and terrorism to legislative and litigative measures. Thus
black activism was successful at engaging the white community in an ongoing struggle
over the nature of race relations which forced whites to take notice of black demands and in
so doing disrupted the day-to-day activities of the community. The closure of the city's
schools forced the community as a whole to confront the issue of race relations in a very
direct way. Whites were made to understand that blacks would simply not allow them to
remain ambivalent in the face of racial oppression and that ignoring black demands held a
high price for the well-being of both blacks and whites. Throughout the 1960s, black
activists in Little Rock strove to keep racial issues at the very forefront of the community
agenda, continually forcing whites, particularly in light of the two and a half years of
turmoil over school desegregation, to evaluate whether the unrest that ensued was
ultimately worth the preservation of Jim Crow.
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CHAPTER SIX
CHANGES II: THE BUSINESS OF INTEGRATION
One specific area that the school crisis exposed as a chink in the South's defensive
armour against segregation, particularly in cities like Little Rock, which were ambitious to
court new industries and promote economic development, was the cost of racial turmoil in
dollars and cents. Business leaders in Little Rock had been moved to intervene in the
school crisis only when they realised that racial upheaval struck at the economic well-being
of the city. This seemed to indicate that if black activists could find some way to keep
attention focused on the fact that continued segregation could not be reconciled with
economic progress, the business community might be pressured into confronting issues of
racial change head-on. Black activists attempted to put this to the test across the South in
the 1960s, through staging mass marches, sit-ins, and a variety of other tactics, in order to
keep the issue of race firmly at the forefront of the community agenda.1
In the aftermath of the Little Rock school crisis the white business leadership
looked to return to the state of race relations that predated 1957, with the token integration
of the city's schools as the only concession to change. Indeed, they recoiled from any
suggestion of using their influence to cultivate a more racially enlightened attitude in the
city. After the school crisis the ACHR presented a film to white business leaders,
sponsored by one of Uttle Rock's top businessmen's associations, entitled Dallas atthe
Crossroads, which charted the smooth process of racial change in that Texas city as a result
of co-operation between various groups in the black and white community. It was
indicative of the degree of enthusiasm that only ten out of seventy-five invited members
attended. Little progress was made in the discussion after the meeting. Everett Tucker,
1 David Chappell, inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rig/its Movement (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 97-12 1. See also Jacoway, "Taken By Surprise."
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president of the school board and director of industrial development for the Chamber of
Commerce, summed up the prevalent attitude in the white business community that "The
best thing for Little Rock to do now is nothing."2
The major obstacle facing Little Rock's black community in the wake of school
crisis was a lack of organisation and direction that could effectively bring more pressure to
bear on the white business community and thus produce change. The position of crisis
leadership vacated by Daisy Bates prompted a new bout of in-fighting as older black
leaders scrambled to reassert their authority. C. D. Coleman, a regional Urban League
representative, reported that "the one great problem facing Little Rock [is] the lack of unity,
confidence and co-operation between Negro leaders and the lack of regular and orderly
lines of communication between Negro organisations.... Disunity among Negro leaders [is
of] greater concern than the school crisis." 3 John Walker, the new young black associate
director of the ACHR, observed early in 1960 that "Negro leadership is virtually nil." Yet
at the same time Walker noted the galvanising effect of the school crisis on the black
community as a whole and expressed the belief that "the 'masses' of Negroes are anxious
for more progressive leadership from new people." Walker ultimately blamed the timidity
of existing conservative black leaders and the interference of white moderates for the lack
of effective black protest.4
An attempt by a black candidate to run for the Little Rock school board in
November 1959 provided a vivid example of the kinds of pressures that stymied potential
local black activism. When Dr. M. A. Jackson, a local physician and representative of
2 Griswold, "The Second Reconstruction," book 2, chapter 1, p. 16.
Memorandum from C. D. Coleman, Director of Community Services, Southern Field Division, to M. T.
Puryear, Southern Field Director, October 5, 1959, group II, series D, container 26, folder "Affiliates File,
Little Rock, Arkansas," National Urban League Papers, Library of Congress (collection hereinafter cited as
NULLC).
John Walker to Paul Riling, November 17, 1959, reel 141, series IV, container 234, Southern Regional
Council Papers (Microfilm), Library of Congress (collection hereinafter cited as SRCLCMF).
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parents who were dissatisfied with the token integration of the schools, announced his
candidacy in the school board election, he was quickly dissuaded from standing. Even
though there was clearly support in the black community for Jackson with over one
thousand signatures in a petition backing his action, established black leaders warned
against the move, claiming that it would help strengthen segregationist sentiment and
encourage further scenes of racial violence. Members of the WEC also tried to dissuade
Jackson from standing, telling him that now was "not the time" for a black candidate and
that the risk of stirring up racial emotionalism in the city so soon after the end of the school
crisis would be potentially harmful to race relations. The combined pressure of black
leaders, the WEC, and, ultimately, his immediate family, who feared for his safety if he
became a focus for racial hostility in the city, convinced Jackson to reluctantly abandon his
candidacy.5
Efforts by the ACI-IR to stimulate discussion in the black community about the need
for organisation and leadership met with little success. In 1960 Nat Griswold, Director of
the ACHR, wrote to John Wheeler who had been instrumental in forming a Council on
Community Organisations in Durham, North Carolina, to fight for black rights there.
Griswold hoped that Wheeler could persuade black leaders in Little Rock of the benefits of
"working together in the interest of all Negroes and ... shift[ingl their focus above the petty
views of individual leaders" that had helped to provide a "strong united voice.., making
unequivocal the common aspirations and demands of Negroes" in Durham. Initially
planned as a day visit, Griswold persuaded Wheeler to stay for a week, conferring with
"individuals and small groups, especially Negro leaders" as he was "really anxious that
Ibid.; "Protest Movement," series 1: office files, box 2, folder 19, "Arkansas Council on Community
Affairs, April 23, 1953-August 2, 1967," Arkansas Council on Human Relations Papers, University of
Arkansas Special Collections Division, Fayetteville (collection hereinafter cited as ACHRUAF); Dr. M. A.
Jackson, interview with John Kirk, February 10, 1993, UNOHC; Arkansas Gazette, November 10, 1959.
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something happen as a result of your visit."6
 However, nothing did happen. Divisions
within the black community remained grouped around the efforts of individual black
leaders to maintain their personal power bases, with each still reluctant to surrender their
own spheres of influence in order to work as part of a collective push for black rights. As
Griswold summed up, "Each wanted a united voice -- his."7
This internal factionalism had serious consequences on national as well as local
black protest initiatives. This became clear at the first student sit-ins of the 1960s. The mass
student sit-in movement began in Greensboro, North Carolina, when four black students
from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College asked for service at the "whites
only" lunch counter of the downtown Woolworth's store on February 1, 1960. The action,
intended as a non-violent but direct protest against segregation, affronted Jim Crow laws
which demanded that blacks and whites eat separately. The students were refused service,
but aside from the glare of a police officer and disparaging remarks from white onlookers,
no violence occurred.
Over the following weeks and months the number of sit-in demonstrators grew and
met with increasingly angry and violent reactions as resentment grew in the white
community. Yet the sit-ins eventually achieved their goal of forcing a recalcitrant white
business community into a successful dialogue about race relations, which in turn
eventually led to the desegregation of lunch counters. Although the tactic of the sit-in had
been used in previous years in a number of places, the Greensboro sit-ins differed in that
they set in motion a wave of similar demonstrations, first in neighbouring towns and cities,
6 j • H. Wheeler to Nat Griswold, Jan 18, 1960; Nat Griswold to J. H. Wheeler, Jan 19, 1960, series 1:
oflice files, box 2, folder 19, "Arkansas Council on Community Affairs, April 23, 1953-August 2, 1967,"
ACHRUAF.
Griswold, "The Second Reconstruction," book 2, chapter 6, p. 9.
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then throughout the nation. In doing so, they provided a catalyst in a movement of student-
based direct action protest that would become a hallmark of black activism in the 1960s.8
The sit-in demonstrations embodied much of the symbolic drama and moral politics
of the 1960s civil rights movement. Heroic black students challenged segregation at lunch
counters, in a dignified non-violent manner, which contrasted starkly with the thuggishness
of violent white segregationists who jeered, spat on and beat the participants for claiming
their rights as American citizens. Indeed, the spectacle was intended to elicit exactly this
kind of symbolic confrontation which would dramatise black oppression, both to members
of the immediate community and to the onlookers in the nation through the mass media. Yet
sometimes the conflict between black student sit-in demonstrators and white segregationists
has in retrospect been reduced merely to the playing out of a drama in which blacks,
seemingly by the very moral force of their actions, managed to bring about the end of
segregation.
The reality was very different. Student sit-ins represented the cutting edge of a
conflict that had much deeper roots within the black community. Students were often the
"shock troops" who did not have the economic and familial responsibilities that precluded
many others from taking similar action. The success of the sit-ins was determined not
simply by the actions of the students, but more importantly by the catalytic effect they had
by sharply focusing previously blurred racial issues within the community and, above all,
by generating wider support from the local black adult community and indigent black
organisations. It was no coincidence that Greensboro, with its large concentration of black
colleges, an active local NAACP chapter and strong established black churches, which all
8 On the sit-ins in Greensboro see William H. Chafe, Civililies and Civil Rig/its. On SNCC and the sit-
ins see Emily Stoper The Student Non-Violent Co-ordinari,zg Com,nittee: the Growl/i of Radicalism in a
Civil Rig/its Organisazion (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing. 1989), Claybourne Carson In Struggle:
SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960's (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) and Aldon D.
Morris, Origins of the Civil Rig/its Movement.
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provided interrelated networks of support, became the launch pad for a successful sit-in
movement. Neither should it have been a surprise that where sit-ins were successful at
bringing an end to segregation, similar networks of support already existed upon which
student activists could build and which, they in turn, stimulated to greater efforts. As black
sociologist Aldon Morris points out in his study of the origins of the civil rights movement,
sit-ins were successful because they "grew out of pre-existing structures" in places where
there was "a well-developed and wide-spread internal [communityl organisation" which in
turn could be adapted for sustaining direct action.9
In contrast to the successful sit-ins that have drawn the attention of scholars, the
first wave of sit-ins at Little Rock reveals another side of the story. Efforts by Philander
Smith students to stage sit-ins in order to put pressure on the white business community,
with the aim of forcing concessions for racial change, failed dismally. With little co-
ordination or co-operation between existing leaders and organisations in Little Rock, the
necessary support networks to sustain such protests were not in place and could not be
mobilised. In the absence of the necessary infrastructure for a sit-in campaign, whites rode
roughshod over student demonstrations, handing out harsh fines and sentences that swiftly
ground the movement to a standstill.
The first sit-ins in Little Rock took place on March 9, 1960, when around fifty
students from Philander Smith entered the downtown F. W. Woolworth Store, sat down at
the lunch counter and waited to be served. Store officials, refusing service to the students,
immediately alerted Chief of Police Eugene Smith who arrived on the scene within five
minutes. Smith advised store officials that they should shut down the lunch counter and ask
the students to leave. When the counter closed all but five students left the premises. Those
left -- Charles Parker, Vernon Mott, Frank James, Ledridge Davis and Chester Briggs --
Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, pp. 195-215.
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were arrested by Smith under a state statute which decreed that it was unlawful for a person
not to leave business premises when requested.'0
Shortly alter arriving at the police station, the five arrested were released on bail of
$100 each supplied by the local NAACP. The actions of the students obviously had the
implicit support of the NAACP since a meeting with Daisy Bates had been held before the
demonstration took place.' I However, the Bateses, aware of the controversy that already
surrounded the organisation and themselves personally, were careful to avoid charges that
they had incited Philander Smith students to take action. L. C. Bates told reporters that his
wife had not given the students any encouragement to stage a sit-in, nor had she advised
against it, and that NAACP involvement was due solely to the orgariisation's commitment
to support any blacks who stood up for their rights. In spite of these claims, it was L. C.
Bates who fielded most of the reporters' questions. When asked why students had
demonstrated Bates replied "Well put it this way. You can go anywhere in any store and
buy anything but when you buy food you are trespassing and the kids can't understand it
and I can't either." After several more questions Bates told reporters "You all aren't colored
and never have been so you've no idea what it's like." One reporter asked "Is it hard to be a
colored person?" Bates replied "It's hell to be a colored person."2
White authorities, determined to stamp out the sit-ins as quickly as possible, took a
hard-line approach to the demonstrations. Attorney General Bruce Bennett advised Eugene
Smith that alongside the state statute for loitering, students should be charged under Act 17
passed in the 1958 special session of the Arkansas General Assembly, which made it a
misdemeanour to enter public school property or a public place of business and create a
disturbance, and Act 226, passed in the 1959 Arkansas General Assembly, specifically
10 kaisas De,nocrat, March 10; Arkansas Gazette, March 11.
11 Moms, Origins of tile Civil Rig/its Movement, p. 201.
l2 âjjj as J)e,nocraj, March 10; Arkansas Gazette, March 11.
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designed to prevent sit-in demonstrations. A breach of both Acts carried sentences of 30
days imprisonment andlor up to $500 in fines. When the students were tried in the Little
Rock Municipal Court the following morning their attorney Harold Anderson asked for a
continuance of the case until March 30 or 31. Immediately, J. Frank Holt, state prosecutor
in the case,jumped to his feet and demanded an earlier trial since the state viewed the acts
of the defendants "as a deliberate attempt... to disturb the peace of the community." By
bringing a swift and decisive retribution to the students the state believed that it could
prevent further demonstrations from taking place. Judge Quinn Glover complied with
Holt's request and set the hearing for March 17. Glover warned Anderson that there would
be no continuances issued in the case and that he should use his influence with the students
to make sure that there were no further demonstrations. Glover added another blow when
he told the defence that he did not intend to rule on the constitutionality of the Acts, which
the NAACP believed to be illegal, but solely on the innocence or guilt of those charged
with the offences.13
Predictably, as the students awaited trial, their actions received widespread
condemnation from the white community. Whites on the scene at the sit-in had been
sceptical of the students' motives with one by-stander telling reporters that "they just want
to get their picture on the T.V. tonight." 4 An impromptu poll of white community leaders
by the Arkansas Democrat revealed that most not only rejected the sit-ins as an acceptable
form of protest but also believed that they would prove detrimental to the black community
in the long run. 15 Outside of the NAACP, support from other black community leaders
was in short supply. Indeed, the sit-ins seemed only to exacerbate the divisions that
existed. A typical reaction came from I. S. McClinton, who hedged his bets by claiming he
was "neither for or against the sit-down." McClinton stated that he empathised with the
13 Arkansas De,nocrat, March 11.
14 Arka,isas Gazette, March 11.
15 Arkansas Democrat, March 11.
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students but was clearly rankled by the fact that they had not acknowledged his importance
and consulted him first. "A community should [not] have to be involved in this sort of
thing without the Negro leadership being alerted" he told reporters.16
An even more volatile reaction came from Philander Smith officials who seemed
more concerned with the potential loss of white financial support than the rights of the
students. President of the college, Dr. Lafayette Harris, was ill in hospital when the sit-ins
took place. Upon his release a few days later Harris told the press that the college had been
unaware of the plans of the students, that it completely distanced itself from their actions
and that it did not and would never "subscribe to mass action in dealing with difficult
problems." Harris warned students that they should not participate in any further
demonstrations. 17 The following day, when the Board of Trustees met, Harris continued to
push for an unreserved condemnation of the sit-in participants and urged that the sternest
possible action be taken against them. Only the calming influence of one white member of
the board prevented the wholesale expulsions of the students involved. At the end of the
meeting the college trustees agreed to release a statement to the effect that it recognised the
right of students to demonstrate, as long as they did not break the law, but did not in any
way endorse their actions.18
Regardless of the mixed community reaction toward their demonstration, Philander
Smith students continued to pursue their own protest agenda. On March 15 five students,
including some of those arrested in the first sit-in, tried unsuccessfully to hold talks with
the manager of McClellan's store on Main street in order to elicit some concessions in
altering their policy of segregation. At the same time nine students entered Walgreen's drug
store and successfully attracted the manager's attention. The manager, a member of the
16
17 Arkansas Democrat, March 13.
18 Ibid., March 16; Dunaway interview.
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Little Rock Chamber of Commerce, told the students that if other officials wanted to get
store managers together to discuss the issue he would consider their proposals. Both
groups of students finally ended up in the foyer of the Arkansas Democrat where they
asked to buy back copies of the paper that had reported the first demonstrations. When
reporters told the students that the police had been called out to McClellan's and Waigreen's
because of their presence they replied that they didn't know why everyone was so jumpy.
The students refused to have their photographs taken and would only tell reporters that their
reason for going into the stores was that they had "business with the manager."9
On March 17 the five students arrested in the sit-in appeared for trial at the
Municipal Court which was packed with other Philander Smith students who went to show
their support for the protest. At the trial, Harold Anderson, joined by NAACP attorney
George Howard from Pine Bluff, moved that the cases of the students be dismissed on the
grounds that the state Acts under which they were being tried were unconstitutional.
Although Judge Glover had already ruled that he would not consider the constitutionality of
the Acts, the attorneys for the black students had little choice in the matter. Arguing against
the constitutionality of the Acts was the only viable form of defence the students had, since
there was no dispute about the fact that they had broken the laws prohibiting such
demonstrations. By sticking to what they believed to be the central issue in the matter, the
students' attorneys believed that they could win their cases in the higher federal courts.
Prosecuting attorney J. Frank Holt argued against the dismissal on the grounds that the sit-
ins had been a "planned and premeditated" breach of the law. Glover upheld Holt's
argument and found the students guilty under Act 266. Each student was fined $250 and
sentenced to 30 days injail. Both of the students' attorneys immediately indicated that they
would appeal both fines and sentences. In the meantime, the Little Rock LDEF posted bond
for the five students.2°
19 Arka,zsasDe,nocrat, March 16.
20 Ibid., March 17.
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It soon transpired that Philander Smith students had planned their own response to
the court decisions. Around 30 students left the courtroom and headed straight for Main
street where they attempted to gain service at F. W. Woolworth's lunch counter. When the
counter closed the students split into smaller groups to test lunch counters in other stores.
At Walgreen's, as black students arrived, a store official wheeled a large sign in front of the
lunch counter that read "Restaurant closed in the interest of public safety." The students left
quietly, but when television cameras and newspaper reporters arrived the manager reacted
angrily, clearly irate at the unwanted publicity. There was a similar scene at Lane Rexall
drug store where lunch counters were closed down as soon as the students arrived. When
questioned by reporters a store official informed them that his head office had told him "not
to make any statements or get involved in any of this."
Other students attempted unsuccessfully to gain service at lunch counter facilities in
other city stores. Wary of the harsh fines and stiff sentences that the courts had already
handed down, the students were careful not to be arrested. When a large police presence
became evident in the downtown area in response to phone calls from store managers, a
group of 22 students took their protest to the State Capitol where they sang "God Bless
America" and "The Star Spangled Banner." The spectacle proved an embarrassment to state
officials. Upon being informed of the students' imminent arrival, Secretary of State C. G.
Hail packed out the cafeteria at the Capitol with state troopers who were ordered to occupy
seats so that a sit-in could not be staged. As for the students outside, Eugene Smith
informed Hall that "until the legislators pass a law that makes the singing of the National
Anthem on the State Capitol grounds a violation" there was little he could do to stop
them.21
21 Ibid.
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The demonstrations only served to fuel anger in the white community. In an effort
to resolve the situation the NAACP sought talks with the Little Rock Chamber of
Commerce but met with a non-committal reply that gave little grounds for encouragement.
The deadlock in Little Rock mirrored the situation in other communities across the South
where sit-ins had taken place. Public announcements had been made by national chain
stores such as F. W. Woolworth, S. S. Kressage, S. H. Kress and W. T. Grant, that the
current policy of segregation would continue. In the light of this, the national headquarters
of the NAACP called for a boycott of stores to support the aims of the sit-in demonstrators.
In Little Rock, on March 31, the Little Rock NAACP formally announced what it termed a
"Racial Self-Defence Policy" against discrimination in local stores. In a memorandum
designed to win widespread support for a boycott of white businesses who refused to
negotiate an end to segregation, the NAACP pleaded with "all religious institutions,
fraternal organisations, fraternities, sororities, civic and political groups" to withdraw
patronage from targeted stores at Woolworth's, McClellan's, Lane Rexall's, Waigreen's,
Blass's, Pfieffer's and Economy Drug Store. The memorandum called for a rallying of the
black adult community to support students who did not "have access to the family purse or
the ballot" to demonstrate their opposition to the segregated order. "1-IE NEEDS OUR
HELP" the memorandum appealed "we have the family purse and we have the ballot, and
the NAACP is asking 'DO YOU HAVE THE WILL?"22
Initially, it seemed that the boycott might prove a success. Local daily newspapers,
television and radio, black and white, gave considerable publicity to the story. At one of the
busiest times of year, the boycott threatened to have a major impact on Easter shopping,
forcing merchants to lend an ear to black demands. Yet within just a week the boycott
collapsed. Once again, divisions within the black community over methods and tactics of
protest surfaced. L. C. Bates placed the blame for the failure of the boycott on the lack of
22 Ibid., April 1; "Memorandum," series I, box 31, folder 322 "Sit-Ins 1960," ACHRUAF.
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co-operation by local black ministers. A more significant obstacle, however, seemed to be
the Southern Mediator Journal, the only black newspaper left in the city alter the demise of
the Stale Press. Editor C. H. Jones was highly critical of the boycott. "Yes, militancy is
airight" Jones declared "but we must also use tolerance." Jones reminded readers that many
of the stores the NAACP proposed to boycott employed Negro workers and that their jobs
might be put at risk. "Where else would these people get jobs?" Jones asked, pointing out
that blacks owned no large stores or business plants and that a boycott would be
tantamount to economic suicide. The Southern Mediator Journal instead proposed the
formation of a bi-racial committee to work out the current problems to the mutual benefit of
both races. However, Jones failed speculate how whites would be persuaded to accept
such an offer.23
A divided black leadership provided a far from ideal backdrop to the trial of the first
sit-in demonstrators. On April 11 Judge William H. Kirby set a trial date for April 27.24
The day alter, there were further attempts to gain service by 10 black students on Main
street, at Woolworth's and McClellan's stores. When the police arrived downtown students
continued to walk up and down past various stores but did not attempt to enter them. They
then split into pairs and entered various shops on Main street. The actions of the students
seemed designed to cagily test what the reaction of the police would be to further attempts
to stage a sit-in. In the afternoon more students arrived downtown. A cat and mouse game
ensued with the police, who were still present in large numbers, as black students tried to
avoid squad cars and police surveillance of the area. When there were no officers in sight
the students entered stores to stage sit-in demonstrations. At McClellan' s the lunch counter
was closed and all the lights switched off until the students left. At Woolworth's students
23 
"Monthly Report of Clarence Laws, field secretary, SWR, February 26- March 31, 1960," box 4, folder
10, DBPW; Southern Mediaiorioiirnal, April 8, 1960, clipping in DBSW.
24 ,iJ)ercrai April 11, 1960.
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found that the lunch counter was already full and, after waiting for spaces to become empty
for several minutes, decided to head back to Philander Smith.25
The following day eight students returned to Main street during the lunch-time rush
hour with a definite plan of attack. Two students went to Blass's store and sat down at the
lunch counter where the store manager informed nearby police who were again, at the
behest of store owners, present in large numbers. Police Captain Paul Terrell and the store
manager met two students, Frank J. Lupper and Thomas B. Robinson, on their way out of
the store. Terrall asked if the two had been involved in a demonstration. They replied they
had. Terrall then arrested them. Six students who staged a sit-in at Pfieffer's Department
store were also arrested.26
Unwilling to risk more arrests, but still determined to show their support for those
on bail, the day after the latest sit-ins Philander Smith students arrived downtown to picket
Blass's, Pfieffer's and McClellan's, waving placards that read "Jailing our youth will not
solve the problem in Little Rock," "Help us make democracy work" and "We want freedom
today, not tomorrow." The NAACP remained the one organisation unflagging in its
support for the students. L. C. Bates provided transportation to and from Philander Smith
for the demonstrators and Daisy Bates joined picket lines outside department stores. Daisy
Bates told the press that "picketing will continue indefinitely until the conscience of the
community is made to realise that Negroes are being refused service in these places" and
expressed the hope that others in the black community would turn out to show their
support. Bates's optimism proved ill-founded. No-one from the black community came to
offer their support. White shoppers generally remained indifferent to the picket lines. Apart
from a few groups who gathered to watch the demonstrators little attention was paid aside
from one or two reported "curious looks." At one point a group of white youths tried to
25 Ibid., April 12, 1960.
26 Ibid. April 13, 1960.
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block the path of the pickets and blew cigarette smoke in their faces but the closest this
amounted to an incident was when a white youth pulled out the shirt-tails of one of the
pickets. Within a few days the picketing ground to a halt.27
On April 21, the trial of the eight students in the second batch of sit-in arrests took
place. Six were tried under Act 226, whilst two, Frank Lupper and Thomas Robinson,
were also tried under Act 14 for their obstinate refusal to leave the premises with the police
when requested. Judge Glover ignored the by now routine appeal of Harold Anderson to
dismiss the case and ruled against the students. In sentencing, Glover handed down even
tougher penalties than in the first sit-in cases, reflecting a growing annoyance and irritation
by the white community at the unwelcome disruption. The six students charged under Act
226 were each fined $250 and handed a sixty-day jail sentence. The two students charged
under Act 14 were each fined $400 and handed a ninety-day jail sentence. 28 The
increasingly hard line the courts were taking with sit-in protesters was in evidence again at
the appeal of the five students arrested at the first sit-in. Judge William J. Kirby ruled that
the Acts passed by the Arkansas General Assembly to prevent sit-ins were "a valid exercise
of police authority" and awarded each of the students a $500 fine and sixty days injail,
doubling the initial sentences. Bail was set at $1,000. The defence attorneys declared their
intentions to appeal the case further.29
On May 31 the appeals of the second group of sit-in demonstrators, being tried
under Act 226, encountered the increased determination of the courts to put a halt to the sit-
ins. At the outset Kirby again made it clear that he would refuse any plea to consider the
constitutionality of the Acts under which the demonstrators were being tried. Undeterred,
Anderson, this time assisted by Wiley Branton, continued to argue that the Acts were
27 Arki,,zsas Gazette, April 16, April 17, 1960.
28 Arkansas Democrat, April 21, 1960.
29 Ibid., April 27, 1960; Arkansas Gazette, April 27, 1960.
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unconstitutional. Kirby refused to listen and overruled all attempts to raise constitutional
issues. At the end of the trial he pronounced all six defendants guilty as charged. In
sentencing Kirby doubled all the penalties for the students, awarding each the maximum
fine of $500 and sixty-day jail sentences. In one case, that of Melvin Jackson, who police
claimed had not moved from the lunch counter when he had been asked to, Kirby went
beyond the maximum limits set out under the Act and handed the student a six month
prison sentence on top of a $500 fine.30 When Frank Lupper and Thomas Robinson were
tried June 17 under Act 14 Kirby handed each student a $418 fine and ninety-day prison
sentence. In all cases, Anderson indicated that his clients would appeal their cases to higher
courts.31
The hostility of the courts in sentencing sit-in demonstrators brought the first
tentative response from the adult black community. A new ad hoc Citizens' Committee was
formed, made up largely of ministers led by Roland Smith of the ACM. Dr. Lafayette
Harris was also persuaded to join the Committee, as, for a time, was L. C. Bates. The
Committee held monthly meetings and attempted to help the students by arranging talks
with downtown businessmen and raising funds to help the LDEF raise their bail.32
The activities of the Citizens' Committee quickly fizzled out. The only one lasting
achievement of the organisation was to bring student activism to a complete standstill when
they insisted that in return for their efforts the students should cease all their
demonstrations. The call for an end to the sit-ins was helped by the summer recess at
Philander Smith since many students left Little Rock and returned home to different parts of
the country. When the autumn term began, in the absence of Dr. Lafayette Harris who had
moved to Atlanta over the summer, a new group of Philander Smith students attempted to
30 Arkansas Gazette, June 1, 1960.
31 Arkansas Democrat, June 17, June 18, 1960.
32 ka,isas Democrat, June 4, 1960; October 4, 1960.
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revive sit-in protests under the banner of the Arkansas Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating
Committee, dubbed "Arsnick" for short. 33 The new leader behind the sit-in movement was
Worth Long, who, according to an observer in the ACHR, had a "good public relations
sense" which resulted in the demonstrations being "well co-ordinated and managed."
However, the students again found it difficult to "deliver the adult community" which
hampered efforts to extend the sit-ins to a boycott of stores. The ACHR lamented the lack
of "co-ordinated support from the adult community which is showing its usual
fragmentation and divisiveness."34 With the initial momentum for demonstrations lost,
together with a wary eye on their friends who were still involved in protracted courtroom
battles and facing large fines and jail sentences, protests were intermittent and eventually,
again, ground to a halt. A combination of the lack of support from the adult black
community and the pressure exerted by whites through the courts meant that Little Rock's
first brief flirtation with 1960s-style direct action protest achieved very little in the way of
concessions from whites.
Little Rock's experiences with the Freedom Rides, another direct action tactic
employed in the struggle for black rights during the 1960s, proved equally inauspicious.
Freedom Rides were the initiative of the Chicago-based civil rights organisation CORE,
under the direction of its president James Farmer. In 1947 members of CORE had
successfully travelled on an interracial "Journey of Reconciliation" through a number of
upper South states after the Morgan v. Virginia(1946) ruling outlawed segregated seating
on interstate bus routes. When the Supreme Court extended the Morgan ruling to include
the desegregation of bus terminal facilities in !3oynton v. Virginia (1960), Farmer, in the
wake of the largely successful sit-in movement and increased civil rights activity across the
South, proposed to renew the Freedom Rides to facilitate a co-ordinated widespread attack
Ibid., November 29, 1960.
4 Memo from Little Rock ACHR to SCR, December 6, 1960, reel 141, box IV, folder 218 "Arkansas
'dope file,' Oct. 14, 1954 - May 26, 1965," SRCLCMF.
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on segregation in bus terminals throughout the region. Since the Freedom Rides this time
would extend into the Deep South, in a climate of increasing anxiety amongst the white
popu'ation because of the attacks on segregation there, trouble, in the form of arrests or
even violence, was anticipated. As with the sit-ins, creating a symbolic confrontation
would illustrate to the nation the ugly face of white southern bigotry which CORE hoped
might bring some federal response to the continued denial of black rights.
On May 4, 1961, thirteen Freedom Riders, comprising veterans from the Journey
of Reconciliation and younger activists, divided into two groups and boarded buses in
Washington D.C. The journey passed without incident through Virginia and North
Carolina where bus operators desegregated facilities in advance of their arrival. Aside from
a minor scuffle with white youths in Rock Hill, South Carolina, the Freedom Riders
successfully made it to Atlanta unharmed. On May 13, the two groups set off on what they
knew would be the most difficuli leg of theirjourney across Alabama to their final
destination of Jackson, Mississippi. The first group, bound for Anthston, met with a
violent reaction from whites. Upon arrival in the town locals surrounded the bus they were
travelling on and smashed its windows and slashed its tires before the police arrived at the
scene to control the disturbance. Just outside Anniston on their way to meet up with the
second group at Birmingham, a section of the white mob caught up with the bus and threw
a fire-bomb on board, then proceeded to beat those who fled the flames with clubs and
blackjacks. Only the intervention of a delegation led by black clergyman Rev. Fred
Shuttlesworth from Birmingham, who arrived on the scene just in time, saved the Freedom
Riders from the mob. The day after the incident at Anniston, the second group of Freedom
Riders pulled into Birmingham, where whites, mostly drawn from the ranks of the Klan,
proceeded to beat the occupants of the bus, not bothering to discriminate between protesters
and other travellers.
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The incidents at Anniston and Birmingham prompted the federal government to take
an interest in events. Up to that point, the Kennedy administration had offered no federal
protection for the Freedom Riders. Indeed, the only federal presence at the scene was
provided by FBI agents who acted merely as observers and refused to intervene. After the
violence at Anniston and Birmingham, United States Attorney General Robert Kennedy
unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a safe passage for the Freedom Riders with Alabama
Governor James Patterson. The situation seemed to have resolved itself, however, when
bus companies refused to transport any more Freedom Riders and CORE called a halt to the
campaign. Yet SNCC, undeterred, declared that it would continue where CORE had left
off. Kennedy responded to SNCC's decision to head for Montgomery by sending federal
representatives to try and ensure their safety. Nevertheless, upon reaching Montgomery,
the Freedom Riders' bus was again besieged by whites and the situation descended into
lawlessness and violence. Even one of Kennedy's top aides in the Civil Rights Division,
John Seigenthaler, became engulfed in the violence and was knocked unconscious by the
mob. Events at Montgomery prompted a more decisive response from Kennedy who sent
in four hundred federal marshals to ensure a safe passage for the Freedom Riders on their
last leg of the journey to Jackson, Mississippi, and arranged a National Guard escort
accompanied by police cars and helicopters. Upon their arrival in Jackson the Freedom
Riders were arrested but, in accordance with an agreement worked out between Robert
Kennedy and Mississippi's Senator Eastland, there was no violence.35
The Freedom Ride campaign ultimately proved a success. As a result of national
publicity for the issue of segregated public transportation the Kennedy administration,
through Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), ordered the integration of all interstate
buses and bus terminals. Meanwhile, CORE, SNCC and the SCLC set up a Freedom Ride
On the Freedom Rides see Fairciough To Redeem (lie Soul of AmerIca, pp. 58-83; Garrow, Bearing the
Cross, pp. 127-172; Branch, Parting the Walers, pp. 451-491; Barnes, Journey from Jim crow, pp. 157-
175.
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Co-ordinating Committee (FRCC) to keep pressure on the federal government as well as
encouraging local communities to confront segregation in their own localities. 36 It was as
part of this follow-up campaign to enforce bus terminal desegregation that, on July 10,
1961, Little Rock's first Freedom Riders, five members of the St. Louis branch of CORE,
arrived in the city on theirjourney to test desegregated facilities at bus terminals in
Arkansas and Louisiana. When the bus carrying the five CORE members drew into Little
Rock it was met by around 400 whites who had gathered to witness the event,
accompanied by around a dozen police officers. As the Freedom Riders disembarked they
met with jeers from the crowd but moved unmolested to the waiting rooms, one of which
was labelled "Inter-State and Colored Intra-State," providing a desegregated waiting room
for black passengers and white inter-state passengers, the other labelled "White Intra-State"
designed for white passengers only, who were travelling within the state.
The facilities at the bus terminal already complied with the letter of the law, which
stated that inter-state travel facilities should be desegregated, but as token defiance retained
segregation in intra-state travel which the ICC did not have jurisdiction over. Nevertheless,
to protest the attempts to continue with the ethos of segregation in intra-state travel, the
CORE delegation made for the "White Intra-State" waiting room. After making a phone call
to inform the St. Louis CORE branch of their arrival, Rev. Ben Cox, head of the group,
told news reporters that they planned to stay in Little Rock for one or two nights before
continuing on to Shreeveport, Louisiana. Cox and the other Freedom Riders had already
successfully tested bus facilities in other parts of Arkansas and expected little opposition in
the upper South state. Rather, the journey through Arkansas was seen as a formality, in
contrast to the hostilities that they expected to encounter in the Deep South state of
Louisiana. Whilst Cox was on the phone to St. Louis, new Chief of Police Paul Glascock
approached and asked the Freedom Riders to move as they were "threatening a breach of
36 Ibid.
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the peace." When they remained silent Glascock, to the delight of the crowd, arrested them.
After consulting prosecuting attorney John Jernigan the Freedom Riders were charged, as
the sit-in demonstrators previously, under Arkansas's Act 226. Local attorney Thad
Williams acted as legal counsel for CORE delegation and informed the press that although
they had been allowed bail, they were refusing to take it and would spend the night in jail
with an intention to plead "not guilty" at their trial the following morning.37
Whereas the sit-ins had been viewed as a local matter, the man-handling of the
Freedom Riders by the local police, who as members of CORE belonged to a national
organisation, set alarm bells ringing in Little Rock which still feared drawing attention to
civil rights issues in the wake of the damaging and unwanted publicity of the 1957 school
crisis. The Arkansas Gazette warned that the city was just managing to recover from the
events of 1957 and that the presence of the Freedom Riders held the potential to damage its
"record of recovery." The paper criticised police handling of the matter, arguing that the
crowds at the bus terminal should not have been allowed to gather in the first place. The
solution the newspaper offered was to "dispose" of the Freedom Riders as quickly as
possible before Little Rock again began to grab national attention and reinforcements
arrived to cash in on the media coverage. "The quicker the defendants can be freed, the
better for the community" the Gazette editorialised. If 'common sense" prevailed in the
matter "then Little Rock may reassert to the nation that the resurgence of law and order,
which we have so proudly been proclaiming, is fact and not illusion."38
The trial the following day demonstrated the desire of the city to be rid of the
Freedom Riders. After hearing the testimony in the case Judge Glover embarked upon a
lengthy lecture in which he admonished Cox and the others for "travel [ing] a long way to
disregard our laws and customs." Their attorney Thad Williams argued that the arrest of the
Arkansas Gazette, July 11, July 12, 1961.
38 Ibid., July 12, 1961.
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Freedom Riders violated the federal inter-state commerce clause, which guaranteed citizens
free and unmolested transit, and that Act 226 which they were being tried under was
unconstitutional. Refuting these arguments, Glover ruled that the case had nothing to do
with inter-state commerce, since the defendants had been arrested under a local Act, and as
to the constitutionality of that Act, the Arkansas Supreme Court had yet to declare on the
matter. However, Glover pointed out, again emphasising that he viewed the Freedom
Riders as outside meddlers and agitators in the state, the defendants "seem unwilling to
wait until the Arkansas Supreme Court has ruled on the validity of this law." Glover
handed down the maximum sentence of a $500 fine and a six month prison term. Yet in
order to get the Freedom Riders out of the city, Glover told the defendants that he would
suspend their sentences if they agreed to "leave the state of Arkansas and proceed to their
respective homes." After discussions with Williams and calls to the St. Louis branch of
CORE the Freedom Riders accepted the terms of the court and were released from
custody.39
The deft handling of the civil rights demonstrators seemed to have achieved the
city's goal of dispatching the Freedom Riders with the minimum amount of fuss. These
plans were disrupted when, later the same afternoon, the Freedom Riders announced that
they were refusing to accept the agreement. In particular, they claimed that they had not
been fully aware that when the Judge had told them to "return home" he had meant for them
literally to return to their doorsteps rather than just leave the state. The terms had been
accepted by the Freedom Riders only in the belief that they would be allowed to continue
on theirjourney to Louisiana. Cox pointed out that they were determined not to leave with
the city believing that "we came here, got spanked and are going back home." For his part,
Glover confirmed that the phrase "return home" meant exactly what it said and that if the
Freedom Riders wanted to go to jail instead "that's airight with me." That evening Cox and
Ibid., July 13, 1961.
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the others were arrested and placed in jail. The arrests resulted in heightened media
attention. Cox was now telling newspaper reporters that he would "much rather be dead
and in my grave" than be "a slave to segregation" and threatening to go on hunger strike
whilst incarcerated.40
For the first time since the school crisis the Freedom Ride fiasco brought an
intervention from the city's businessmen. Thirteen business leaders met at First National
bank to discuss the situation and formed an ad hoc Civic Progress Association (CPA) to
handle the matter. In a statement to the press the business leaders diplomatically backed the
city authorities in their handling of the matter whilst suggesting that there were areas in
which the city could learn from the incident in dealing with similar matters in the future.
The following morning Judge Glover recapitulated. In court, Glover admitted that he did
not have the legal authority to prevent the Freedom Riders continuing on theIr journey.
Instead, Glover ordered that there should be no more demonstrations in Arkansas and
declared he was turning "the other cheek in this matter, hoping it to be for the good of all"
albeit "very, very reluctantly." Cox and the others continued out of Arkansas on the same
day to continue their testing of bus terminal facilities in Louisiana. 41 Little Rock's flirtation
with the Freedom Rides had proved even briefer than the first wave of student sit-ins.
The debacle over the Freedom Rides acted as a catalyst for the formation of CoCA,
a new organisation that was dedicated to providing the type of co-ordinated black
community leadership which Little Rock needed in order to effectively mobilise an assault
on the city's segregated order. Since John Wheeler's speech to community leaders in early
1960, efforts had been made to try and put aside self-interests in order to pursue goals that
would bring collective benefits. The new initiative wasted by a cadre of young medical
professionals who had recently banded together to set up their own joint practice in the city
40Ibid.
41 Ibid., July 14, 1961.
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after being located in the offices of Dr. J. M. Robinson on West Ninth street for several
years. The office-block of Dr. William H. Townsend, Dr. Maurice A. Jackson, Dr.
Evangeline Upshur and Dr. Garman P. Freeman on Wright Avenue became CoCA's
headquarters in the 1960s. This new leadership was careful to foster good relations with
older leaders and persuaded them to pool their constituencies of support in the pursuit of
black rights. CoCA achieved this seemingly impossible task by co-opting black influentials
on to an executive board that met to consult on all decisions made by the organisation. By
incorporating all factions within the black community under one umbrella, CoCA managed
to temper rivalries between different leaders and organisations. Like Arkansas's earlier
prototype civil rights organisation the CNO, CoCA's explicit aim was to create an
"organisation of organisations" providing unity and direction of purpose to black activism
in the city.42
On July 21, 1961 CoCA met with the City Board of Directors to present an outline
of what it considered to be the main problems in the city's race relations, along with some
proposed solutions. CoCA told the City Board that the lack of desire to confront racial
issues had resulted in a failure to instigate any positive programme to alleviate the latent
tensions that existed between the races in the city, fostering a potentially "explosive"
situation. Confronting the situation, CoCA suggested, would help to speed the process of
repairing the city's tarnished image after the school crisis by eliminating the need for sit-
ins, boycotts, Freedom Rides and other demonstrations in the first place. With black and
white communities working together, CoCA told members of the City Board that they
believed the process of desegregation, which would only be achieved in other communities
through turmoil and costly litigation, could be carried out in Little Rock in a relatively
painless and civilised manner. With this process underway issues of black employment and
other allied problems in the field of race relations could then be addressed. CoCA proposed
42 Dr. William H. Townsend, interview with John Kirk, April 25, 1993, UNOHC; Jackson interview.
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as a first step forward in race relations the formation of a bi-racial "Little Rock Commission
on Human Relations" that could discuss the issues raised by the organisation. 43 CoCA
took these proposals to other white groups including the Little Rock Board of Education,
the Chamber of Commerce and Little Rock Downtown Limited, a group made up of the
city's influential businessmen. In the light of the divisions which influential whites knew
existed in the black community the proposals by CoCA were not taken seriously. With the
belief that black groups could be stalled indefinitely whites met with black leaders only
intermittently and refused to take any action on their proposals.44
After several months, when all channels for dialogue and co-operation had been
exhausted, CoCA resolved to demonstrate that they were a force to be reckoned with. On
March 8, 1962, twenty-two members of CoCA filed a collective suit against the City Board
of Little Rock for the desegregation of "public parks, recreational facilities, Joseph T.
Robinson Auditorium and all other public facilities." Wiley Branton, hired by CoCA as
legal counsel, was confident of victory. "Without question, the court has always ordered
desegregation of all facilities. The day of separate but equal is out" Branton told reporters.
Apparently, a number of factors had resulted in the case being brought, but, as with the
Freedom Rides, an incident of potentially national embarrassment had acted as catalyst for
the action. The final straw had come when Duke Ellington cancelled his scheduled show at
the Joseph T. Robinson Auditorium in response to criticism by the NAACP that the concert
would be staged in front of a segregated audience.45
At first, the City Board were not entirely hostile to the idea of a programme of
controlled and limited desegregation. H. L. Windburn, one member of the board, seemed
happy to concede that there probably wouldn't be much trouble if blacks were allowed to
' CoCA to City Board of Directors, July 21, 1%!, series 1: office files, box 2, folder 19, "Arkansas
Council on Community Affairs, April 23, 1953-August 2, 1967," ACHRUAF.
Griswold, "The Second Reconstruction," book 2, chapter 6, p. 13.
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use the city's tennis courts. As for the golf course, this might prove more difficult, but
would depend largely upon how blacks "behaved themselves" once they were permitted to
use such facilities. What stiffened Windburn's resistance was the news that the swimming
pool in War Memorial Park had been included on the CoCA list. "Surely they're not going
to use the swimming pool?" gasped Windburn incredulously. Other members of the board
reacted in a similar manner to the news. G. W. Blakenship echoed Windburn's sentiments
that he saw "less problems at the golf courses and tennis courts than other things," refusing
to elaborate what exactly "other things" meant. Several others explicitly declared that they
would close down the city's pools rather than desegregate them. The decision to include the
swimming pools on the list of black demands may have been intended as a bargaining tactic
since Wiley Branton subsequently indicated that CoCA was willing to drop the pools from
the list if other demands were met. However, the very thought of interracial bathing, in
particular the idea of black men potentially mingling with white women in a semi-clad state,
hit at many of the deep-seated psycho-sexual fears and taboos over race-mixing. The
swimming pool issue brought up a wall of resistance amongst members of the City Board
preventing further discussions about the desegregation of any other facilities. Even though
one City Board member admitted that the desegregation of public facilities was "a foregone
conclusion" if the case went to the courts, there was an absolute conimitment to fight the
lawsuit, if only to buy time in order to devise other methods that could avoid desegregation
of the swimming pools.46
In an effort to keep the initiative alter filing the lawsuit against the Little Rock City
Board for the desegregation of publicly owned facilities, CoCA arranged for a meeting with
Little Rock Downtown Limited to table demands for the desegregation of restroom facilities
in the city's stores, an end to segregated lunch counters and better job opportunities for
46 1b1d March 10, 1962.
235
blacks.47 CoCA leaders, having already proved that they were willing to take their
gnevances to court if demands were not met, felt confident that their requests would be
taken seriously. The downtown businessmen were still not prepared to bargain. As with
the City Board, the city's businessmen seemed prepared to draw out litigation in order to
stave off desegregation as long as possible.
Just as student protests had failed without the backing of a unified black community
leadership, the efforts of CoCA, without the type of direct action protest that could create a
sense of urgency to get white businessmen to capitulate to black demands, met with little
success. Only through a two-pronged approach of direct action coupled with a support
network that could help sustain such protests, and articulate the demands of the local black
community, would whites respond to black activism. With the student movement at
Philander Smith decimated by the harsh sentences and fines previously imposed by the
courts, the potential base for direct action was moribund. In an effort to try and revive the
sit-ins, the ACHR asked SNCC head offices in Atlanta if they would lend assistance in
trying to re-vitalise protest in the city. Under the auspices of seasoned civil rights
campaigner Bill Hansen, SNCC would light "the fuse that started stalling business leaders
to make changes."48
When white SNCC volunteer Bill Hansen arrived in Little Rock on October 24,
1962, at 23 years old he was already a veteran of the civil rights movement. Hansen had
first become involved with civil rights activism through his local CORE branch in
Cincinnati, Ohio. In 1961 he travelled to Montgomery to participate in one of the first
Freedom Rides, from Montgomery, Alabama, to Jackson, Mississippi. Arrested en route
Hansen spent one and a half months in a Mississippi jail. After his experience in
Untitled Statement, July 12, 1962, series 1: office files, box 2, folder 19, "Arkansas Council on
Community Affairs, April 23, 1953-August 2, 1967," ACHRUAF.
48 Griswold, "The Second Reconstruction," book two, chapter VI, pp. 15-16.
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Later that afternoon Hansen contacted Philander Smith student Worth Long, whom
he had already met at several national SNCC conferences. 51 Long offered to take Hansen
to a meeting of student activists on campus that evening. At the meeting Hansen witnessed
first-hand the threadbare state of the student movement there. Only seven people turned up.
Even out of those present Hansen failed to detect any "ground-swell of...enthusiasm."
Attempting to generate some interest, Hansen explained the work of SNCC, what it had
already done and achieved, what it planned to do, what it stood for, and the general
structure of the organisation. The meeting concluded on a positive note when Hansen
persuaded a couple of the students present to accompany him downtown the following day
to try and gain service at a segregated lunch counter.52
Hansen used the sit-in to gauge community feeling amongst whites in Little Rock.
At 11.30 a.m. he travelled downtown accompanied by two black students, Bert Strauss
and William Bush. Hansen went into Woolworth's, sat at the lunch counter and ordered a
coffee. Several minutes later Bush sat five seats away and asked for service. After being
refused, Bush went to see the store manager and asked if it was the policy of his store not
to serve blacks. The manager replied it was not store policy but rather city policy. In a field
report to SNCC's Atlanta headquarters about the incident, Hansen noted that "the most
significant thing...was the absolute lack of tension at the counter when Bush was sitting
there." In contrast to the hysteria and violence which similar demonstrations had
encountered in other communities, Hansen noted, hardly anyone took any notice of Bush.
One woman had looked up then carried on eating and another had sat down next to Bush
without apparently even noticing that he was black. Hansen concluded that "the whole
incident gives an indication that there would be no widespread consternation among the
white community if Negroes were served at the lunch counters." As a result, Hansen
1 Worth Long interview with John Kirk, August 8, 1993, UNOHC.
52 Field Report, Thursday October 23, 1962-Thursday November 1, 1962, box 8, folder 5 "Field Reports -
Maryland, Georgia and Arkansas: Hansen, William W," SNCCSHSW.
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advised students that the best way to proceed was to avoid demonstrations if possible,
which might risk a white backlash, but rather to try and quietly convince the managers of
downtown stores that it would be in their best interests to desegregate without any fuss.53
After leaving to vote in his hometown of Cincinnati the following weekend, Hansen
returned to encounter the type of in-fighting and bickering which had thwarted attempts of
blacks to organise effectively in Little Rock previously. The trouble began when black
student William Bush called a meeting of campus activists at Wesley Chapel, next to
Philander Smith, for Monday night. Bush neglected to ask permission from the pastor of
Wesley, Rev. Negail Riley, whose angry reaction when he found out led to the cancellation
of the meeting. Hansen spent two days smoothing out relations between Bush and Riley,
after which Riley agreed to let the students use his church. When the meeting eventually
took place disagreements between Bush and other students emerged on the issue of
whether adults from the black community should be informed of any plans for action by
students. When the majority agreed to invite adult representatives to a further meeting the
following night Bush declared that he would not attend. Subsequently, Bush turned up to
the meeting with his own proposed plan of action and when it was rejected he stormed out.
Worth Long was then elected president of the Student Freedom Movement (SFM) and an
agreement was finally reached that a delegation of students should approach the manager of
Woolworth's store in attempt to negotiate an end to segregated lunch counters there.54
The following Monday morning four students went to Woolworth's to talk to the
manager of the store. At first the manager was reluctant to talk to the student delegation.
However, when they played the role of moderates and warned him that "the students are
pretty worked up over this and we can't hold them off for much longer" the manager began
Ibid.; Arkansas Gazette, November 8, 1962; Arkansas De,nocrat, November 8, 1962.
54 "Field Report, Thursday October 23, 1962-Thursday November 1," 1962, box 8, folder 5, "Field Reports
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to explain that there was little he could do about the situation. In an attempt to stall the
students he asked them to return in a couple of weeks. The students demanded an answer
by Wednesday and left the store. Come Wednesday, the manager told students that he was
trying to work out a solution to the problem with other downtown businessmen and that
counters might soon be desegregated. When pressed on these plans the manager of the
store refused to set a specific date. In response, students sat at the lunch counter, which
was immediately closed. Hansen called newspapers, television and radio stations in order
to publicise the event, as a way of bringing further pressure on the business community to
meet the students' demands. When the police arrived the manager refused to press charges
against the students. By mid-afternoon the students left of their own accord.55
The sit-ins had the intended impact on the business community. Shortly after the
outbreak of new demonstrations, Willard A. Hawkins, executive director of Downtown
Little Rock Limited, contacted Worth Long and informed him that a newly formed
Downtown Negotiating Committee (DNC), headed by James Penwick, manager of
Worthen Bank, were willing to meet with students. Alongside Penwick on the DNC was
Will Mitchell, who had been instrumental in organising the STOP campaign, Arthur
Phillips, who was president of Pfieffer's store, and B. Finley Vinson, who was president
of First National bank. Before meeting with students, Penwick, a well-respected and
powerful figure in the Little Rock business community, met with downtown merchants and
professional leaders to inform them that they must face the choice of risking further
demonstrations or negotiating an end to segregation. During the first two weeks in
November 1962 a delegation from the black community, including both students and adult
leaders from CoCA, met with the DNC to discuss desegregation. Although both sides
agreed that segregation should be brought to an end talks halted abruptly after conflict
Report, Friday November 2, 1962-Wednesday November 7, 1962," box 8, folder 5 "Field Reports
- Maryland, Georgia and Arkansas: Hansen, William W," SNCCSHSW.
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emerged about the timing involved, with the black delegation pressing for change within a
matter of weeks and whites talking about gradual desegregation over a number of years.56
Disillusioned with the results of the talks, Philander Smith students determined to
increase pressure for change by expanding sit-in demonstrations to Waigreen's,
McClellan's and Blass's stores, as well as Woolworth's. The demonstrations led to the
first arrests in over a year. The protests began at Waigreen's where nine students asked for
service at a segregated lunch counter. The manager immediately wheeled out his sign
reading "This counter is closed in the interests of public safety." This time the students
refused to leave. In hour-long shifts, Hansen ferried students between Philander Smith and
Waigreen's. As the third shift took their places at the lunch counter one of the students
from the second shift tried to return into the store to pass a message to a friend. The
manager angrily stood in the way and refused the student access. Hansen and Long
watched as the situation "got rather nasty." When they realised the manager was close to
losing his temper they entered the store by another door and sat at the lunch counter in
order to find out what would happen if they refused to obey his orders. When Hansen and
Long refused to leave the lunch counter the store manager called the police and had them
arrested. The arrests helped muster more support from campus, with over one hundred
Philander Smith students holding a march downtown the following day. At a rally that
evening COCA offered their backing for the demonstrations by providing the $1000 bond
money for the release of the two arrested students.57
The new burst of demonstrations brought the city's businessmen back to the
negotiating table. Rather than risk the potential damage of a prolonged battle over
desegregation a decision was made to seek a compromise. Eventually, after further
56 Spitzberg, Racial Politics, pp. 143-144; Vinson interview; Sutton interview.
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haggling, an agreement was reached to desegregate downtown lunch counters in the early
months of 1963. James Penwick took charge of the operation by approaching the store
manager at Woolworth's, opposite Worthen Bank's downtown headquarters, and
explaining that the DNC had reached an agreement with students that lunch counters would
desegregate in return for an end to demonstrations. The manager at Woolworth's agreed to
go along with the plan if other stores were also willing to participate. Penwick used this
tentative agreement to persuade other stores to adhere to the arrangements for
desegregation. When the major downtown stores agreed to co-operate, store managers,
businessmen, and representatives from the black community, met to discuss arrangements
for desegregation. It was agreed that initially a small delegation from the black community
would ask for service at particular stores at a set date and time. At first the black groups
would stay only for a short while and, by prearrangment over the course of the next few
weeks, increase the numbers of those served and the length of their stay. Both the local
police and staff at lunch counters were to be notified of what was to happen beforehand in
order to avoid any confusion.58
On January 2, 1963, Woolworth's, McClellan's, Walgreen's and Blass's all
desegregated their lunch counters.59
 The only dissension in the whole process came from
Amis Gutheridge of the CCC who led a handful of die-hard segregationists in a picket of
stores, carrying placards such as "Gus Blass Company serves niggers out of the same
plates as whites." When the picketing had no effect whatsoever the demonstrations ceased.
Not only did the white community ignore the segregationist contingent, but, as Hansen
observed, many actually went out of their way to eat at desegregated lunch counters to ease
and Piucedures for Making Changes," series 1, box 19, folder 190 "LR Downtown,"
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242
the process.6° The whole event took place under a blanket of media silence to avoid
adverse publicity that might stir up widespread opposition. The lack of local newspaper,
television or radio coverage came at the request of the city's businessmen and, in the
perceived interests of the community, the owners of those companies agreed to comply.61
Not until January 20 did the first reports of desegregation emerge in a Pine Bluff
newspaper that revealed the "secret."62
The successful desegregation of the major lunch counters prompted smaller
businesses to follow suit shortly afterwards. Moreover, by the end of January several
major hotels, motels and a downtown bowling alley had desegregated. 63 In June, the city's
movie theatres and Robinson Auditorium were opened to blacks. By October most of the
city's restaurants had desegregated, as, by the end of the year, had all city parks,
playgrounds, golf courses, the Little Rock Zoo and the Arts Centre. Negotiations to
upgrade black employment in stores, banks and other downtown businesses were already
underway. At the end of 1963, without drama or fuss, Little Rock had desegregated
virtually all its public facilities.64
Ironically, the changes taking place at Little Rock captured media attention precisely
because of the notable absence of tensions surrounding desegregation there. Little Rock's
rediscovered image of racial progress contrasted starkly with the major upheavals
surrounding desegregation in other southern cities, such as Birmingham, Alabama, where
60 News Release, Jan. 24, 1963, reel 19, frame 176, folder 88 "Arkansas Little Rock, Dec. 1, 1962-July
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in 1963 Chief of Police Eugene Connor was using police dogs and spray from fire hoses to
break up black demonstrations. The New York Times ran a feature-length story about the
calm and peaceful desegregation in Little Rock that the business community were eager to
promote. James Forman, executive secretary of SNCC, heralded the city as "just about the
most integrated.., in the south." Local black leaders indicated that they were pleased with
the progress that had been made. Both Ozell Sutton and Dr. William Townsend agreed
when interviewed that the major change which had taken place in the city since 1957 was
the new-found unity within the black community. "Negroes realise they can do things on
their own behalf" Sutton said, adding that it was this fact which had forced the white
community to confront the racial situation in the city. Despite the cautious optimism,
however, there were also reservations, as Gertrude Samuels pointed out in her New York
Titnes article, entitled "Little Rock -- Tokenism Plus." Whilst Little Rock was making great
strides in some areas, Samuels noted, there were still pockets of resistance to change, most
notably in the schools. At a school assembly in Central High, Samuels spotted only 20
black students out of more than two thousand whites. In classrooms and at the school
cafeteria, blacks were left isolated, sitting on their own notjust by choice but because of a
definite hesitancy amongst white students to accept them fully into the school community.
Many school clubs and societies counselled against participation by blacks. Black students
still spoke of the "limitations" placed on them in white schools. As Samuels observed, all
these signs begged the question of whether Little Rock's desegregation was in fact a
genuine recognition of black equality or simply a public relations exercise by the business
community to avoid further demonstrations.65
Blacks sought an answer to Samuel's question as they began to focus on the lack of
progress made in school desegregation toward the end of 1963. School board members
65 John Britton, "Image Makers Erasing 1957 from the City's Calendar," Jet, 23 pp. 14-19, April 4,
1963; Gertrude Samuels, "Little Rock Revisited -- Tokenism Plus," New York Tunes Magazine, June 2,
1963, pp. 13, 57-59.
244
were reluctant to press ahead with desegregation in the same manner as the downtown
businessmen for a number of reasons. Foremost was the fact that the school board did not
have the same standing in the community as the businessmen or the power to hide their
actions behind secret negotiations and a media blackout. Particularly since the schools had
provided a focal point for resistance in the community to racial change in the past, the
school board remained reticent in taking any positive steps to desegregate. Compounding
these problems was the fact that some members of the school board were less than
sympathetic to the idea of desegregation, with some still outrightly hostile to the notion.
What remained unclear was how the school board would react to pressure from a united
black community, which had been absent previously, to speed the course of desegregation.
The challenge black activists now faced was to find a way to address the problem of school
desegregation that would be as effective in persuading the school board to co-operate as
their efforts with the downtown business community had been.
CoCA arranged to meet with the school board on August 29, 1963, to put forward
their proposals for racial progress in the city's schools. Rev. Negail Riley, chair of
CoCA's Education Committee, presented the school board with a document entitled
"Integration -- An Unfinished Business." The document stated the views of CoCA that
school desegregation in Little Rock was taking place at a "painfully slow" pace. CoCA
complained that nine years after the Brown decision, six years after the school crisis and
four years after the schools had reopened on a supposedly integrated basis, only two per
cent of the 6,500 black students in Little Rock attended integrated schools. To improve the
schools situation CoCA proposed the abandonment of the Pupil Assignment plan, full
participation of black students in all activities, the desegregation of Little Rock Vocational
school, employment of black educators in administrative offices, increased salaries for
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professional and non-professional staff and the formation of an interracial advisory
committee on schools.66
Several weeks later, in a formal reply to CoCA's proposals, the school board
indicated that it would not make any concessions. The school board pointed out that the
Pupil Assignment plan was agreed by court order and that they were legally obliged to
carry it out. To answer the charge that the school board did not allow full participation by
blacks in school facilities, a list was produced of school clubs which had interracial
memberships. As far as Little Rock Vocational school was concerned, the school board
claimed that the institution was already desegregated but had not yet received suitable
applications from black students. The demand for employment of black administrators in
the schools system was met with the curt reply that the school board "hired on merit, not
color." The demand for better wages was answered by the observation that school board
looked to raise salaries where it could. As far as the formation of a bi-racial conimittee was
concerned, the school board argued, the proposal could not be considered since it was out
of the board'sjurisdiction to appoint such a body.67
Further representations to the school board met with an equally frosty reception.
Frustrated with the lack of progress CoCA, in consultation with SNCC and local students,
attempted to use direct action as a way of breaking the deadlock. On March 22, 1964,
CoCA and SNCC issued ajoint statement which declared that a boycott of the city's
schools by all black students would take place on April 6 to "dramatise to the city, the state
and the nation" the poor progress made in desegregating the schools at Little Rock, and the
city's unwillingness to listen to the "legitimate grievances" of the black community.68
66 CoCA to Board of Education, Little Rock Public Schools, August 29, 1963, series 1, box 2, folder 19
"Arkansas Council on Community Affairs, April 23, 1953-August 2, 1967," ACHRUAF.
67 Minutes of the Little Rock School District Board of Directors Executive Meeting, November 21, 1963,
Little Rock School Board Minutes, Special Collections Division, University of Arkansas Libraries, Little
Rock (collection hereinafter cited as LRSBUALR).
68 Arkansas Gazelle, March 22, 19.
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When the school board met on March 25, representatives from CoCA and SNCC picketed
outside the meeting with placards reading "Total Integration, not Token Integration." In a
surprise move at the meeting the school board, without comment or explanation, voted to
extend the plan for desegregation of schools to all twelve grades the following term. The
pickets outside, however, remained less than impressed at the news, especially since the
school board also announced that the policy of banning lateral transfers of students between
schools after initial entry, which meant that the majority of black students already attending
black schools would not be able to move, would still be in effect. CoCA and SNCC
dismissed the news which, they argued, did little to halt the "continuation of tokenism."69
Most whites in Little Rock opposed the idea of a school boycott but there was some
sympathy with blacks over the schools situation. The Arkansas Gazette called on the school
board to open channels of communication with CoCA in response to the "need.. .for
meaningful negotiation." 7° The Greater Little Rock Ministerial Alliance suggested the
formation of a bi-racial committee and offered assistance in helping to convene a meeting.7'
Russell H. Matson, Jr., president of the school board, told the press that he thought a bi-
racial committee was a "fine" idea. Others were less convinced. In particular, J. H.
Cottrell, another member of the school board, announced that he was "sick and tired of
having the Arkansas Gazette tell us how to run [our business]" and refused to have
anything to do with the "communist influenced" SNCC. Albeit in a less overtly hostile
manner, other school board members voiced their reservations about holding talks with
CoCA and SNCC.72
Meanwhile, CoCA and SNCC continued to make preparations for the boycott.
Plans were laid to open "freedom schools" on the day of the demonstration so that no black
69 Ibid., March 25, 1964.
70 Ibid., March 26, 1964.
71 Ibid., March 27, 1964.
72 Ibid., March 27, 28, 1964.
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students would miss out on classes and leaflets were handed out in the black community
urging parents to "Take Them Out To Get Them In."73 Black leaders announced that there
would be a rally on March 30 at Miles Chapel CME Church in order to "inform the Negro
community of the purposes and objectives of the school boycott" with John Lewis, national
chairman of SNCC, due to address the crowd on the "need for complete participation and
unity." Other speakers would be on hand to explain the organisation of the boycott and
how the freedom schools would work. Clifford Vaughs, a SNCC representative, told
reporters that SNCC and CoCA had notified the United States attorney general, the Justice
Department and the Civil Rights Commission about their grievances and intended actions.
Rev. Negail Riley indicated that the idea of the boycott was gaining increased support in the
black community and was confident of its success.74
The school board had obviously underestimated the resolve of the black community
to carry out its threats and tried to arrange a meeting with black leaders in order to get the
proposed boycott called off. The afternoon before the CoCA rally was due to take place
Russell Matson invited a group of black and white leaders to discuss the situation. As the
meeting opened it became clear that the school board intended it to be a stage-managed
attempt to discredit CoCA and weaken the chances of the boycott's success. I. S.
McClinton spoke first and announced that he was a member of CoCA but disapproved of
the boycott. A number of ADVA members present at the meeting backed up his statement.
Charles Bussey followed with a speech on his reservations about the boycott and inferred
that CoCA did not speak for the entire black community.75
Ozell Sutton, determined not to let the school board get away with its scurrilous
attempts to side-track the discussion into a question of divisions within the black
' 
"Take Them Out To Get Them In," series 1, box 2, folder 19 "Arkansas Council on Community
Affairs, April 23, 1953-August 2, 1967," ACHRUAF; Arkansas Gazette, March 26, 1964.
Arkansas Gazette, Mach 29, 1964.
75 Ibid., March31, 1964.
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community and the legitimacy of CoCA, leapt to his feet and demanded to know "What's
the design here?" He informed the school board that if he had been told they were going to
"invite a few of their friends in the Negro community" he would have invited "a few of my
friends in the white community" who supported the boycott. What about the real issues?
Sutton asked. Why were black students being barred from participation in certain school
clubs? Why was the school board using the Pupil Assignment law to limit desegregation
rather than promote it? Flummoxed by the turn of events members of the school board
mumbled unconvincing excuses to Sutton's questions and countered with the feeble
accusation that CoCA was acting irresponsibly and that its planned boycott would do more
harm than good if it went ahead. In a last effort to avert the boycott taking place Matson
asked Sutton what the school board would have to do to compromise. Sutton replied that if
the school board appointed a bi-racial committee to deal with racial issues in the schools
and allowed black students full participation in all school activities with immediate effect,
CoCA would reconsider its position. Matson closed the meeting by telling Sutton that he
would raise his proposals at the next school board meeting.76
At the planned rally held afterwards Ozell Sutton told the crowd that he was "totally
disappointed" as a result of the meeting with the school board. In particular, he directed his
anger at the attempts of the school board to exploit divisions within the black community
asserting "That's an old trick and I can assure you it ain't going to work." John Lewis
addressed the rally after Sutton, urging members of the community not to relent until their
demands had been met. As for allegations that SNCC was communist inspired, Lewis
retorted "How long will it take the American people to realise that we don't need an outside
body or foreign force to tell us that segregation is wrong?" The rally ended with a rendition
of freedom songs and a collection to help finance the freedom schools.77
76 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
249
The day after the rally Russell Matson called a crisis meeting of the school board.
At 4.00 p.m., the time allotted for the meeting, only one school board member, Ted Lamb,
turned up. When two other members of the school board called to say that they would not
be attending, Lamb left. Matson appeared soon after and told pressmen waiting outside that
"I guess there won't be a meeting." J. H. Cottrell, one of the non-attendees, revealed that
the reason he had not turned up to discuss a compromise was the speech delivered by John
Lewis which, he said, made it patently "obvious that this whole thing is being run from
Atlanta and not by local people." Lamb, highlighting the fact that there were divisions
within the school board, disagreed with Cottreil's comments and admitted that the boycott
was being carried out by "responsible negro... parents." It was up to the school board,
Lamb maintained, to recognise this and act accordingly.78
As the weekend approached, with no sign that the black community was willing to
back down in its determination to continue with the boycott the following Monday, panic
began to set in. On Thursday afternoon Little Rock Superintendent of Schools Floyd W.
Parsons sent letters to all black parents urging them not to partake in the boycott and to put
the welfare of their children and their education first. This was backed up with a threat to
put a mark of disapproval permanently on the school record of each black student who did
not turn up for classes. On Friday morning the school board met in a last ditch attempt to
stop the boycott from taking place. This time everyone attended. An hour later the school
board released a statement, backed by four of its six members, which acknowledged that all
black students should be allowed to participate fully in all school activities, asserted that
applicants to Little Rock Vocational school would be admitted solely on the basis of
qualifications, that applicants forjobs in the schools system would be considered without
regard to race, that a commitment would be made to raising school workers' salaries and a
promise to apply the Pupil Assignment plan in schools "without prejudice or bias." The
78 Ibid., April 2, 3, 1964.
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statement differed in tone rather than substance to the reply the school board had given
previously to CoCA's proposals and offered little new. What the statement did do,
however, was indicate that the majority of the school board were now willing to take a
more positive attitude toward racial issues in the future even if the delicate balance of
opinions restricted any definite commitments being made.79
In the afternoon CoCA called a meeting of the executive committee to discuss the
board's proposals. After much discussion Dr. Townsend announced that the school
boycott would be postponed to allow the school board time to show that they intended to
keep the promises outlined in their statement. A rally held by CoCA that night turned out to
be a low-key affair with less than 60 people present, indicative of the anti-climax which
many in the black community felt at the decision to back down from carrying out the
boycott. In contrast, whites were more than pleased with the outcome. Russell Matson
acknowledged that he believed "each side of the controversy understands each other a little
better now" but stressed that the school board's statement represented nothing more than a
confirmation of policies that already existed. An Arkansas Gazette editorial proclaimed that
"reason triumphed over racial antagonisms" and that the school board had made
"substantive concessions" which CoCA had "accepted.. .in a spirit of reciprocal
conciliation."80 In another article published in the same paper, a very different view was
put forward by the reporter who had covered events at the meeting. He echoed the opinions
of some dissenters in the black community that "it looked as if COCA gave up the school
boycott too quickly and too easily."8'
Whether the decision by CoCA to call off the school boycott represented a climb
down that potentially sold black activism short, or was in fact a shrewd decision not to put
Ibid., April 4, 1964.
80Ibid.
81 Ibid., April 5, 19&).
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black community activism to the test and risk embarrassment if it failed to generate
widespread support, the bold stance by its leaders was in itself significant. The ability of
CoCA to fluster white officials and eke out concessions, however slight, was a far cry
from the disarray of black activism in the immediate aftermath of the Little Rock school
crisis. Through their backing of the sit-ins and the school boycott, CoCA demonstrated that
the new leadership group of professionals represented a force to be reckoned with. By
nurturing a new set of protest leaders while maintaining the respect and co-operation (albeit
sometimes reluctantly) of older leaders and their constituencies of support, CoCA managed
to provide a level of community cohesion which blacks had struggled to sustain in the past.
With impressive returns already apparent, CoCA now looked to extend its activities across
the state, encouraging the formation of similar organisations at a county-wide level to co-
ordinate black activism. Like its forbearer the CNO, political organisation and mobilisation
would prove to be one of its most enduring and successful endeavours.
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CONCLUSION
The 1966 campaign for the office of governor offered a clear choice to voters in
Arkansas. On the one hand was Jim Johnson, a candidate representing racial bigotry,
nominated to stand for the Democratic party in the absence of Orval Faubus who had
announced his political retirement. As a die-hard southerner and head of the ACCA, from
the outset Johnson ran an overtly racist campaign, declaring "I'm not campaigning amongst
the colored community" and refusing to shake hands with any blacks on his electioneering
trail.' On the other hand Republicans nominated Winthrop Rockefeller, who came from
one of America's wealthiest families based in the North. Rockefeller had been appointed as
head of Arkansas's Industrial Development Commission by Governor Faubus and ran
unsuccessfully against the old political campaigner in the 1964 gubernatorial election.
Rockefeller's views on race were not well known, and, indeed, he appeared to lack any
clearly defined position on the matter. However, it was clear from the way Rockefeller ran
his ranch at Petit Jean mountain in north-west Arkansas -- with Jimmy Hudson, a black
friend from the North, in charge of its day-to-day running -- that he did not conform to the
traditional racial etiquette of the state. John Ward, one of Rockefeller's chief campaign
managers, thought his views on race relations could best be described as "color-blind," that
is, he did not have any definite or specific programme to better the position of blacks across
the state, but would run his office on a non-discriminatory basis.2
Given the choice between a down-the-line good old poor-boy southern
segregationist and a wealthy Yankee with suspect liberal tendencies, the Arkansas electorate
chose the latter --just. Rockefeller edged the election by only 49,121 votes, in a 306,324 to
257,203 split. The general consensus in the state was that the 80,000 black voters who cast
Arkansas Gazelle, December 11, 12, 1966.
2 John L. Ward, The Arkansas Rockefeller (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), pp.
159- 178.
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their ballots for Rockefeller swung the election decisively in his favour. Since many blacks
were still unsure about Rockefeller's intentions with regard to race relations, the anti-
Johnson vote seemed more significant than positive enthusiasm for the new governor. As
Dr. Garman Freeman of CoCA put it "You can solidify us more when you get us against
something." Throughout his term in office Faubus had managed to keep blacks solidly in
the Democratic camp, despite his actions in the Little Rock school crisis. By appointing
blacks to various political offices, presenting himself as the candidate of the poor who
would increase welfare payments, and cultivating links with key black politicians, Faubus
retained an overwhelming number of black votes. Johnson was a different prospect
altogether: his outright hostility to the black population meant that no black leader could
convince anyone that he possessed any redeeming features. Therefore, in the 1966 election,
according to one observer, "the Negro leadership [hadj the choice of either supporting
Rockefeller or keeping quiet."3
Many factors combined to enhance the capacity of the black electorate to influence
the 1966 gubernatorial election. The most important was the change made to the state's
voting laws in 1964, replacing the poll tax in favour of a voter registration system. Under
the poll tax regime whites, particularly in the densely populated eastern Arkansas delta
region, had been able to abuse the political system. Through paying black poii taxes,
whites could coerce the black population to "block vote" in the way they were told to.
Blacks, out of fear of reprisals, deference, or simply because they knew that there were no
candidates to vote for who would be sympathetic to them anyway, usually went along with
whites. Since there was no system in place to check on who turned up and voted, many
blacks in eastern Arkansas cast their ballots in elections over a number of years without
ever being aware that they had actually done so -- whites simply paid their poii tax and
voted on their behalf without telling them. The new voter registration system introduced to
Arkansas Gazelle, December 11, 12, 1966.
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Arkansas the novel concept of individual accountability for the franchise. The onus for
voting was specifically with the individual voter who was required to register with the
county clerk in person. Doing so cost nothing, removing the financial barrier from blacks
who still lived in poverty in eastern Arkansas. Moreover, the new set-up involved a
permanent voter registration system, which meant that blacks did not have to go through
the ordeal of registering to vote every year -- once on the rolls they kept the right to vote
indefinitely. The new system also took the significant step of removing racial designation
from voter qualification records, effectively desegregating the ballot.4
According to organisations who helped to mobilise the black electorate under the
new system, many whites quickly resigned themselves to the inevitability of an expanded
black political presence. Indeed, the major obstacle to black voter registration was less
centred on white resistance than the problems of overcoming the life-long acculturalisation
of many blacks to a meaningless participation in politics that was perceived merely as an
instrument of white oppression. In order to get blacks to register to vote, they had first to
be convinced that possessing the franchise would actually make a difference to them.
Therefore, the main task of those attempting to mobilise the black vote was to convince the
black electorate that voting could return tangible gains. This involved the painstaking work
of explaining to black voters the concept of how democracy was supposed to work and
how turning up to vote on election day could translate into getting commitments for basic
improvements such as "sewage facilities, lights, paved streets and roads" in their own
communities.5
A co-ordinated campaign run by various groups to explain how to vote and to raise
the political consciousness of the black community, in order to demonstrate the potential for
change which voting held, was integral to the decisive impact of black votes on the 1966
Ibid., October 23, 1966; Dccember 12, 1966.
Ibid.
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election. The provision of the vital funding to carry out this monumental task came largely
through the offices of the Voter Education Project (VEP). The VEP had its origins in the
wishes of the Kennedy administration to move the focus of the civil rights movement away
from mass demonstrations and marches, which could prove highly embarrassing to federal
government, towards what they (in particular, Attorney General Robert Kennedy)
mistakenly believed would be the easier task of registering black voters who could then
exercise influence through the ballot box. Grossly underestimating the hostility that a voter
registration campaign would actually entail in many areas of the South, the Justice
Department civil rights chief, Burke Marshall, held talks with the outgoing executive
director of the Southern Regional Council, Harold C. Fleming, and wealthy philanthropist
Stephen R. Currier, to try to establish a privately funded, non-partisan black voter
registration drive across the South. Such a scheme, Marshall believed, would provide the
financing and co-ordination of various civil rights groups that the task of mass registration
of the black community would inevitably require. SNCC, CORE, the NAACP, the
National Urban League (NUL) and SCLC all eagerly endorsed the plan. The VEP was
subsequently established under the tax-exempt auspices of the SRC, with its own director
to oversee the distribution of funds and responsibilities to local representatives and civil
rights affiliates.6
When Wiley Branton, a native Arkansan, was appointed as director of the VEP
upon its launch in 1962, blacks in the state eagerly anticipated funding of voter registration
efforts. These hopes were dashed when the VEP refused funds to Arkansas, as well as to
Texas, because neither had a permanent voter registration system. VEP representatives felt
that the absence of such a system in those two states would drain too much funding since
voter registration efforts would have to be repeated on a yearly basis. Only when Arkansas
adopted its new voter registration system in 1964 were VEP funds committed to the state.
6 Garrow, Bearing 1/ic Cross, pp. 161-164.
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Subsequently, in July 1964 blacks from across the state met in Little Rock to form the
Arkansas Voter Project (AVP). The black leadership in Little Rock was instrumental in the
leadership of the AVP, with Ozell Sutton elected head of the Project in Arkansas with Dr.
W. H. Townsend as chairman. Townsend named a steering committee of influential black
leaders from various communities to help co-ordinate activities at a local grassroots level.7
Although envisaged as a state-wide project, the AVP placed a heavy emphasis on
eastern Arkansas, particularly in the heavily populated black counties. Reminiscent of the
first major attempt to encourage mass black political participation in politics by the CNO
over twenty years earlier, the AVP looked to "All leaders of civic, social, political, fraternal
and religious organisations" to exercise their influence and mobilise local resources in order
to make the voter registration campaign a success. One notable difference from earlier
campaigns, however, was the increased involvement of the black church. Whereas in
earlier voter registration efforts business, civic and social organisations had played the
major role, now black clergymen, perhaps responding to the region-wide efforts of the
black church, specifically of the SCLC and Martin Luther King, Jr., were far more
prominent, preaching voter registration from the pulpit and utilising church membership as
an organisational base to mobilise voter registration efforts. A significant role was also
played by the extension of new technologies largely unavailable to the CNO in earlier
decades, such as television and radio. KOKY-Little Rock, a black-oriented radio station
established in the 1950s, announced on the hour where black electors should go to register
to vote and urged them to do so. Overcoming the drawback of being unable to effectively
pamphleteer a largely illiterate black electorate in eastern Arkansas, the T.V. and radio
waves, provided an effective form of communication. As Dr. Garman Freeman of CoCA
noted "People who can't read fluently can watchT.V. or listen to the radio." Within just the
' Arkansas Gazette, August 2, 1964.
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first three month of campaigning, the AVP claimed to have registered 12,000 new black
voters.8
SNCC proved extremely influential in assisting the voter registration efforts of the
AVP in eastern Arkansas. After Bill Hansen had successfully helped to organise the student
demonstrations in Little Rock that led to desegregation of downtown facilities, he had
moved to Pine Bluff, liasing with students at Pine Bluff AM&N college and established
black leaders there to form the Pine Bluff movement. Preliminary efforts at desegregating
downtown Pine Bluff proved unsuccessful, but, after an effective boycott of downtown
businesses, accompanied by further demonstrations and arrests, downtown lunch counters
and theatres were finally integrated. Hansen, along with Ben Grinage, a local black
student, and other white volunteers sent from Atlanta, established Pine Bluff as a centre of
operations for an Arkansas SNCC project designed to tackle the deep-seated racism that
existed in many of the eastern Arkansas delta counties. From 1963 onwards SNCC
attempted to develop "a comprehensive voter registration drive in Eastern Arkansas." In
line with the SNCC philosophy, hand-in-hand with voter registration efforts were attempts
to help build a trained and active civil rights leadership at a grassroots level to enable local
people to take control of and direct their own efforts for black advancement. Based at
Forrest City, SNCC helped with the formation of the St. Francis County Achievement
Committee (SFCAC) and at Gould, SNCC aided local people in founding the Gould
Citizens' for Progress (GCP). A few years ahead of the AVP, SNCC helped to begin the
organi sing and mobilising efforts in local black communities which funding from the VEP
enabled to expand. Again, although SNCC workers were largely unaware of it, their work
built upon efforts by W. H. Flowers and the CNO in earlier years who had been the first to
form a basic skeletal structure for black organisation, mobilisation and voter registration
8 Ibid., August 2, 1964; Dcccmbcr 12, 1966; Ozcll Sutton to Wiley Branton, September 12, 1964, reel
184, series VI, folder 387, "VEP 4-32, Arkansas Voter Project, Arkansas, Little Rock, July 28, 1964 -
Apr. 13, 1965," SRCLC.
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efforts. The very fact that SNCC chose Pine Bluff as its base was testimony to the pre-
established potential of the town with its network of black organisations already
experienced in civil rights work.9
Meanwhile, in Little Rock, CoCA, and in particular Dr. W. H. Townsend,
continued to lead by example. As efforts were made to set up county CoCA affiliates across
Arkansas that could provide similar state and local co-ordinating "organisation of
organisations" committees, Townsend continued to seek election to office in order to
demonstrate that blacks possessed the ability to have a say in the way that local and state
politics were run. Townsend first ran for office in 1962 in an unsuccessful bid to win
election onto the City Manager Board. 10 Four years later, standing for the same position,
Townsend was again defeated. 11 In 1969, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller nominated
Townsend to a term on the State Board of Education, but the Arkansas Senate vetoed the
move. 12 Although unsuccessful in these attempts, each bid had an important psychological
effect in demonstrating to the black community that there were blacks in the state who were
willing to take on the white power structure. Moreover, the presence of a black candidate
on the ballot aided black voter registration efforts by giving the black community a
candidate to vote for who would stand up for their interests. Townsend was finally
rewarded for his efforts in the 1972 gubernatorial elections when he was elected to Position
II in District III of the Arkansas House of Representatives.'3
Winthrop Rockefeller's campaign for governor in 1966 also helped to bolster the
impact of the black vote. Alongside the work of civil rights organisations, Rockefeller's
considerable personal resources were ploughed into the campaign, a portion of them
An overview of SNCC operations in Arkansas can be found in the guide to SNCCSHSW.
10 Arkansas Gazelle, September 27, 1962.
Ibid., November 7, 1966.
' 2 lbid March26, 1969.
' 3 Ibid., February 4, 1973.
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specifically geared toward registering and securing the votes of the black electorate. Both
the Republicans and, more significantly, the "Democrats for Rockefeller" campaign, sought
out influential black leaders to help to direct voting efforts in local areas. This was done out
of the public glare in order to avoid a white "backlash" that might be caused if Johnson
exploited the still sensitive issue of race. "We had an excellent volunteer organisation in the
Negro community as well as the white community [both of which worked at securing black
votes]" said Dr. Wayne H. Babbitt, Rockefeller's campaign organiser, after the election.
"That's how we got out the vote." One of the groups foremost in the white community's
efforts to cultivate links with blacks were the state's Unions, a growing force after the
merger of the ClO and AFL in the mid-1950s, led in Arkansas by Bill Becker. Ex-members
of the WEC, in particular Irene Samuels who co-ordinated an extensive campaign on behalf
of Rockefeller across the state, also played an important role in black voter registration
efforts.'4
The efforts of the VEP, AVP, SNCC, CoCA, NAACP, Rockefeller, Labor Unions
and ex-members of the WEC, amongst others, had a profound impact on the black
electorate in Arkansas, both in the election of 1966 and the years afterwards. This was
evident in the rapid growth of black voters and in the election of black officials. By 1972,
according to statistics complied by the VEP, Arkansas's 99 black elected officials ranked
second only to Alabama's 117. Across the state black officials comprised 36 aldermen, 19
justices of the peace, 12 school board members, five city recorders, five mayors, four city
treasurers, three state representatives (including Dr. Townsend), two city clerks, one state
senator (Dr. Jerry Jewell, who succeeded Daisy Bates to the presidency of the Arkansas
NAACP State Conference of Branches in 1962), one city director (Perlesta A.
Hollingworth in Little Rock) and one vice-mayor (Charles Bussey in Little Rock). 15 By the
14 1b1d., October 28, December 12, 1966; John Ward, interview with John Kirk, April 28, 1993, UNOHC.
15 Arkansas Gazette, February 4, 1973.
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mid-1970s, an estimated 92% of Arkansas's black population were registered voters, the
highest number in any southern state.'6
These developments wrought a sea-change in the political culture of the state.
Rockefeller was successfully re-elected to governor in 1968. When Dale Bumpers, a
Democratic party nominee, won the race for office in 1970, the bastion of white supremacy
for many years had undergone a thorough re-examination of its ideals and priorities. No
longer could a candidate like Jim Johnson be countenanced and the political realities of
black influence marked a fundamental shift in the party. Bumpers was the first in a line of
Democratic governors of Arkansas to embrace new racially enlightened ideals and make
open and active efforts to encourage black participation in politics. As at a national level,
the Democratic party in Arkansas became the party of black rights. The black vote at the
state level was vital in securing the post of governor for Bill Clinton in the 1980s, just as
the national black vote was a part of his successful campaign for President of the United
States in 1992 and 1996. In the absence of Clinton's successor to governor, Jim Guy
Tucker, who was attending the presidential inauguration ceremony in January 1993, Jeny
Jewell, as president pro-temprore of the Arkansas senate, became the first black to assume
the duties of the head of state.
Despite the spectacular gains in the political arena in the late 1960s, blacks still
struggled to translate political power into direct and tangible gains. One area in which
blacks believed that growing political power might have an impact was in appointments to
state agencies. Rockefeller had the opportunity to reward political support by placing blacks
into important governmental positions that might prove a training ground for, and stepping
stone to, jobs in the private sector. Rockefeller was keen to advance the best and brightest
in the Arkansas black population in order to keep the young and ambitious in the state as
16 Lawson, Running for Freedo,n, p. 228.
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role models and leaders. In order to achieve this, Rockefeller set up a Governor's Council
on Human Resources (GCHR), headed by Ozell Sutton, to address the issue of black
employment. Initially, Rockefeller tried to establish the GCHIR with state funds but when
the state senate blocked these proposals he drew upon money from the Winrock
Foundation to subsidise a private agency.17
In the four years of Rockefeller's administration there were notable achievements.
When Rockefeller assumed the duties of head of state in 1966 there were around 325 black
state employees, with only 30 holding supervisory positions; by the time he left office in
1970 there were 1,800 black state employees, with 170 in administrative positions.
Rockefeller appointed blacks to many state jobs, boards and commissions that had
previously never been open to them. Out of the appointments which Rockefeller made, the
most notable was William "Sonny" Walker as state director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO), an agency set up as part of President Lyndon Johnson's War on
Poverty programme. Walker became the first black to serve as the head of a state agency in
Arkansas and was the only black state OEO director in the South. Other appointments
included W. L. Currie to the state Board of Correction, Elijah Coleman to the Board of
Trustees of the predominantly white Arkansas State University, Fred Oakley to the Board
of Pardons and Paroles and George Howard, Jr., to the State Claims Commission. Black
representation on state Draft Boards increased dramatically. Although not all Rockefeller's
efforts were successful -- the state senate turned down both John Walker and Dr. William
Townsend as appointees to the State Board of Education, for example -- many blacks were
encouraged by the progress made. Some promising young blacks who had left the state
were actually persuaded to return to Arkansas specifically because of the commitment of
Rockefeller to appoint and promote in a non-discriminatory manner.18
17 John L. Ward, The Arka,zsas Rockefeller, pp. 159-178; Ward interview.18 Arkansas Gazette March 23, 1969; John Ward, The Arkansas Rockefeller, pp. 159-178.
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Yet the Republican governor also had his critics. At the end of Rockefeller's term of
office in 1970 Jerry Jewel! remained "unimpressed by the progress allegedly made." Jewel!
claimed that the impact of "appointments is more illusionary than real because it doesn't
make much difference when you appoint one Negro to a 10 member board." Certainly,
Rockefeller's record was open to criticism. Just a year before Rockefeller left office records
showed that only 579 out of 12,383 positions controlled by the governor were black
appointments, a total of around 5%. Of these appointments, two-thirds belonged to the
lowest seven of the twenty state government salary grades. In the bottom seven grades
there were 413 black state employees; in the next five 49; in the next seven, the highest,
only three. Blacks thus held 527 jobs on the lower end of the scale and just 52 in the upper
half. In offices not controlled by the governor the situation was even worse. Out of 265
state employees in the Game and Fish Commission only one, a long-time janitor, was
black. All 21 employees of the State Auditors office were white. At the State Highway
Department only 40 out of 3,709 employees were black and most of these were hired as
janitors or groundskeepers; the highest-ranking office held by a black was as a key-punch
operator. In the secretary of state's office the existing policy was that blacks were not
sought for positions above ajanitorial level.'9
Little headway was made in the desegregation of schools. In 1964 a group of
parents, aided by the NAACP, had launched a new lawsuit against the Little Rock school
board, attacking the Pupil Assignment plan. On April 22, 1965, the Little Rock school
board announced that it would abandon its Pupil Assignment plan in favour of a "Freedom
of Choice Policy." The action, motivated by the dual pressures of the lawsuit and the threat
of losing federal funds if the school board did not comply with provisions laid down under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, resulted in other school districts across the state swiftly
following Little Rock's lead. Doing away with the testing, evaluation and hearings required
19 Arkansas Gazelle, March 23, 1%9, November 29, 1970.
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by the Pupil Assignment plan, which were not permitted under the new legislation, the
Freedom of Choice plan allowed students entering kindergarten or first grade and those
going into junior or senior high, to state a preference of which school they would like to
attend. Regardless of race, these choices would be honoured if there was enough room in
the school chosen by the student. If there was not enough room, students would be
assigned to their second choice of school. Students already assigned to schools would
remain there and lateral transfers would be allowed "only in the event of unusual
circumstance [5]." Furthermore, the Little Rock school board made a pledge to "assume...
the responsibility of undertaking and completing as expeditiously as possible the
desegregation of teachers and staff" in all schools in the district.20
NAACP attorneys, already involved in litigation over the Pupil Assignment law,
articulated the objections of the black community to the Freedom of Choice plan in the
courts. The major criticism was that the plan placed an undue burden of responsibility on
black parents and students to desegregate the city's schools whilst enabling the school
board to side-step its obligation to orchestrate an active desegregation policy. Whites, given
the choice, would certainly not apply to attend black schools since it would limit their
"educational, emotional and future employment opportunities of participating in the white
world" NAACP attorneys contended. Whites attending black schools would be stigmatised
for breaking racial mores and would receive an inherently inferior education since, as the
United States Supreme Court affirmed in the Brown decision, black schools were not equal
to those which whites attended. The only chance for any desegregation would be for blacks
to apply to attend "white" schools. Again, existing racial mores mitigated against this.
Many in the black community did not want to put their children through the ordeal of being
the ones to push the process of integration forward. Doing so might also risk economic
pressures or physical intimidation from whites. Black students, who would inevitably be in
20 Jbid April 23, 1965.
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a minority in white schools, would have to face the ordeal of desegregation in relative
isolation; they would also have to leave behind the existing security of friendships already
formed in the "black" schools system. Moreover, there was a higher chance of academic
failure in white schools since on average the equivalent grades were two years in advance
of black schools. By adopting a so-called Freedom of Choice plan, the school board were
in fact relying on existing social pressures that would give black and white students
practically no choice at all in the matter.21
NAACP attorneys argued that the Freedom of Choice plan was unconstitutional
since it practically enabled the Little Rock school system to maintain a dual school system.
Furthermore, they contended, this was exactly what the school board wished to achieve,
and had done so ever since Virgil Blossom reluctantly drew up the original plans for the
token integration of Little Rock schools. Each proceeding superintendent of schools had
publicly extolled their opposition to desegregation on a large scale. Yet, the NAACP
attorneys argued, "tokenism does not change the character of the schools system" and
without further efforts to integrate more white and black students in truly interracial schools
the pretence of desegregation would continue to be a sham. Can the board operate a dual
school system? NAACP attorneys asked. Will the plan afford the relief to students to which
[under Brown] they are entitled to? What immediate steps are required of the school board
to comply with Brown? Answering these questions would show that the plan was clearly
unconstitutional. Rather, what the black community wanted was a plan that would
"generally reassign all pupils to schools nearest their residence." On this basis, given the
interracial nature of several neighbourhoods, meaningful desegregation could then take
place.22 In 1970 the U.S. Eighth Circuit Appeals Court ruled both the Freedom of Choice
and Pupil Assignment plan unconstitutional. A year later the first plans to "bus" black
21 Ibid., May 23, 1965.
22 Ibid.
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students to "white" schools and white students to "black" schools were introduced, thus
embarking upon yet another new phase of desegregation implementation.23
The trend in housing patterns in Little Rock toward racial segregation, with whites
moving to the west of the city and blacks being moved to the east, continued to cause
concern in the black community. On the one hand, urban renewal seemed to target
interracial neighbourhoods in particular for demolition, while on the other hand, despite its
prohibition by federal government in 1962, public housing projects remained segregated.
CoCA raised these concerns in 1964 when the Little Rock Housing Authority proposed to
demolish one of the few remaining interracial neighbourhoods at University Park in west
Little Rock, where there were 231 white and 100 black family homes. CoCA claimed that
the clearance project was designed specifically to force blacks out of west Little Rock and
turn the area into "a white preserve." Certainly, not all houses there seemed to come under
the description of slum housing. The home of Edward Moore, a successful black
businessman who had lived in the area all his life, was valued at $35,000 with nine rooms,
air conditioning and an expensively tiled front entrance hail. Under the urban renewal plan,
Moore's home would be demolished and he would be forced to relocate, most probably to
a black neighbourhood in the east of the city. Although CoCA and the ACHR were
successful in arranging a federal government investigator to the city, the results were
disappointing. Lawrence Duncan, assistant to the urban renewal commissioner in the
Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency, told CoCA that in consultation with the
LRHA they had agreed that some black families might be allowed to stay under "certain
conditions." These conditions involved vacating the property for 8 to 10 months while
renewal work was carried out in the area, paying towards the costs of improvements and
making whatever improvements to their property that might be necessary to meet the new
23 Robert L. Brown, "Thc Second Crisis of Little Rock: A Report on Desegregation Within the Little
Rock Public Schools," June 1988, in the "Arkansas Collection," Special Collections Division, University
of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
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standards of the area. These harsh conditions virtually ensured that blacks would move out
of the area. With apparent federal complicity, the LRHA continued to actively engineer
residential segregation in the city and surrounding areas.24
As with the desegregation of the city's schools in the late 1960s, the trend towards
segregated housing patterns would only end if blacks took the initiative. Whites were
hardly going to move into a black neighbourhood, both because of existing racial mores
and the fact that much of the housing in black areas remained substandard. Blacks faced a
series of barriers if they wanted to buy a house in a white neighbourhood. For a start,
houses in white areas were generally more expensive, and since blacks held lower paying
jobs simple matters of economics generally prohibited the move. For those who could
afford the prices, white estate agents, who alone handled white properties, would only
show prospective black customers housing in designated "black" areas. White homeowners
largely refused to sell properties to blacks, either from overt prejudice or peer group
pressure from other families: if blacks moved into a neighbourhood, house prices would
plummet. The very few who made it through the obstacle course faced being socially
ostracised, both in terms of their physical distance from the black community and the
unwelcoming tone of white neighbours. When John Walker bought a house in white west
Little Rock in 1965 a can of paint was hurled through the front window and the shrubbery
set on fire before the family even moved in. After taking up residence, no more incidents
occurred, but neighbours simply refused to acknowledge the family's presence. Few
blacks, even if they possessed the money and could cut through the rampant discrimination
in the job market, wanted to live under such conditions.25
Developments in housing patterns had important ramifications in other areas of
black progress. In concentrating the black and white population in two separate halves of
24 Arkansas Gazette, October 16, 1964.
25 Ibid., "Race and Residence," articles, April 8-17, 1966.
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the city, facilities such as parks and schools became practically segregated by custom rather
than law since blacks and whites quite naturally tended to use facilities closest to their own
neighbourhoods. By the late 1960s, the impact of functional housing segregation on school
attendance was becoming clear. In 1966, using the Missouri Pacific railroad tracks as the
dividing line between east and west of the city, the Arkansas Gazette outlined the shift in
schools and pupils that had taken place since 1950. The number of whites attending
elementary schools east of the tracks had dropped from 2,722 to 1,022, while the number
of blacks increased from 2,197 to 4,216. West of the tracks, the 4,352 whites attending
schools had grown to 7,417 while the numbers of blacks had grown slightly from 340 to
576 because of the one remaining black school there. In east Little Rock, the number of
schools with white students dropped from 6 to 2, with all-black schools rising from 14 to
24.26
 Since the change in city government from wards elected by individual districts to the
city manager board elected by a city-wide vote had taken place in 1957, blacks did not even
benefit politically from their numerical concentration. Indeed, in 1970, a suit was launched
to try and gain more representation in the city for so-called "ghetto voting areas." These
areas comprised 68% of the city's blacks (out of a 23% city-wide black population), which
had poorer quality housing and only two-thirds of the average median family salary for the
city, with 85% in non-supervisory, blue collar labour. Over represented in all the indicators
for a poorer standard living, blacks held no positions on the city managerial board and
therefore had virtually no say in city politics that held the potential to address these
problems.27
The continued lack of progress in areas of perceived importance such as
employment, education, and housing, opened up a new phase of youth-led black activism
that became increasingly vociferous and militant in the late 1960s. The first indication of
rising black discontents came alter the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on
26 Ibid., April 8, 1966.
27 Ibid., July 5, 1970.
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April 4, 1968. The day after the assassination a group of Philander Smith students marched
peacefully to the state capitol singing "We Shall Overcome." By the time that students
arrived back on campus the mood of calm was beginning to change, with the presence of a
police car nearby provoking growing unrest. President of the college Dr. Ernest T. Dixon
urged students to go about their daily business or file into the Wesleyan Chapel Methodist
Church next to campus where a memorial service for Dr. King was being held. Dixon
warned students not to demonstrate or do anything to fan the flames of a potentially
"explosive situation." Indicating that the students should be submissive to the feelings of
the white population, he told them "Sometimes you've got to eat cheese." At the church
service a young black student took the rostrum and urged defiance. "We tried to be nice"
the student told the assembly, "The white man had his chance to make this thing equal and
he blew his chance... If you let the white man beat on you, and not do anything about it,
he'll beat on you again." The speech was greeted by roars of approval from the audience in
a standing ovation.28
Frustration turned to violence in August 1968 after the killing of a black 16 year-old
youth, Cecil Ingram, Jr., at the County Penal Farm. The official line was that the inmate,
who was serving a six-month sentence for violating the state drug abuse control act, was
killed in a scuffle with a trusty of the County Penal Farm after he had attacked him with a
"three-foot stick." However, KOKY-Little Rock produced two anonymous witnesses, who
the station claimed were former prisoners, to tell a very different story. According to them,
Ingram had been attacked on the orders of a paid guard after he had complained of being ill
and had asked permission to return to barracks. A new community group, Black United
Youth (BUY) announced that they would lead a march to the Little Rock courthouse to
demonstrate against what they believed to be Ingram's murder. On the way into town,
several windows of white downtown business were smashed by marchers. The heavy
28 Ibid., April 6, 1968.
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police presence as a result of these incidents further fuelled tensions. The situation quickly
deteriorated into a full-scale riot with reports of stone-throwing, window-breaking and
attacks on cars. When fires were lit and looting began, 500 National Guardsmen were
called out by Governor Rockefeller, who flew back to the city from the Republican
National Convention at Miami Beach. By imposing a curfew and maintaining a heavy
police presence, the disturbances were finally subdued. Sporadic outbreaks of violence
over the next few days, however, continued to cause widespread disruption in downtown
areas.29
In an effort to resolve the situation William Walker, state director of the OEO,
arranged a public meeting at which representatives of BUY and other members of the black
community could put questions to the Mayors of Little Rock and North Little Rock. At the
meeting BUY put forward a three-page document of grievances, including demands for
more black representation in city government, more blacks on the city police force and
civilian review boards to investigate police brutality charges. Little was achieved as white
officials simply stone-walled on black demands.30
The presence of a militant black organisation that could mobiise angry black youths
proved disconcerting to many in the white community. As in other cities, authorities
quickly moved to stamp out what they perceived to be a threat to law and order, through
any means available. BUY's activities were dealt a severe blow in July 1969 when its
president Bobby Brown and another member, James Edward Perkins, were charged with
armed robbery. Brown and Perkins stood accused of stealing guns, ammunition, an
overnight case and some jewellery, at gun point from a Mr. and Mrs. James Leonard. As
the case unfolded it transpired that the Leonards had themselves stolen all the items (except
the overnight bag) from Missouri, before they were allegedly stolen by Brown and
29 Ibid., August 10, August 12, 1%8.
30 Ibid., August 16, 1968.
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Perkins. The Leonards were charged with burglary and grand larceny at Sheridan,
Arkansas, where Mr. Leonard had already escaped from jail once. When John Walker, the
attorney for Brown and Perkins, asked the prosecution if the Leonards were reliable
witnesses, he was told that Mrs. Leonard probably was, but that Mr. Leonard probably
was not. Another of the contentious issues at the trial was how police knew to search the
homes of Brown and Perkins, where the allegedly stolen items had been found. The
prosecution told the court that they had been tipped off by an informant, described as a
black male "of average height and build in his mid-20s," who had infiltrated BUY on their
behalf. When the prosecution failed to identify the informant or let him take the stand,
Walker moved that the case be dismissed since the constitutional rights of his clients had
been violated by an illegal search. Judge Glover refused to dismiss the trial and upheld the
requests of the prosecution that their witness should not be called to the stand with the
words "He doesn't have to testify, Constitution or no." At the end of the trial, the case was
referred to the Grand Jury. 3 ' Before that hearing, however, the state cut a deal with Brown
and Perkins that if they agreed to leave Arkansas the case would not go to trial. In order to
avoid being convicted they agreed.32
By the late 1960s the civil rights struggle in Arkansas was moving into a new
phase. Since 1940 the main focus of black protest had been the effort to remove the legal
basis of racial discrimination. Efforts to organise and mobilise the black population as a
political force within the state had underpinned this goal. Black activists like W. H.
Flowers saw the vote as an instrument to provide political leverage with the white
community to improve the conditions of the race in the state. Coupled with local efforts,
national organisations like the NAACP paved the way to increase the number of black
voters and through the courts chiselled away at Jim Crow barriers to black advancement,
focusing in the main on educational opportunities, first in higher, then secondary
Ibid., July 9, 1969.
32 Robert Brown, interview with John Kirk, May 10, 1993, UNOHC.
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education. In the 1960s, a new wave of direct action protests challenged the segregated
order head-on by engaging in direct action tactics which brought about the desegregation of
public facilities. Yet with the legal underpinnings of segregation gone, black activists faced
a new era of complex and ambiguous race relations. The enduring legacies of black
activism were plain to see: voter registration increased rapidly, schools desegregated and
some employment opportunities, particularly in state government agencies, were being
opened up to blacks for the first time. The question was no longer where change would
occur, but to what extent and how fast. The painstaking task of consolidating the gains of
the past decades and translating them into a tangible form that could improve the conditions
of the state's black population was the legacy that a new generation of black activists faced.
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